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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis reports on five experiments that investigated the role of awareness in 
second language acquisition (SLA). Previous research has demonstrated that various 
areas of second language (L2) grammar can be acquired as result of incidental 
exposure. In addition, it has been shown that this exposure can lead to implicit 
knowledge. The results from recent experiments examining the incidental learning of 
L2 morphology, however, have found little evidence of incidental learning. 
Furthermore, what little research there is has not provided firm evidence of the nature 
of the knowledge acquired in these experiments. This thesis set out to address these 
gaps by testing the degree to which L2 inflectional morphology can be acquired as a 
result of incidental exposure, and whether the resulting knowledge is implicit or 
explicit in nature.  
 
The experiments in this thesis followed two different methodologies to address the 
issues outlined above. The first four experiments followed the artificial grammar 
learning paradigm, and the final experiment followed a self-paced reading 
methodology. In the training phase of all experiments, participants were exposed to 
an artificial language system based on Czech morphology under incidental learning 
conditions. Subjective measures of awareness and retrospective verbal reports were 
used to address awareness in all five experiments. The results of the first four 
experiments indicated that L2 case markers can be learned in the presence of low 
levels of awareness (below the threshold of verbalisation). These results were 
supported by the findings of the final experiment. However, the final experiment also 
revealed that this knowledge can be utilised automatically. Thus, the results of this 
thesis provide additional data to address the aspects of L2 grammar that can be 
acquired as a result of incidental exposure and provide further insight into the 
characteristics of the knowledge that is acquired as a result of this exposure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Since the 1960s, much research within the cognitive sciences has focused on 
the role of conscious and unconscious processes in learning. This research has 
encompassed a range of research traditions, including artificial grammar learning 
(AGL) (Reber, 1967; see Reber, 1993 for a review), serial reaction time (SRT) 
research (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; see Robertson, 2007 for a review) and the 
statistical learning paradigm, which has examined phenomena related to the learning 
of one's first language (L1) (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; see Gómez, 2007 for a 
review). Studies operating within these areas have examined the learning of a wide 
variety of stimulus materials, both arbitrary in the form of artificial grammars, and 
stimuli that are more reflective of naturally occurring languages. This research has 
contributed to our understanding of the mechanisms of learning, as well as the 
constraints thereof. For instance, studies following the artificial grammar learning 
paradigm have been remarkably consistent in indicating that mere exposure to an 
artificial grammar results in a knowledge base that is largely tacit in nature (Reber, 
1993; cf. Perruchet, 2008). Thus, this research has provided some evidence regarding 
the degree to which adults are able to develop knowledge of the grammatical 
regularities and patterns subsumed within the underlying structure of input without 
conscious awareness of having done so.1 
                                                     
1 However, the exact nature of the knowledge that is acquired as a result of exposure to input in AGL 
studies has been a matter of fierce debate. See Perruchet (2008) and Section 3.1 for discussions. 
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Within the field of second language acquisition (SLA), interest in conscious 
and unconscious processes of learning came to the fore following several theories set 
down by Stephen Krashen (1982). Among Krashen’s claims were arguments for two 
disparate learning processes in language learning: a conscious process that results in a 
conscious knowledge base, and an unconscious process that results in an unconscious 
knowledge base. Furthermore, Krashen postulated that explicit language instruction 
and metalinguistic awareness play little to no role in the acquisition process. These 
ideas sparked a great deal of empirical research into the effects of language 
instruction and the role of awareness in SLA, the results of which largely ran counter 
to many of Krashen’s arguments. As an example, a wealth of studies has consistently 
demonstrated that higher levels of conscious awareness facilitate the learning of a 
second language (L2) (Alanen, 1995; Brooks & Kempe, 2013; DeKeyser, 1995; 
Grey, Williams, & Rebuschat, 2014, 2015; Hama & Leow, 2010; Leow, 1997, 2000, 
2001; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012; Rosa & Leow, 2004; Rosa & O’Neill, 1999; 
Robinson, 1997, 2002, 2005; Williams, 2005).  
Although there is now broad agreement concerning the facilitating effects of 
increased levels of conscious awareness, questions regarding implicit and explicit 
processes and products remain thorny topics within the SLA literature (Hama & 
Leow, 2010; Leow, 2015a, 2015b; Leow & Hama, 2013; Leung & Williams, 2011, 
2012, 2014; Schmidt, 2010; Truscott & Sharwood Smith, 2011; Williams, 2005). 
Within this debate, recent years have seen a shift away from examining the role of 
awareness in the learning process towards gauging the conscious status of knowledge 
acquired as result of different learning conditions (see Rebuschat, 2013; Rebuschat & 
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Williams, 2012 for examples). Work in this area has included theoretical elaborations 
on the defining characteristics of explicit versus implicit knowledge (R. Ellis, 2004, 
2005), as well as the development and refinement of a number of instruments 
designed to determine whether knowledge is implicit or explicit in nature (R. Ellis et 
al., 2009; Rebuschat, 2013; see Section 2.3 for a discussion of the characteristics of 
implicit versus explicit knowledge, and Section 3.5 for a discussion of the 
measurement of implicit versus explicit knowledge). 
In summary, despite the fact that it is now well established that awareness and 
explicit instruction facilitate adult SLA, interest in topics related to implicit and 
explicit learning and the development of implicit and explicit knowledge continues to 
the present day. This interest has been sustained for a number of reasons. Firstly, on a 
theoretical level, the development and measurement of implicit and explicit 
knowledge is important because understanding the manner in which knowledge 
develops could shed light on how various aspects of languages are learned, how this 
knowledge is represented within memory systems, and how this knowledge manifests 
in L2 performance. Secondly, with regard to the role of awareness in the learning 
process, as noted above, it is now well established that awareness is facilitative to the 
learning process. However, it is also generally accepted that most language learning, 
both L1 and L2, takes place incidentally (Mitchell, Myles, & Marsden, 2013; 
VanPatten & Williams, 2007, 2015); in other words, without intention and as a result 
of processing input for meaning. Despite this, research has pointed to limits regarding 
the aspects of language learners appear to acquire on their own as a result of 
incidental exposure (Long, 2015; Schmidt, 2010; VanPatten, 2004a). As such, 
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research in this area might serve to elucidate the constraints concerning what might 
be learned as a result of exposure to input, and to identify areas in which instructional 
intervention might be required. 
The objective of the present thesis is two-fold. Firstly, this thesis sets out to 
examine whether L2 case markings, an area of grammar that is notoriously difficult 
for L2 learners to acquire (Larsen-Freeman, 2010; Long, 2015), can be learned under 
incidental learning conditions and to uncover the role of awareness in this process. 
For this purpose, a novel, semi-artificial language based on Czech was developed (see 
Section 1.3 for a brief overview of Czech case marking and Chapter 3 for a full 
discussion of the stimuli used in this thesis). Secondly, this thesis aims to reach a 
better understanding of the characteristics of the knowledge resulting from incidental 
exposure, in particular, to establish whether the resulting knowledge is implicit or 
explicit in nature. To do so, this thesis incorporates a number of methodological 
improvements to previous research. Specifically, this thesis incorporates a variety of 
instruments that are designed to differentiate between conscious and unconscious 
knowledge. By so doing, data concerning the conscious status of knowledge can be 
triangulated from multiple sources. This will allow for a more valid, and refined, view 
of the type of knowledge resulting from incidental exposure. 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction and 
the operationalisations of a number of key terms that are used extensively throughout 
this thesis as well as a brief introduction to Czech morphology. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 
provide the background to the present investigation. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
underpinnings of this study. Specifically, it discusses the prevalent models of 
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attention and awareness in SLA, sets out the defining characteristics of implicit and 
explicit knowledge, and provides an overview of the theoretical models that account 
for how implicit and explicit knowledge interface in their development. Chapter 3 has 
a methodological focus, and represents an overview of the two research paradigms 
that are germane to the present thesis: the artificial grammar learning paradigm and 
the serial reaction time paradigm. This chapter concludes with a critical evaluation of 
the instruments used to measure implicit and explicit knowledge within these 
paradigms. Chapter 4 then focuses on the literature relevant to the processing and 
acquisition of L2 case markers, and concludes with the research questions of the 
present thesis. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 represent empirical chapters, in which the findings from a 
series of five experiments are presented. Chapter 5 reports on the results of two pilot 
studies conducted for the present thesis. The purpose of these pilot studies was, 
firstly, to test and validate the experimental materials and procedures and, secondly, 
to establish an initial learning effect among the participants. Chapter 6 examines the 
main experiments in this thesis, which followed the same research model as the 
previous two pilot studies. Chapter 6 consists of two experiments, Experiment 1 and 
its replication, Experiment 2. Chapter 7 then describes Experiment 3, which set out to 
address the same research questions as the previous experiments using a different 
research methodology, namely a self-paced reading task. Finally, Chapter 8 presents 
the conclusion of this thesis. It includes a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the results of the five experiments discussed in this thesis, as well as 
possible directions for future research. 
20 
 
In the following section, several key items of terminology are discussed. 
These items are related to the role of consciousness in learning and are used 
extensively in this thesis. The following section is not intended to provide an in-depth 
discussion of these concepts, but rather to situate and operationalise these terms 
concisely and clearly as they are used throughout the present thesis. Beginning with 
clear definitions is particularly important when we take into account that differences 
in how researchers have operationalised many of these key concepts have contributed 
to the contentious nature of the ongoing debate on the role of consciousness in SLA 
(Dörnyei, 2009; Hulstijn, 2007; Leow, 2015a; Schmidt, 1995). I begin by briefly 
outlining previous attempts to arrive at a suitable 'blanket' definition for 
consciousness and its sundry sub-processes. Following this, further 
operationalisations are provided for the concepts that have dominated much of the 
debate within SLA, such as the distinction between implicit and explicit learning. 
1.1. Key Concepts 
 
1.1.1. Consciousness 
 
There has long been a preoccupation with consciousness within the Western 
tradition (Baars, 1988). Attempts to come to an understanding of this term, as well as 
to flesh out what it means ‘to be’, can be found from the time of Plato’s Republic (c. 
380 BC) to Descartes (c. 1640) and William James (1890), as well as many others in 
between. This interest continues to the present day, and has expanded beyond the 
borders of philosophy; it continues to be a current topic in a wide range of academic 
fields concerned with human cognition. As an illustration, several journals are 
focused directly on issues of consciousness within the field of cognitive psychology 
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alone (such as Consciousness and Cognition and the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies). In addition, within this same field, recent years have seen a number of full-
length manuscripts and reference books devoted to issues related to the relationship 
between human consciousness and cognition published (Bayne, Cleeremans, & 
Wilken, 2009; Blackmore, 2010; Velmans, 1996, 2009b; Velmans & Schneider, 
2007; Zelazo, Moscovitch, & Thompson, 2007). 
But what, exactly, does it mean to be conscious? The term consciousness, 
although seemingly a basic concept, has proved tricky to define. Within philosophy, 
proposed definitions have included associating consciousness with thought and the 
mind (for example, Descartes, 2010), or more recently, defining consciousness 
broadly in relation to subjective, personal experience (Nagel, 1974). Despite these 
attempts to define consciousness in global terms, there has been little agreement to 
date on the “core meaning” of consciousness. There does, however, appear to be 
consensus in that consciousness, and the concomitant features associated with 
consciousness, are a central aspect of being human (Velmans, 2009a, 2009b).  
Although there have been a number of proposed definitions and theoretical 
accounts for consciousness, the most influential within cognitive psychology and 
SLA have been reductionist in nature. In other words, rather than attempting to 
broadly account for all aspects of human consciousness, these models have narrowed 
their focus to the relationship between consciousness and aspects of information 
processing (Baars, 1988, 1997a, 1997b; Block, 1996; 2007; Cleeremans, 2014; 
Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002; Searle, 2007; Schacter, 1989). Among these models, 
Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 1997a, 1997b) has arguably been the most 
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influential on SLA. In this model, consciousness is defined as being the “facility for 
accessing, disseminating and exchanging information, and for exercising global 
coordination and control" (Baars, 1997b, p. 19). Within Global Workspace Theory, 
consciousness can be seen as being a central aspect of both general cognitive 
processes and of language. 
Despite adopting a reductionist view of consciousness, there is still 
considerable controversy and disagreement concerning how to define and 
operationalise this term within the field of SLA. This disagreement can partly be 
attributed to the fact that consciousness is not a unitary construct, but is comprised of 
several sub-processes, such as attention, awareness, intentionality, and knowledge 
(Cleeremans & Jimenez, 2002; Schmidt, 1990, 1994a; see Velmans, 2009b for a full 
discussion), each of which has also proven difficult to define and operationalise (see 
discussion below). In an attempt to move the debate forward, several researchers 
(Leow, 2002) have suggested dropping consciousness as a blanket term to cover all of 
these sub-processes. In this thesis, I follow this suggestion and refer to a specific sub-
process, such as awareness, where relevant. Where the term consciousness is used, it 
is used in the everyday sense of being synonymous with awareness. Constructs 
related to the sub-processes of attention, awareness, intentionality, and knowledge are 
further discussed and operationalised below. 
1.1.2. Intentional versus Incidental Learning 
 
Concerning intentionality, the constructs of incidental and intentional learning 
have garnered considerable attention in SLA (Hulstijn, 2003). Firstly, intentional 
learning is learning that occurs with intent. An example of intentional learning in an 
23 
 
instructed setting would be students trying to learn a set of descriptive L2 
grammatical rules in a language classroom. In experimental contexts, intentional 
learning has also been operationalised as a “rule-search” training condition in which 
participants do not receive direct instruction, but are informed of the existence of a 
rule or rules and are given the task of discovering these rules during the exposure 
phase of the experiment (Rebuschat, 2008; Robinson, 1996). What these two 
examples have in common is that both the students receiving instruction in the 
classroom and the participants in the rule-search condition are aware that there are 
features that they should be learning and, furthermore, are typically given the task of 
trying to learn these features.  
Less straightforward than intentional learning is the term incidental learning. 
A basic definition would be that incidental learning refers to learning that occurs 
without intent. A narrower definition of this term was proposed by Schmidt (1994a) 
as the learning "of one thing (e.g., grammar) when the learner's primary objective is 
to do something else (e.g., communicate)"(p. 16). An example of this might be 
someone who picks up a new word or phrase as a result of engaging in active 
communication (Hulstijn, 2013). From a methodological perspective, incidental 
learning has been operationalised as an experimental condition in which participants 
are not informed that they will be tested later in the experiment (Hulstijn, 2003, 2013; 
Williams, 2009). Frequently, experiments operating in this area also include a cover 
story, or task in their training conditions, which is designed to orient participants' 
attention towards the meaning of the input, rather than towards the grammatical 
features that will later be tested (see, for example, the plausibility judgement task in 
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Rebuschat & Williams, 2012, or the discussion of supraliminal tasks in Shanks & St. 
John, 1994).  
It is important to stress, however, that incidental learning conditions do not 
control or guarantee that learners will necessarily learn incidentally (Schmidt, 1993). 
Several studies have demonstrated that some learners may employ intentional 
learning strategies even under incidental learning conditions (Alanen, 1995; 
DeKeyser, 1995; Leow, 1998, 2000; Robinson, 1996, 1997). As such, incidental 
learning is operationalised here in a strictly methodological sense―specifically, as an 
experimental condition designed to influence the manner in which participants 
approach the task(s), and consequently process the input, in the training phase of an 
experiment.  
1.1.3. Attention and Awareness 
 
The most influential model of attention and awareness in SLA stems from 
Schmidt's noticing hypothesis (1990, 1993, 1994a, 1995, 2001, 2010). In this model, 
Schmidt differentiates between two levels of awareness that are argued to be 
facilitative for the learning process (Schmidt, 1994a). Firstly, awareness at the level 
of noticing (henceforth noticing) refers to a lower level of awareness that involves the 
conscious registration of surface features of the input. For Schmidt (1995), this level 
of awareness is largely isomorphic with focal attention. Next, reflecting a higher level 
of awareness, awareness at the level of understanding reflects awareness that includes 
rule and/or metalinguistic knowledge. Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis, together with 
other influential models of attention and awareness in SLA (Robinson, 1995; Tomlin 
& Villa, 1994) will be discussed further in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1). 
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1.1.4. Implicit versus Explicit Learning 
Two types of learning are directly related to the issue of awareness in SLA: 
implicit and explicit learning. The term implicit learning is often conflated with 
incidental learning (Hulstijn, 2007; Leow, 2015a). This confusion can be partly 
attributed to the fact that implicit learning is learning that also takes place 
incidentally; that is, without intention. However, implicit learning is further 
characterised by a lack of awareness throughout the learning process (Williams, 
2009). From a methodological perspective, when learning incidentally, participants 
may or may not become aware of the linguistic focus of the experiment. The key 
criterion when learning implicitly, on the other hand, is that participants remain 
unaware of what is being learned during the experiment. Explicit learning is often 
equated with intentional learning in that it refers to learning that occurs with intent 
and conscious awareness of what is being learned (DeKeyser, 2003). An example of 
explicit learning, as with the example of intentional learning above, would be 
scenarios in which people are deliberately trying to learn; for example, students 
studying grammatical rules on which they will later be assessed at school. 
1.1.5. Implicit versus Explicit Knowledge 
In contrast to implicit and explicit learning, which refer to the learning 
process, the terms implicit and explicit knowledge refer to the product of learning 
(Leow, 2015a, 2015b). Implicit knowledge is unconscious knowledge–in other words, 
implicit knowledge lies outside of awareness, cannot be verbalised and, as such, can 
only be inferred from behaviour (R. Ellis, 2004, 2005; Loewen, 2015; Reber, 1993). 
Explicit knowledge, then, is knowledge that we are aware we possess, that lies within 
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awareness and is often, though not always, verbalisable (DeKeyser, 2009; Dörnyei, 
2009; Reber, 1993; Williams, 2009). As noted above, although there is considerable 
debate concerning what it means to be conscious (see Velmans, 2009b), following 
DeKeyser (2009), in this thesis I treat the terms implicit as being synonymous with 
unconscious, and explicit as being synonymous with conscious. Further distinctions 
between implicit and explicit knowledge, as well as their interface, are discussed in 
Chapter 2 (see Sections 2.4-2.5). 
1.1.6. Declarative versus Procedural Knowledge 
Although often associated with skill-acquisition theory (Anderson, 1982; 
Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981), declarative and procedural knowledge are also 
important concepts that feature heavily in the debate on consciousness in SLA (R. 
Ellis, 2004, 2005). Declarative knowledge is typically defined as “knowledge that,” 
whereas procedural knowledge is “knowledge how” (DeKeyser, 2009). What this 
means is that declarative knowledge is factual knowledge, such as knowing how 
many degrees there are in a right angle, or being able to describe how one rides a 
bicycle. Procedural knowledge, on the other hand, could represent motor skills, such 
as how to actually ride a bicycle in practice, or mental skills, such as how to solve 
geometrical problems (DeKeyser, 2001; 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; 2009). Although 
declarative/procedural knowledge is often confused with explicit/implicit knowledge, 
these terms are not isomorphic (DeKeyser, 2009; DeKeyser & Juffs, 2005; Reber, 
Allen, & Reber, 1999; Reber & Squire, 1999; Squire & Knowlton, 2000; Ullman, 
2005; Williams, 2009). A key difference is that while explicit / implicit knowledge is 
considered to be represented within distinct memory systems, which may or may not 
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influence and interact with each other,2 declarative and procedural knowledge are 
seen as part of a continuum of skill development in which declarative knowledge can 
become functionally equivalent to procedural knowledge as a result of time and 
practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
2 This, of course, depends on one’s theoretical orientation regarding the interface between implicit and 
explicit knowledge. As noted above, this topic is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4 below. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Chapter 2 of this thesis provides the 
theoretical background to the present thesis, particularly with regard to issues 
surrounding the role of awareness in SLA, and the debate concerning the 
development of implicit and explicit knowledge. This chapter first briefly introduces 
Krashen's (1982) influential monitor theory before discussing more current models 
that address the role of attention and awareness in SLA, specifically Schmidt's (1990) 
noticing hypothesis, and Tomlin and Villa's (1994) model of attention in SLA. 
Following this, the focus of this chapter shifts to how implicit and explicit knowledge 
have been classified and defined in the literature. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the various interface positions that have attempted to account for the 
manner in which implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge interact in their 
development. 
Implicit learning, or learning that occurs without intention and in the absence 
of awareness of what has been learned (Perruchet, 2008; Reber, 1993; Shanks & St. 
John, 1994; Williams, 2009), has been argued to bear on many areas of everyday life. 
For instance, the mastery of social skills is generally acknowledged to develop 
implicitly (Perruchet, 2008; Reber, 1993). There also is substantial experimental 
evidence confirming that people can acquire unconscious knowledge of complex 
artificial grammars solely as a result of exposure to input (see Cleeremans, 
Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998 and Reber 1989, 1993, for reviews). With regard to 
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language learning, first language (L1) acquisition is frequently cited as a process that 
occurs implicitly (N. Ellis, 2002, 2008, 2011; Long, 2007; Reber, 1967; Van den 
Branden, 2007; Wells, 1985).3 The degree to which implicit processes are involved in 
second language (L2) learning has, however, been the focal point of much debate 
within the field of second language acquisition (SLA) in recent years (Andringa & 
Rebuschat, 2015; Chaudron, 1983; DeKeyser, 1997, 2003, 2009; Dörnyei, 2009; 
Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015; N. Ellis, 2005, 2011, 2015; R. Ellis, 1994, 2015; Gass, 1997; 
Han & Finneran, 2014; Hama & Leow, 2010; Hulstijn, 2015; Krashen, 1978, 1981, 
1982, 1985; Leow, 2002, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Leow & Hama, 2013; Leung & 
Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014; Long, 1988, 1996, 2015; McLaughlin, 1990a; Paradis, 
2004, 2009; Rebuschat, 2015a; Robinson, 1995; Robinson, Mackey, Gass, & 
Schmidt, 2012; Schmidt, 1990, 1993, 1994a, 1994b; 1995, 2001, 2010; Sharwood 
Smith, 2008; Truscott, 1998, 2015a, 2015b; Truscott & Sharwood Smith, 2011; 
Williams, 2005; see DeKeyser, 2003 & Williams, 2009, for reviews). This interest 
was largely sparked by the work of Stephen Krashen (1981, 1982, 1985). Among 
other claims, Krashen has argued that both L1 and L2 acquisition are primarily the 
result of an unconscious (implicit) process, and occur as a result of processing input 
for meaning.  
 
 
 2.1. Krashen and Monitor Theory 
 
                                                     
3 Although L1 acquisition is generally considered the result of an unconscious process, some have 
expressed quiet reservations about the empirical support underlying this assumption. For instance, 
Long (2007), in a discussion of monitor theory, notes that "children (supposedly) learn their first 
language without conscious awareness” (p. 17).  
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Building on earlier work by Corder (1967), Krashen (1978, 1981, 1982, 1985) 
distinguished between the types of knowledge acquired from two distinct processes, 
which he labelled learning and acquisition.4 Learning, in Krashen's view, is a 
conscious process characterised by learning about language and its structure (i.e., 
metalinguistic information). One might associate learning with what students learn 
within a more traditional, non-communicative, language classroom; for example, 
memorising prescriptive rules for the use of verb tenses in a foreign language. In 
contrast, acquisition is a process similar to first language acquisition in that it comes 
about as a result of exposure to input. Furthermore, and importantly, acquisition is an 
unconscious process (1982). This distinction between learning and acquisition is a 
central part of Krashen's monitor theory. In this theory, only acquisition can lead to 
communicative competence—in other words, the ability to use language 
spontaneously, freely, and fluently. The knowledge that results from learning, on the 
other hand, is knowledge about language (1985). In this view, knowledge about 
language is not directly related to communication: rather, it can only serve to monitor 
the accuracy of the language being produced. In sum, for Krashen, explicit language 
learning (as it might be referred to today) and metalinguistic awareness play little or 
no role in either the L1 or the L2 acquisition process. To be able to use a language, 
one must acquire it unconsciously, over time, and as a result of exposure to input.  
Krashen's monitor theory encountered much criticism (Gregg, 1984; Hulstijn 
& Hulstijn, 1984; Sharwood Smith, 1981), and it has been superseded by alternative 
                                                     
4 Although Krashen distinguishes between learning and acquisition, these two terms are used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis to refer to the development of L2 knowledge. Throughout this 
thesis, I use the italicised forms learning and acquisition to indicate Krashen's usage. 
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theories regarding the role of consciousness in SLA (Loewen, 2015). These include 
alternative models of attention and awareness in SLA, which are discussed in detail in 
the section below. Despite falling out of favour with present-day SLA researchers, 
Krashen's influence on the field is undeniable; his arguments about learning versus 
acquisition brought issues of attention, awareness, and types of L2 knowledge to the 
fore in SLA research. I return to some of Krashen’s arguments in Section 2.4, in 
which I discuss the interface between implicit and explicit knowledge.  
2.2. Attention and Awareness in SLA 
 
2.2.1. Schmidt's Noticing Hypothesis 
 
Running counter to previous theories (such as that of Krashen, 1981) that 
posit a minor role for conscious processes in SLA, Schmidt (1990, 1993, 1994a, 
1994b, 1995, 2001, 2010) called for a re-evaluation of the role of consciousness in 
language learning. Building upon case studies of second language learners, including 
his own experience of learning Portuguese (Schmidt, 1983; Schmidt & Frota, 1986), 
Schmidt argued that awareness is facilitative, and perhaps even necessary, in second 
language acquisition. In what is now known as the noticing hypothesis, Schmidt drew 
on a wide range of research from the cognitive sciences to develop a model to 
account for the role of awareness in SLA. There are three levels in Schmidt’s model 
of awareness. The first level, perception, is unconscious: input that is only registered 
at this level does so without any conscious awareness of the input being processed. 
Schmidt pointed out that while subtle effects on behaviour can be seen from 
information processed below the threshold of awareness, it is unclear whether these 
effects should actually be considered as learning. Furthermore, there is an absence of 
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“indisputable evidence about events near the threshold of conscious experience” 
(1993, p. 210). It should be pointed out that similar scepticism regarding the 
possibility of subliminal learning is not limited to Schmidt's noticing hypothesis: 
Whether or not learning can occur below the threshold of awareness remains a topic 
of debate in, for example, cognitive psychology (Perruchet, 2008; Shanks & St. John, 
1994). 
 Noticing (awareness at the level of noticing) is the second level in Schmidt's 
model. For Schmidt (1995), noticing is isomorphic with focal attention. It can be 
distinguished from perception in that it is marked by conscious awareness of, at least, 
the surface features of the input. Noticing has been operationalised as the “conscious 
registration of the occurrence of some event” (1995, p. 29) and is “related to rehearsal 
within working memory and the transfer of information to long-term memory, to 
intake, and to item learning” (Schmidt, 1993, p. 213). Noticing, then, represents 
awareness at a low level of abstraction, in that the objects of noticing are the surface 
features of the input, rather than underlying grammatical rules or patterns (Schmidt, 
2001). 
The final level in Schmidt’s model is understanding (awareness at the level of 
understanding). While awareness at the level of noticing may fit the common 
definition of what constitutes being "aware" of something, awareness at the level of 
understanding reflects further processes that occur within consciousness to attempt to 
explain or make sense of observed phenomena. Schmidt notes that both problem-
solving and all forms of metacognition are indicative of awareness at this level 
(Schmidt, 1990) and that awareness at this level “implies recognition of a general 
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principle, rule or pattern” (Schmidt, 1995, p. 29). Furthermore, if noticing is related to 
the transfer of information to long-term memory and item learning, then awareness at 
the level of understanding is connected to “the organization of material in long term 
memory, to restructuring, and to system learning” (Schmidt, 1993, p. 213). 
In what can be referred to as the strong form of the noticing hypothesis, 
Schmidt argued that awareness at the level of noticing is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for SLA to occur. Understanding, while perhaps not necessary, is argued to 
have a facilitating effect on SLA. This strong form of the noticing hypothesis has, 
however, encountered criticism in relation to a number of theoretical and 
methodological issues, as well as in the face of contradictory empirical findings. For 
instance, Schmidt (2001) has acknowledged that his original claim that no learning 
can occur without awareness is not falsifiable and thus cannot be tested empirically 
(Baars, 1997a; Dienes, 2008a; McLaughlin, 1990a). In addition, in opposition to 
Schmidt's claim that attention to input is a necessary condition for SLA, Gass (1997) 
has argued that not all learning appears to depend on input. Studies that have 
examined the universal relative clause accessibility hierarchy (Eckman, Bell, & 
Nelson, 1988; Gass, 1979, 1982) have indicated that, after receiving instruction on 
particular relative clause types (such as the object of a preposition), learners were able 
to generalise this knowledge to completely different relative clause forms (such as 
subject or object relative clauses) to which they had not been exposed in the input. 
This finding casts some doubt on the strong version of the noticing hypothesis 
because these data indicate learning in the absence of input. Thus, "if no input [to the 
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target structures] existed, how could attention to input be a necessary condition for all 
aspects of learning?" (Gass, 1997, p. 16). 
Given these criticisms, the strong form of the noticing hypothesis, as Schmidt 
has conceded, makes too bold a claim (Schmidt, 1995, 2001; Truscott, 1998). 
Schmidt later modified the noticing hypothesis so that awareness at the levels of both 
noticing and understanding are facilitative to SLA (Schmidt, 1994b; 1995; 2010), 
with noticing perhaps still being necessary under certain conditions; for example, 
with non-salient or redundant grammatical features (2001). It is important to reiterate 
that these arguments against the strong form of the noticing hypothesis should not be 
interpreted as casting doubt on the importance of attention and awareness in the 
process of learning a second language. Schmidt (2001, and onwards) has maintained 
his position regarding the importance of attentional processes in SLA, a view that is 
also subsumed within a number of theoretical frameworks in SLA (N. Ellis, 2005; 
Gass, 1997; Leow, 2015a, 2015b; Robinson, 1995) (this point is touched on further at 
the end of Section 2.2.2). 
2.2.2. Tomlin and Villa's Model of Attention 
Although Schmidt (1995) considered awareness at the level of noticing to be 
isomorphic with focal attention, Tomlin and Villa (1994) proposed a model of 
attention that, they argued, might lead to a better understanding of the attentional 
processes involved in SLA. The central argument of Tomlin and Villa (1994) is that 
previous theoretical formulations of attention in SLA were influenced by four 
different conceptualisations of attention:  
a) The limited capacity model (Anderson, 1983, 1990),  
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b) selective attention (Wickens, 1989),  
c) controlled versus automatic processing (McLaughlin, 1990b), and  
d) conscious regulation of attentional resources (Bialystok, 1990, 1992).  
These conceptualisations, Tomlin and Villa argued, are too "coarse-grained" in that 
they do not provide specific information as to how attention is allotted during a task. 
Drawing on the work of Posner (1988, 1990; 1992; Posner & Carr, 1992), Tomlin and 
Villa proposed a finer-grained model in which attention is not analogous to awareness 
(cf. Schmidt, 1990), and attention is not a unitary construct, but is instead comprised 
of three separate but interrelated processes.  
 Alertness, the first level in Tomlin and Villa's (1994) model, describes an 
overall mental readiness to deal with incoming information. Tomlin and Villa argued 
that it has been shown that alertness can be both assessed and manipulated under 
experimental conditions and that different levels of alertness have “differential effects 
on processing or performing tasks” (Tomlin & Villa, 1994, p. 190). In short, alertness 
is important to SLA because input is more likely to be subjected to further processing 
when learners are mentally prepared to deal with input. 
Orientation, the second level in this model, concerns the outcome of the 
allocation of attentional resources to stimulus material. It is at this stage that the 
learner “aligns” or “orients” his or her attention to a type or class of input (such as 
auditory information) at the expense of others (for example, visual information). This 
process has been argued to involve higher-level activation of schema that “may 
predispose learners to attend … to form or meaning in processing a stimulus” 
(Robinson, 1995, p. 296). Tomlin and Villa noted that input that the learner is 
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oriented towards has a greater chance of reaching detection, the next stage of 
attention. This does not preclude the possibility of stimuli that occur outside of 
orientation reaching the stage of detection: Stimuli that do not receive attentional 
orientation may still be detected, but the possibility of this occurring is inhibited and 
would require a substantial amount of effort on the part of the learner.  
Detection is the final stage of Tomlin and Villa’s model. Unlike orientation, in 
which a learner aligns his or her attention with a particular type or class of stimuli, 
detection is the process “that selects, or engages, a particular and specific bit of 
information” (Tomlin & Villa, 1994, p. 192). Detection consumes additional 
attentional resources and enables “further processing of a stimulus…such as storage 
and rehearsal in short-term memory” (Robinson, 1995, p. 296). In summary, detection 
represents the cognitive registration of stimuli and, as Tomlin and Villa argued, it is at 
the level of detection that language acquisition must take place. Furthermore, it is 
detection alone that is necessary for the further processing of incoming stimuli. The 
levels of alertness and orientation can increase the probability that detection will take 
place, but neither of these two levels is necessary. 
As previously mentioned, Schmidt (1995) considered noticing to be 
isomorphic with focal attention. As such, it would appear that detection, in Tomlin 
and Villa's model, can be seen as roughly analogous to awareness at the level of 
noticing in Schmidt’s model (1990, 1995, 2001). It is important to note that, unlike 
Schmidt's noticing hypothesis, none of the levels in Tomlin and Villa's model, 
including detection, requires awareness. Similarly, Robinson (1995) has pointed out 
that there is “considerable evidence indicating that information can be cognitively 
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detected, even though the individual is not aware its having occurred” (p. 193). This 
represents the central difference between Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis and Tomlin 
and Villa’s model. In the latter model, learning can take place outside of conscious 
awareness, whereas the strong version of Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis does not 
allow for this possibility. In order to reconcile these differences, Robinson (1995) 
proposed redefining the concept of noticing to “detection plus rehearsal in short-term 
memory, prior to encoding in long-term memory” (p. 296). Noticing can thus refer to 
exemplars that are detected in Tomlin and Villa’s model, and can then be “further 
activated following the allocation of attentional resources from a central executive” 
(Robinson, 1995, p. 297). In this view, awareness remains the defining characteristic 
of noticing and, furthermore, clearly delineates the constructs of noticing and 
detection. 
2.2.3. Summary 
Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis and Tomlin and Villa’s model of attention are 
concerned with the role of attention and awareness in the learning process. For 
Schmidt (1990, and onwards), attention is considered identical to awareness in the 
form of noticing, and awareness at the level of noticing plays a facilitative and, at 
times, vital role in SLA. By contrast, in Tomlin and Villa's model, detection is 
considered sufficient for learning to take place, and detection can occur on both a 
conscious and on an unconscious level. In other words, awareness is divorced from 
attention, and awareness is not necessary for SLA to take place. Despite various 
attempts to reconcile the differences between these two models in a single framework 
(Robinson, 1995; Schmidt, 2001; Truscott, 2015a, 2015b; Truscott & Sharwood 
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Smith, 2011), the role of consciousness in SLA remains a current topic of interest 
within SLA (see Andringa & Rebuschat, 2015; Rebuschat, 2015a; Williams, 2012). 
In addition to examining the role of attention and awareness at the point of learning, 
recent years have seen an increased focus on the conscious status of linguistic 
knowledge; in other words, whether L2 knowledge gained through various 
interventions is implicit or explicit in nature. The next section addresses an area 
central to this thorny area of enquiry: the differentiating characteristics of implicit 
versus explicit knowledge, and the operationalisation of these two terms within SLA. 
2.3. Nature of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge 
As noted in Section 2.2, Krashen (1981, 1982, 2003) distinguished between 
two independent learning processes; learning, which is a conscious process, and 
unconscious acquisition. Furthermore, as part of this argument, Krashen maintained 
that the conscious process of learning results in a conscious knowledge base, namely 
explicit knowledge. According to Krashen, one example of this conscious knowledge 
is metalinguistic knowledge, or knowledge about the rules of language. Importantly, 
for Krashen, the conscious knowledge resulting from learning is not available for 
spontaneous communication: It can only serve as a monitor of language being 
produced. In contrast to learning, acquisition is an unconscious process that comes 
about solely as a result of exposure to input. Furthermore, acquisition results in an 
unconscious knowledge base of implicit knowledge that can be used for spontaneous, 
free language production (Krashen, 1982). 
As noted in Section 2.1, much of Krashen’s work, such as his distinction 
between learning and acquisition, no longer represents received views within the 
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field of SLA. However, some of Krashen's arguments do remain topics of debate. For 
example, his claims for a relationship (or lack thereof) between conscious and 
unconscious knowledge continue to garner interest within SLA. This interest has 
mainly taken the form of theoretical accounts that attempt to map the respective roles 
of implicit and explicit learning in second language development (see N. Ellis, 2005; 
R. Ellis, 1994; Han & Finneran, 2014; Paradis, 2009).  
Of particular importance to this debate is the definition and operationalisation 
of implicit and explicit knowledge, and how these two types of knowledge are 
manifested within linguistic performance. As noted in Section 1.2, implicit and 
explicit knowledge are often operationalised and defined, as is the case in this thesis, 
as being unconscious/conscious types of knowledge, respectively. Recent years have, 
however, seen attempts to elaborate on the operational characteristics of implicit 
versus explicit knowledge (DeKeyser, 2009; R. Ellis, 2004, 2005; R. Ellis et al., 
2009; Reber, 1993). For example, it has been argued that implicit and explicit 
knowledge also differ in their degree of verbalisability, learnability, and automaticity. 
In addition, it has been postulated that implicit and explicit knowledge differ with 
regard to how they are utilised, depending on the nature of the task at hand. In the 
next section, I will elaborate further on these contrasting features of implicit and 
explicit knowledge. 
2.3.1. Consciousness 
As mentioned previously, implicit knowledge is tacit knowledge (R. Ellis et 
al., 2009; Reber, 1993; Rebuschat, 2013; Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990; Shanks & 
St. John, 1994). In other words, it represents knowledge that we are not aware that we 
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possess. Conversely, knowledge can be considered explicit if we are aware that we 
possess it. During performance, implicit knowledge is commonly realised through 
feelings of intuition (Dienes, 2008b, 2010; Dienes & Scott, 2005). Explicit 
knowledge, on the other hand, is often evinced through the use of conscious 
knowledge of, for example, an underlying grammatical system. This conscious 
knowledge can be partial, in the form of bigrams and trigrams of an artificial 
grammar system (Perruchet, 2008; see Section 3.1 for a brief discussion), or complete 
in the form of abstract rule knowledge of the underlying structure or principles 
governing a linguistic system (see Pothos, 2007; Reber, 1967, 1969, 1976; Shanks, 
2005). A classic illustration of this distinction is how native speakers might judge the 
grammaticality of a sentence (R. Ellis et al., 2009). When confronted with the 
ungrammatical sentence He has gone to the store last week, a native speaker of 
English would know that something is wrong with it. If you asked this native speaker 
how he or she knows that this sentence is ungrammatical, the expected response 
would be that it just sounds, or feels, incorrect. In other words, a native speaker 
would rely on implicit knowledge, realised in the feeling of intuition, to make this 
judgement. Conversely, a native speaker with more metalinguistic knowledge, such 
as linguists or EFL teachers, would know that the present perfect construction 
typically refers to events that occurred at an unspecified time in the past. In this case, 
the knowledge here would be conscious in that the native speaker is aware that he or 
she knows the rule that he or she is using to judge the sentence’s grammaticality.5 
                                                     
5 To cloud this issue further, however, this native speaker would be in possession of both implicit 
knowledge as a result of learning the L1, and explicit knowledge as a result of studying grammatical 
rules. It is possible that a native speaker in this situation could rely on his or her implicit knowledge to 
judge the sentence, and later use his explicit, metalinguistic knowledge to justify his or her previous 
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2.3.2. Verbalisability 
Closely related to consciousness, verbalisability has historically been the 
operationalisation most commonly used to determine whether knowledge is implicit 
or explicit in nature (Baars, 1988; Rebuschat, 2013; Seth, Baars, & Edelman, 2005). 
If knowledge is implicit, then it is not verbalisable. As in the example in Section 
2.3.2, a native speaker without formal linguistic training would base his or her 
decision on feeling and would not be able to explain the grammatical rule 
shepherding his or her decision. Implicit knowledge, then, can only be inferred from 
behaviour—in this case, by observing the native speaker’s performance, we can infer 
that some knowledge is driving his or her (accurate) decisions. By logical extension, 
then, explicit knowledge is verbalisable to some degree, whether in the form of a 
complete rule or a partial rule, and can be expressed in technical or layman’s terms 
(Loewen, 2015). Despite its long use as a criterion for implicitness in the cognitive 
sciences, verbalisability has been criticised on methodological, although not 
necessarily theoretical, grounds (Leow, 2002; Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Schmidt, 
1994a; Shanks & St. John, 1994). I will return to these criticisms related to the 
measurement of implicit and explicit knowledge in Section 3.5. 
2.3.3. Automaticity 
Another operational distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge lies 
in the relative automaticity of these two types of knowledge (DeKeyser, 2009). 
Explicit knowledge has been argued to consist of facts, or rules, such as 
metalinguistic knowledge of grammatical rule systems. Furthermore, explicit 
                                                     
(implicit) judgment (see Section 2.3.6 below for a brief discussion of how task demands influence the 
type of knowledge utilised by the learner). 
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knowledge is available for controlled processing; that is, explicit knowledge can be 
accessed less quickly than is implicit knowledge, and, it is argued can only be utilised 
when sufficient time is provided to access it. Conversely, implicit knowledge has 
been argued to be available for automatic, spontaneous processing (Bialystok, 1982; 
R. Ellis, 2004, 2005). In other words, parallels have been drawn between explicit and 
declarative knowledge, as well as between implicit and procedural knowledge. 
However, implicit/explicit knowledge is not synonymous with procedural/declarative 
knowledge. These terms have developed via different theoretical frameworks (this 
point is discussed further in Section 2.4). For example, declarative/procedural 
knowledge is thought to operate along a continuum on which declarative knowledge 
can be transformed into procedural knowledge as a result of practice (Anderson, 
1982, 1992, 2000; Anderson & Schunn, 2000; Carlson, 2003; DeKeyser, 1997; 1998, 
2007b; R. Ellis, 1993). Implicit and explicit knowledge, on the other hand, are 
generally regarded as distinct systems, the interface of which is a matter of much 
debate in SLA (see Section 2.4, and Robinson et al. 2012, for a concise review).  
2.3.4. Learnability 
Still another operational difference between implicit and explicit knowledge 
has been argued to be the degree to which these various types of knowledge develop 
in adult learners of an L2. Here, learnability should not be interpreted following 
Krashen’s distinction between learning and acquisition (see Section 1.2). To say that 
explicit knowledge is more learnable than implicit knowledge means that there appear 
to be fewer limitations to the development of explicit knowledge compared to the 
development of implicit knowledge. There are two issues at play with regard to the 
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learnability of implicit versus explicit knowledge. The first concerns limits on the 
acquisition of implicit and explicit knowledge in  light of individual difference 
variables such as age and aptitude. This argument has largely arisen out of the 
putative constraints on the development of implicit knowledge when taking into 
account that many L2 learners, despite years of formal instruction, fail to approach a 
near-native level of proficiency in their L2 (Loewen, 2015, Long, 2013, 2015). Other 
researchers (Bialystok, 1982; DeKeyser, 2003; N. Ellis, 2005) have argued that 
explicit knowledge can be learned throughout one's lifespan. In this view, older 
learners are more adept at learning explicitly (Muñoz, 2006, 2008), whereas there are 
age-related limitations to the development of implicit knowledge by L2 learners 
(Long, 2015). 
A further issue with regard to differences in learnability between implicit and 
explicit knowledge concerns limitations concerning the linguistic features that can be 
learned implicitly versus explicitly. Both Reber (1993) and Krashen (1981, 1982) 
have theorised that only relatively simple rules, such as third person –s, can be 
learned and formalised as explicit knowledge. By contrast, they are that only complex 
rules can only be "acquired", or developed, through an unconscious process that 
results in implicit knowledge. Although few studies in SLA have tested these claims 
directly (DeKeyser, 1994, 1995; Robinson, 1996), what little evidence there is 
suggests that explicit learning is best suited to rules that are simple and categorical, 
whereas implicit learning is more suited to concrete elements in close proximity, such 
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as collocations, or to more complex or non-salient rules (Long, 2015; see also N. 
Ellis, 2005 for a discussion).6  
2.3.5. Task demands 
Finally, with regard to language use, implicit and explicit knowledge can be 
utilised to varying degrees depending on the nature of the task. Evidence from 
Bialystok (1982) suggests that the demands of task type might influence the types of 
knowledge deployed in terms of the degree of analysis and control. For example, 
error correction tasks presented visually encourage learners to rely on explicit 
knowledge. The same task presented auditorily, however, promotes the use of implicit 
knowledge. In addition, tasks that the L2 learner finds difficult, or that result in 
breakdowns in communication (N. Ellis, 2005), might result in the learner attempting 
to exploit explicit knowledge. R. Ellis (2004) gives the example of learners being 
asked to justify their choices concerning a GJT on a think-aloud task, during which 
they might attempt to draw on their explicit knowledge if they do not feel confident 
enough to make a judgement based on their intuition. Such tasks have been 
operationalised as being likely to elicit more implicit or explicit knowledge according 
to their modality (visual versus auditory), as well as with regard to whether they 
encourage automatic versus controlled processing (see R. Ellis, 2005; Rebuschat & 
Williams, 2012). Such operationalisations, however, should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that the use of implicit and the use of explicit knowledge are mutually 
exclusive. It is generally well accepted (DeKeyser, 2009; N. Ellis, 2005; R. Ellis, 
                                                     
6 However, as others have pointed out (Erlam, 2013; Roehr, 2008, 2010), it is not always 
straightforward to identify exactly what constitutes a “simple” versus a “complex” rule. 
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2004; Loewen, 2015) that learners utilise both implicit and explicit knowledge stores 
to varying degrees depending on the nature of the task at hand. 
2.3.6. Summary 
In summary, explicit knowledge is marked by awareness—in other words, we 
know that we know it. Explicit knowledge is typically verbalisable, learnable, 
declarative, and not spontaneous, and it can be elicited by tasks that allow for 
controlled processing. Conversely, implicit knowledge is by definition unconscious. It 
is not verbalisable, is typically procedural in nature, can usually be deployed 
spontaneously and automatically, and can be elicited by tasks that encourage faster, 
more automatic processing. This section has outlined the definitions and operational 
characteristics of implicit and explicit knowledge. At this point, it is worth shifting 
our focus towards how these two types of knowledge develop and, furthermore, 
interact in their development. 
2.4. Interface between Implicit and Explicit Knowledge 
2.4.1. Non-interface  
To return to Krashen (1981, 1982, 1985), the monitor theory posited that adult 
second language acquisition is fundamentally the same as first language acquisition 
by children. Furthermore, this process is both incidental, in that it happens without 
intention, and implicit, in that acquisition occurs without awareness and is entirely 
based on the abstraction of patterns from the input. Krashen’s monitor hypothesis 
claims that learners possess two distinct systems that are involved in language 
learning: a "learned system" and an "acquired system." As mentioned earlier, 
acquisition is an unconscious (implicit) process that occurs during communication, 
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whereas learning is the conscious (explicit) process of attempting to understand 
language and/or memorise rules. For Krashen, unconscious acquisition is responsible 
for the vast majority of what is ultimately learned. Learning, on the other hand, plays 
a minor role in this process and only serves to monitor the output the learner 
produces. In other words, rules that are explicitly learned only serve to compare with, 
and possibly make changes to, utterances that have been produced by the "acquired 
system" (Krashen, 1982). Of particular relevance here, Krashen also claimed that the 
two different systems, learned and acquired, are not connected: Thus, learned 
competence cannot turn into acquired competence (1982, 1985). The position that 
explicit knowledge cannot become implicit knowledge later became known as the 
non-interface position (R. Ellis, 2008); it inspired a number of competing theories 
regarding the role of explicit knowledge in the development of implicit knowledge. 
Firstly, non-interface positions (Krashen, 1982, 1994; Paradis, 1994, 2004, 2009) 
hold that explicit knowledge cannot be transformed into implicit knowledge, and 
explicit knowledge does not directly influence the development of implicit 
knowledge. The strong-interface position (DeKeyser, 2003, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2009, 2015), which is predicated on skill-acquisition theory (please see Section 2.4.2 
below), argues for a direct line of causation from declarative knowledge to procedural 
knowledge. Finally, weak-interface positions (N. Ellis, 2005; R. Ellis, 1994) argue 
that explicit knowledge can directly facilitate the development of implicit knowledge, 
although the success of this hinges on various factors. These positions are discussed 
in more detail in the sections below. 
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2.4.2. Strong Interface 
Early critics of Krashen’s distinction between learning and acquisition 
suggested alternative accounts to explain the relevant phenomena cited in support of 
the monitor hypothesis, such as the relative speed of production using implicit 
knowledge compared to when using explicit knowledge (see Krashen, 1982, p. 89). 
Building on an information-processing model developed within the domain of 
cognitive psychology, McLaughlin (1978) proposed distinguishing between 
controlled and automatic processes. The central claim of this model, later to be 
identified as skill acquisition theory (see Anderson, 1982; Carlson, 2003; DeKeyser, 
1998, 2007b for overviews), is that “a wide variety of skills shows a remarkable 
similarity in development from initial representations of knowledge…to eventual 
fluent, spontaneous, largely effortless, and highly skilled behaviour” (DeKeyser, 
2007a, p. 97). This process is governed by the power law of practice (Anderson, 
2000), which is a mathematical function that describes how error rates and reaction 
times decline over time “regardless of the domain of learning” (DeKeyser, 2007b, p. 
3). 
It is important to note that this position, which would later be called the 
interface hypothesis, or strong interface position (R. Ellis, 2008), does not typically 
refer to implicit versus explicit knowledge. Instead, the strong-interface position 
references declarative and procedural knowledge. These two types of knowledge are 
argued to operate along a continuum on which declarative knowledge can transition 
into procedural, or automatised, knowledge over time with practice (Anderson, 1982, 
1992, 2000; Anderson & Schunn, 2000; Carlson, 2003; DeKeyser, 1997; 1998, 
48 
 
2007b; R. Ellis, 1993; Sharwood Smith, 1981; Ullman, 2004, 2005). As mentioned 
previously, this continuum from declarative to procedural knowledge represents a 
break from the characteristics of implicit and explicit knowledge, which are believed 
to operate as two separate systems.  
As part of the strong-interface position, the transition from declarative to 
procedural knowledge embodies a qualitative shift as a result of automatisation, also 
referred to as practice (DeKeyser, 2001). Automatisation refers to the process of 
“knowledge change from initial presentation of the rule in declarative format to the 
final stage of fully spontaneous, effortless, fast, and errorless use of that rule, often 
without being aware of it anymore” (DeKeyser, 2007b, p. 3). In this sense, the strong-
interface position holds that automatised declarative knowledge, or procedural 
knowledge, can be seen as functionally equivalent to implicit knowledge. It should be 
reiterated, however, that automatised knowledge is not necessarily the same as 
implicit knowledge. Unlike implicit knowledge, a lack of awareness is “not a 
requirement for automaticity” (DeKeyser, 2007b, p. 4; see also R. Ellis, 1994; 
Ullman, 2005). In other words, it is possible to attain automaticity of a particular 
structure while being fully aware of the rules underlying it. As such, automaticity can 
characterise both implicit and explicit knowledge (DeKeyser, 1998, 2007b), with both 
types of learning involving a shift from more controlled to more automatic 
processing. 
2.4.3. Weak-interface Positions 
Other researchers (R. Ellis, 1993; 1994; N. Ellis, 2005) have proposed weak-
interface positions for the interface between explicit and implicit knowledge. In R. 
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Ellis’ (1993, 1994) weak-interface model, explicit knowledge can be converted into 
implicit knowledge under certain conditions. This weak-interface position 
distinguishes between developmental and variational features of language. 
Developmental features of language, such as negation or third person –s, are 
linguistic features whose acquisition appears constrained by universal orders of 
language development. In contrast, variational features, such as the copula “be”, are 
linguistic features that do not appear constrained by acquisition orders. In R. Ellis’ 
model,explicit knowledge can become implicit knowledge only with variational 
features of language and only when the learner is developmentally ready to 
incorporate this feature into his or her interlanguage system (R. Ellis, 2008). The 
learner’s current existing knowledge thus serves “as a kind of filter that sifts explicit 
knowledge and lets through only that which the learner is ready to incorporate into 
the interlanguage system" (R. Ellis, 1994, p. 88). Drawing on Schmidt’s noticing 
hypothesis (1990), this model also acknowledges that explicit knowledge and formal 
instruction can have a facilitating effect on implicit knowledge by drawing the 
learner's attention to relevant features in the input that would not have otherwise been 
noticed, as well as by “noticing the gap” (Schmidt & Frota, 1986); in other words, 
comparing what he or she has noticed with his or her own current interlanguage. In 
this view, explicit knowledge then facilitates the development of implicit knowledge 
by sensitising “the language processor so that it takes account of data in the input” 
(Schmidt & Frota, 1986, p. 98). However, the fact that noticing is considered a 
conscious process (Schmidt, 1990) suggests that this “taking account” by the 
language processor is a conscious, or explicit, process. In other words, what remains 
50 
 
unclear within R. Ellis’ model is how noticing, which is associated with conscious 
awareness, aids in the development of implicit, rather than explicit knowledge. 
N. Ellis’ weak-interface model (1993, 1994b, 2005, 2011, 2015; N. Ellis & 
Larsen-Freeman, 2006; see also the entries in N. Ellis, 1994a) shares features with 
both Krashen’s (1982) non-interface position and R. Ellis’ (1994) weak-interface 
position. Like Krashen, N. Ellis argues that implicit learning is primary7: Most 
learning is implicit, and most knowledge is tacit (2005). Also, as with the non-
interface position, implicit and explicit knowledge represent distinct systems within 
N. Ellis' weak-interface model. Furthermore, explicit knowledge cannot be converted 
into implicit knowledge. This, however, should not be taken to mean that implicit and 
explicit knowledge operate independently of each other. According to N. Ellis, 
“conscious and unconscious processes are dynamically involved together in every 
cognitive task and in every learning episode” (2005, p. 340), including both input and 
output processing. As an illustration of the interplay between implicit and explicit 
knowledge during language use, N. Ellis argued that we rely primarily on automatic 
processing; however, we also draw upon explicit knowledge when automatic 
processes fail. Examples of this would include when we stumble while walking, or 
when communication breaks down. In this sense, explicit knowledge serves as a form 
of "collaborative conscious support" for more automatic processes (p. 308). 
In addition to explicit knowledge ballasting implicit knowledge during 
language production, N. Ellis also maintained that there is a relationship between 
implicit and explicit knowledge as part of language development. A key feature of N. 
                                                     
7 See also Reber (1990). 
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Ellis' (2005) weak-interface model is that it stresses the importance of attention in the 
development of both explicit and implicit knowledge. In this model, explicit 
knowledge develops as a result of conscious attempts at learning. Implicit knowledge, 
on the other hand, develops as a result of repeated exposure to exemplars within the 
input available to the learner. As a result of this repeated exposure, connections are 
strengthened within a connectionist framework via an unconscious tallying 
mechanism, resulting in the development of implicit knowledge (N. Ellis, 2005, 2011; 
Hulstijn, 2002). Of key importance here is that, although awareness is not necessary 
for tallying to take place within this model, attention is (N. Ellis, 2005). It is only 
after constructions have been detected, to borrow Tomlin and Villa’s terminology, 
and then seeded within explicit memory that there is scope for implicit learning to 
take place. This differentiates N. Ellis' (2005) and R. Ellis' (1994) weak-interface 
models, in that explicit knowledge does not become implicit knowledge (as is the 
case in R. Ellis' model), although explicit knowledge does have a direct line of 
influence in the development of implicit knowledge.  
2.4.4. Non-interface Revisited 
Despite the arguments in favour of an interaction between implicit and 
explicit knowledge, not all researchers are convinced. Bialystok (1982, 1994) and 
Paradis (2004, 2009), for instance, have pointed out that evidence that might be 
interpreted as a shift from explicit to implicit knowledge can also be argued to 
indicate a shift in the control of processing. In other words, do changes in the degree 
of automaticity reflect the development of implicit knowledge, or simply the use of 
implicit knowledge? Paradis (1994, 2004, 2009) has further argued fervently that any 
52 
 
changes in learners’ language production from explicit, declarative knowledge 
towards implicit, procedural competence should not be taken as evidence of an 
interface between explicit and implicit knowledge. For Paradis (2004), any shift in 
learners’ performance can be attributed to changes, or variation, in their reliance on 
one type of knowledge over the other. For example, in the early stages of language 
learning, learners may rely exclusively on explicit, metalinguistic knowledge. Over 
time, however, as their implicit knowledge develops, learners slowly come to rely 
less on explicit knowledge in favour of more automatic, procedural processes. As 
noted, Paradis (2004, 2009) holds that explicit and implicit knowledge develop 
independently throughout this process, and do not interact directly (2009).  
This chapter has outlined the various theoretical models that have attempted to 
account for the development of implicit and explicit knowledge, as well as how these 
types of knowledge may interface in their development and use. The following 
chapter will shift the perspective towards research methodology, particularly with 
regard to how implicit and explicit knowledge have been operationalised and 
measured within cognitive psychology and SLA. Starting with the artificial grammar 
learning studies of Arthur Reber (1967), I will trace the use of artificial and semi-
artificial languages, and outline how different tools for gauging awareness have been 
utilised in conjunction with these languages. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Chapter 3 provides the methodological background to this thesis. This chapter 
first introduces the major paradigms on which the experiments in this thesis are 
based, namely the artificial grammar learning paradigm (Reber, 1967), the serial 
reaction time paradigm (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) and the self-paced reading 
technique (Roberts & Felser, 2011). Following this, the chapter provides a critical 
overview of the types of stimulus arrays that are typically included in the experiments 
operating within the cognitive framework, specifically artificial languages, semi-
artificial languages, and miniature language systems. At this point, the chapter shifts 
focus towards the measurement of implicit and explicit knowledge within the 
methodological frameworks listed above. Instruments such as verbal reports, 
subjective measures of awareness, and direct and indirect tests of learning are 
discussed in terms of their strengths and limitations in differentiating between 
implicit and explicit knowledge. 
3.1. Artificial Grammar Learning 
As in the field of SLA, implicit learning has been the focus of much research 
and debate in cognitive psychology, with interest in this area being revived after 
Arthur Reber's (1965, 1967) seminal investigation into the incidental learning of the 
statistical regularities of an artificial grammar system. In the training phase of this 
experiment, which was disguised as a study of rote memory, participants were 
presented with individual strings of letters that were between three and eight letters in 
length, such as TPTXXVS, on index cards. The training task required the participants 
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to memorise these strings of letters to a criterion, which was measured by their ability 
to reproduce the strings from memory successfully by writing them down on a 
separate piece of paper. However, the participants were not informed that these 
strings followed a complex rule structure; in this case, they were generated according 
to an algorithmic model following a complex finite-state Markovian system (see 
Figure 3A below for a visual representation of how these strings were generated).  
 
Figure 3A. Reber’s Markovian grammar (taken from Reber, 1967, p. 854). 
 Following the training phase, participants were given a surprise 
grammaticality judgement test (GJT). In this test, participants were presented with 
novel strings of letters, half of which were grammatical, in that they followed the 
same rule system as the strings of letters presented during the training phase, and the 
other half of which were ungrammatical, in that they violated the rule system in some 
way. For example, following the schematic representation of the grammar system in 
Figure 3A, the string TPTXXVS would be considered grammatical because it follows 
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one of the possible paths through the model. On the other hand, the string TTPSPXV 
would be ungrammatical, because this particular construction cannot be formed by 
following the paths in the diagram.  
The results of the testing phase indicated that participants were able to classify 
approximately 80% of the strings accurately. Reber argued that this significant 
performance was evidence that the act of memorisation in the training phase was 
sufficient for participants to develop an abstract mental representation of the 
underlying rule structure regulating the stimulus array. Furthermore, Reber argued 
that this process, for which he coined the term implicit learning, was an inductive and 
unconscious process that resulted in an unconscious knowledge base (see also Reber, 
1993, 2011; Winter & Reber, 1994). However, a limitation of Reber’s (1967) 
interpretation8of implicit learning is that his experimental design failed to include any 
measures to ensure that participants were not aware of the rule system. Thus, in the 
absence of data as to the conscious status of knowledge, Reber’s claim that the 
knowledge was implicit appears to be an assumption, although it should be pointed 
out that later experiments (Reber & Allen, 1978) attempted to address this issue by 
including retrospective verbal reports as part of their design (see Section 3.5.2 below 
for a discussion of retrospective verbal reports). 
Reber’s (1965, 1967) study and subsequent experiments sparked considerable 
research in experimental psychology (for general overviews, see Cleeremans et al., 
1998; Misyak, Goldstein, & Christiansen, 2012; Perruchet, 2008; Reber, 1993; Reber 
& Allen, 2009; Shanks, 2005), most of which followed what has become known as 
                                                     
8 This criticism can be extended to many influential studies that have followed Reber’s original 
methodology (see also Reber, 1976; Reber, Kassin, Lewis & Cantor, 1980; Reber & Lewis, 1977). 
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the artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm. In this paradigm, as in Reber’s 
study, participants are exposed to strings of letters, the construction of which is 
governed by a complex grammar system. Typically, participants are not informed 
about this underlying grammatical system, and instructions and tasks are designed to 
prevent participants from analysing the stimulus material (Perruchet, 2008; see Reber, 
Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980 for an exception). Following exposure, participants 
are told about the existence of the underlying system, and are then asked to 
distinguish sequences that have been generated by the same rule system from 
sequences that have not. Ordinarily, this involves the use of a grammaticality 
judgement test, although more recent studies have adopted alternate assessments (see 
the later discussion of serial reaction-time research). In studies that follow this 
paradigm, participants are generally able to perform at levels significantly above 
chance in the testing phase, even after a minimal amount of exposure to the training 
task (Reber, 1993). Awareness is typically assessed using retrospective verbal reports. 
Research into the learning of artificial grammars has been particularly robust, in that 
studies following the AGL paradigm (Allen & Reber, 1980; Brooks, 1978; Dienes & 
Altmann, 1997; Morgan & Newport, 1981; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Reber, 1969, 
1976) have been remarkably consistent in establishing a learning effect (Perruchet, 
2008; Winter & Reber, 1994), to the degree that the AGL paradigm has been used as 
a demonstration of laboratory learning in psychology textbooks (Reber, 1993; 
Rebuschat, 2015b).  
Although the fact that some learning typically takes place in AGL studies is 
well established, two of Reber's assertions, specifically that the participants in these 
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experiments developed abstract rule knowledge and that this knowledge was 
unconscious in nature, have been fiercely contested in the literature (see Perruchet, 
2008; Pothos, 2007 for reviews). Firstly, several studies in the early 1990s (Dienes, 
Broadbent, & Berry, 1991; Gómez & Schvaneveldt, 1994; Mathews, 1990; Perruchet 
& Pacteau, 1990; Perruchet, Gallego, & Savy, 1990; Perruchet, Gallego, & Pacteau, 
1992; Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990) challenged the claim that the training 
phase of Reber's (1967) early experiments resulted in abstract rule knowledge. These 
studies have demonstrated that participants become sensitive to the statistical 
regularities of bigrams and/or trigrams, that is to groups of two or three letters (such 
as DV or XYV), found within the longer strings of letters in the input (as in 
DVPYXYV). For example, Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) reported that the 
performance of learners who were trained only on bigrams was identical to those 
trained on entire strings. Similarly, data from Dienes et al. (1991) suggest that 
participants' classification of individual bigrams of longer strings fully accounted for 
their overall performance in judging complete strings.  
In summary, these studies suggest that learners were relying on "piecemeal 
knowledge" of the strings of letters, rather than necessarily on an abstract knowledge 
of the linguistic system (Perruchet, 2008). This issue is partly connected with the use 
of a GJT as the chief measure of learning in these studies. As part of a GJT, 
participants are presented with individual strings of letters that they then have to 
indicate as being grammatical or ungrammatical. The issue here is that such a binary 
classification does not provide information concerning why participants judge some 
strings as grammatical and other strings as ungrammatical, nor can it identify which 
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component, or sequence of components, participants utilise in the course of their 
judgements. To obtain this information, assessments would have to provide 
information about the participants' real-time processing of grammatical violations, 
information that a GJT is unable to provide. 
Secondly, the degree to which the resulting knowledge in these studies is, in 
fact, implicit has been the focus of much debate in the cognitive sciences (Perruchet, 
2008; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Shanks, 2005; Shanks & St. John, 1994). Within the 
AGL paradigm, the conscious status of knowledge has been measured via 
retrospective verbal reports (see Reber, 1993; Rebuschat, 2013, for overviews) in 
which participants are prompted at the end of the testing phase to verbalise any rules 
they noticed during the experiment. Typically, the results of AGL experiments 
indicate that participants are unable to verbalise the underlying rule structures, despite 
being able to classify novel strings of letters as grammatical or ungrammatical at 
levels significantly above chance level and/or above the performance of untrained 
control groups (Rebuschat, 2008). In other words, the knowledge reported by the 
participants is not sufficient to account for their performance (Dienes et al., 1991).  
This significant performance in the absence of verbalisable rule knowledge 
has been argued as evidence of an unconscious, implicit, knowledge base (Reber, 
1993). Critics of this interpretation have called into question the veridicality of 
retrospective verbal reports, specifically the sensitivity of this instrument in gauging 
awareness that occurred earlier in the experiment. In other words, the inability to 
verbalise the underlying rule system in retrospective verbal reports might simply 
reflect the limitations of this instrument, rather than tacit knowledge (Bialystok, 1979; 
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Brody, 1989; Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1994; Leow, 2002, 2015a, 2015b; the 
limitations of retrospective verbal reports are discussed in more detail in Section 
3.5.2). In light of these criticisms, some researchers (Dienes, 2004; Dienes & Scott, 
2005; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010) have turned to 
alternate instruments, such as subjective measures of awareness, to provide more 
valid data regarding the conscious status of knowledge. These measures of awareness 
are discussed further in Section 3.5.3 below. 
3.2. Serial Reaction Time Methodology 
To address some of the issues related to the use of GJT as the chief measure of 
learning, many studies in cognitive psychology have turned to online ("in real time") 
measures of learning. The most commonly utilised online methodology has been the 
serial reaction time (SRT) paradigm, or variants thereof (see Robertson, 2007, for a 
review). SRT tasks gained in popularity in the late 1980s as an alternative 
methodology to investigate the learning of sequential regularities (Cleeremans & 
McClelland, 1991; Lewicki, Hill, & Bizot, 1988; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; Perruchet 
et al., 1990). Within this paradigm, participants track the location of stimuli presented 
on a monitor using response keys. For example, in an early study by Lewicki et al. 
(1988), the screen was divided into four quadrants by one vertical and one horizontal 
line. Participants were shown the letter "X," which appeared in one of the four 
quadrants. The participants were tasked to react to the appearance of the letter X by 
pressing the corresponding button on the keypad. The participants were not informed 
that the sequence of positions in which the letter appeared followed a regular pattern. 
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Thus, differences in reaction times to sequences that followed or violated this pattern 
serve as evidence of whether the sequence had been learned. 
SRT research has proven to be a fruitful method for examining sequence 
learning and, when accompanied by measures of awareness, the role of awareness 
within this process (Williams & Rebuschat, 2013). However, the degree to which 
evidence from SRT tasks, which often involve examining reaction times to the 
location of a stimulus presented on a monitor, can be generalised to the learning of 
artificial, much less natural grammars, is questionable (Leow, 2015a, 2015b; Leow & 
Hama, 2013). Furthermore, from a methodological perspective, the traditional SRT 
paradigm does not appear to be immediately applicable to examining the learning of 
an artificial language. This is due to the fact that artificial languages are constructed 
according to constraints governing letter combinations and string length (Reber, 
1967), and are not constructed with regard to the locations in which particular 
characters are presented on the monitor. 
To overcome this methodological hurdle, some recent AGL studies have 
followed in the tradition of SRT research by adopting alternative methodologies that, 
as with SRT tasks, incorporate reaction times as a means of tracking learning. Both 
self-paced reading and/or eye-tracking tasks have been included among these 
methodologies (Amato & MacDonald, 2010; Karuza, Farmer, Fine, Smith, & Jaeger, 
2014; Andringa & Curcic, 2015; Williams & Rebuschat, 2013). There are a number 
of methodological improvements in the use of these online tasks compared to 
traditional GJTs. First, as noted, online tasks can provide more fine-grained evidence 
about the aspects of the artificial grammar the participants have learned, and whether 
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these are bigrams, trigrams or whole strings of letters by conducting fine-grained 
analyses of how reaction times, or eye movements, coincide with specific features of 
the input.  
 In addition, online measures have been argued to be more transfer-
appropriate for the type of learning that occurs as a result of incidental exposure 
(Hulstijn, 2002, Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). The concept of transfer 
appropriateness, which has roots in the depths of processing framework (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972), holds that we are more likely to remember what we have learned if 
there is a match between the conditions under which the material is learned and the 
conditions under which it is tested. In other words, learning is more likely to transfer 
from training to testing when there is fidelity between the conditions of training and 
testing (see Hulstijn, 2003, 2013; Larson-Freeman, 2013; Lightbrown, 2008 for 
discussions of transfer-appropriate processing in SLA). In this regard, online tasks are 
advantageous in that the training and testing phases place identical, or very similar, 
processing demands on the learners. It has also been argued that online assessments 
are better indicators of implicit knowledge than are offline measures, because the 
constraints of processing in real-time mitigates the opportunities for participants to 
utilise explicit, metalinguistic knowledge in their judgements (Godfroid et al., 2015; 
R. Ellis, 2004, 2005; R. Ellis et al., 2009; Jegerski, 2014; Norris & Ortega, 2000; 
Perruchet, 2008). In summary, online measures of learning have been argued to be 
preferable to offline instruments because they reflect the learning that results from 
incidental exposure more reliably.  
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In the following section, I discuss the use of the self-paced reading task as a 
method for the collection of online data. I focus more on this type of task than on eye-
tracking, as self-paced reading is a technique that is used in the research presented in 
this thesis. 
3.3. Self-paced Reading Tasks 
As noted above, one technique that allows for the collection of online data is 
the self-paced reading (SPR) task. Originally developed in the 1970s (Mitchell & 
Green, 1978), the SPR task is a computerised technique that has become increasingly 
popular in the field of psycholinguistics (see Jegerski, 2014; Keating & Jegerski, 
2014; Marinis, 2003, 2010; Roberts, 2012a, for overviews). Although SPR tasks have 
primarily been applied in research examining various phenomena related to L2 
processing, such as the processing of sentence ambiguities (Roberts & Felser, 2011), 
this technique has also been used to assess learners' sensitivity to grammatical 
violations during L2 processing, thus shedding light on learners' current levels of 
grammatical competence (Hopp, 2010; Jiang, 2004, 2007; Karuza et al., 2014; 
Sagarra & Herschensohn, 2011; Tokowicz & Warren, 2010; Williams & Rebuschat, 
2013).  
As part of the SPR task, which is also commonly referred to as a “moving 
windows” technique (Jegerski, 2014), participants read individual sentences in 
segments, either word-by-word or phrase-by-phrase. Typically, participants are given 
instructions to read the sentence as quickly as possible, but they are only presented 
with a single word or a single segment at a time. Participants must press a button, 
either on the keyboard or on the response pad, to progress to the next word or phrase 
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in the sentence. The software package then records the time that the participant 
spends on each segment of the sentence. Learning is then operationalised according to 
the time it takes a participant to progress between the segments of the sentence. 
Sensitivity to grammatical violations in the form of increased reaction times is taken 
as evidence that the underlying grammatical rules have been acquired. 
Although all SPR tasks tend to follow the basic model outlined, there are a 
few permutations of the basic SPR task in terms of the manner in which the stimulus 
sentences are displayed to the participants. Firstly, an SPR task can be cumulative; 
that is, once a word has been displayed, it remains visible to the participant until the 
end of the sentence or experimental trial (an illustration can be seen in Figure 3B 
below). 
 
 
While ...... ..... ...... ...... ...... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
While the ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
While the band ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
While the band played ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
While the band played the ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
While the band played the beer ..... ..... ..... ..... 
While the band played the beer pleased ..... ..... ..... 
While the band played the beer pleased all ..... ..... 
While the band played the beer pleased all the ..... 
While the band played the beer pleased all the customers. 
Figure 3B. Example of a cumulative self-paced reading design with word-by-word 
segmentation (Roberts & Felser, 2011). 
 
Although this variant of the SPR task might appear to be reflective of normal, 
incremental reading processes, cumulative SPR tasks are problematic for 
experimental purposes because participants tend to develop reading strategies in 
64 
 
which they reveal several segments of the sentence at a time before reading them 
(Ferreira & Henderson, 1990; Jegerski, 2014; Just, Carpenter, & Wooley, 1982; 
Marinis, 2003, 2010). Thus, the construct validity of the experimental design is 
threatened, since the time measurements recorded for each segment might not 
accurately reflect the time the participant spent reading that segment in particular.  
An alternative to a cumulative display is a non-cumulative presentation. 
Within such a presentation, only one segment is visible at a time and, when a new 
segment is revealed, the previous segment is hidden (see Figure 3C below). 
 
..... ..... While ..... ..... 
..... ..... the ..... ..... 
..... ..... band ..... ..... 
..... ..... played ..... ..... 
..... ..... the ..... ..... 
..... ..... beer ..... ..... 
..... ..... pleased ..... ..... 
..... ..... all ..... ..... 
..... ..... the ..... ..... 
..... ..... customers ..... ..... 
Figure 3C. Example of a centred non-cumulative reading design with word-by-
word segmentation (Roberts & Felser, 2011). 
 
 Non-cumulative presentations have included both centred presentations in 
which each word is presented in succession in the same location at the centre of the 
screen, as well as linear presentations in which the sentence is presented from left to 
right (or right to left, depending on the nature of the language being investigated) on 
the screen without any overlap in presentation (Figure 3D below). As others 
(Jegerski, 2014) have noted, the ecological validity of the centred version of the non-
cumulative SPR task has been challenged on the grounds that the manner of 
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presentation might not reflect normal reading processes, such as the “left to right” 
reading processes of participants with an English L1. Consequently, linear 
presentations are preferred because they are closer to what might be considered a 
“normal” reading than is a centred presentation. Given the shortcomings of the 
cumulative and centred non-cumulative versions of the SPR task, nearly all recent 
SPR studies have opted for a linear non-cumulative version of the SPR task in their 
experimental design (Jegerski, 2014). 
 
While ...... ..... ...... ...... ...... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... the ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... band ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... played ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... ..... the ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... beer ..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... pleased ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... all ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... the ..... 
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... customers. 
Figure 3D. Example of a non-cumulative self-paced reading design with word-by-
word segmentation (Roberts & Felser, 2011). 
 
Two recent studies operating in the AGL tradition (Amato & MacDonald, 
2010; Karuza et al., 2014) have incorporated SPR tasks in their examinations of the 
statistical learning of artificial grammars. First, Karuza et al. (2014) examined the 
learning of an artificial grammar of shape sequences. In this study, the stimulus 
material consisted of glyphs, namely symbols from Ge'ez script (the writing system 
found in Ethiopia and Eritrea). These glyphs were chosen because they are visually 
distinct and represent a writing system with which participants would be unfamiliar. 
Similarly to the letter strings utilised in early AGL research (Reber, 1967), the order 
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of these symbols was governed by a complex rule system. The exposure phase 
consisted of 432 trials in which triplets of the glyphs were presented via a self-paced 
exposure phase. These triplets contained both "predictable" combinations, such as 
combinations of glyphs that co-occurred at high rates of probability across the 
training phase, and "unpredictable" elements, or glyphs that co-occurred at low rates 
of probability across the training phase. Built into the exposure phase were 144 
intermittent "catch" trials, in which participants were asked if the previous set of 
triplets contained a particular symbol. The purpose of the catch trials was to ensure 
that participants were paying attention throughout the training phase and were not 
simply clicking through the experiment. Following exposure, the participants 
completed a familiarity judgement task in which they were presented with triplets in 
their entirety. Participants then had to indicate whether the triplet seemed familiar; in 
other words, whether it had appeared in the training phase. Data collected over the 
course of the experiment indicated that participants' reaction times decreased quickly 
for triplets containing predictive glyphs, but reaction times did not decrease for non-
predictive sequences. In other words, participants responded more quickly on the SPR 
task for predictive sequences than for non-predictive sequences. These results suggest 
that the participants rapidly derived some knowledge of the underlying patterns of the 
artificial system based on the statistical probabilities that certain combinations of 
glyphs occurred in the input. 
In another study, Amato and MacDonald (2010) measured the learning of a 
miniature artificial language via two separate testing instruments: a self-paced reading 
task intended to measure implicit knowledge, and a sentence completion task argued 
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to reflect explicit knowledge. The artificial language used in this experiment was 
"miniature" in that it only consisted of 18 words: three animate nouns designated as 
the subject of the sentences, three inanimate nouns designed as the object of 
sentences, three verbs, five adjectives of colour, three adjectives describing patterns 
or markings (such as stripes and spots), and one preposition. Sentences like Veek pim 
mog minada sarp skod that corresponded to events depicted in cartoon images were 
created. Each cartoon image contained one cartoon monster (always the subject) 
acting on one inanimate, nonsense object. The frequency with which the individual 
combinations of monsters, verbs, and objects appeared was experimentally 
manipulated so that certain combinations occurred more frequently than did others, 
with certain combinations occurring with a high rate of frequency and others with an 
extremely low rate. 
The training phase in this study consisted of four blocks. The first three 
consisted of vocabulary training/sentence learning in which participants had to match 
the cartoon images with one of two sentences displayed on the screen. The fourth 
block in this study consisted of a non-cumulative, centred, self-paced reading task. 
Following each sentence in the SPR task, participants were presented with a picture 
and were asked to indicate whether the picture matched the previous sentence. 
Following 36 training trials, participants completed 36 test trials in which their 
reaction times to rare versus frequent combinations of the artificial language were 
compared. Although no measurement of awareness was included in this study, this 
task was argued to assess more automatic, implicit knowledge. Following the self-
paced reading task, participants completed two further tasks designed to access any 
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explicit knowledge acquired during the training phase of the experiment. The first 
was a sentence completion task in which a sentence with a missing word, such as 
"Veek pim mog minada _____ skod", was presented on the monitor. Participants had 
to choose between three options, "gorm, sarp, or clate" to complete the sentence. The 
second task presented participants with a picture in which one of the objects had been 
removed. Participants were asked to select one of three options to indicate which 
object had been removed. 
The results of the explicit tasks of this experiment revealed no significant 
learning effect across either the sentence-completion or picture-completion tasks. The 
results of the self-paced reading task did, however, find significant differences in the 
participants' reaction times between frequent and rare combinations. The results of 
the SPR task can thus be interpreted as suggesting that the participants had developed 
some sensitivity to the underlying regularities of the artificial language system. 
Furthermore, the results from this study support arguments that behavioural measures 
of learning, such as reaction time tasks, are a more sensitive measure of learning than 
are traditional learning tasks, such as the sentence completion task used in Amato and 
MacDonald (2010; see also Hulstijn, 2002 for a discussion).  
In summary, the artificial grammar learning paradigm, as established by the 
work of Reber (1967) has generated considerable interest, and controversy, in the 
cognitive sciences. This ongoing debate has largely focused on the degree to which 
statistical regularities can be inducted as a result of exposure to input, as well as 
whether the resulting knowledge is conscious or unconscious in nature. Furthermore, 
from a methodological perspective, the AGL paradigm has proven to be a robust 
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methodological framework for experiments examining incidental learning within the 
cognitive sciences. However, for researchers operating in other domains, such as 
second language acquisition, one important question is the degree to which the 
findings from AGL research, which has investigated the learning of meaningless 
strings of letters, can be generalised to more complex stimulus domains, such as 
natural languages (Robinson, 2010; Schmidt, 1994a). The following section will 
review literature that is relevant to this issue—specifically, the discussion 
surrounding the limitations of artificial grammars in the study of SLA, and attempts 
by researchers to address these limitations. 
3.4. Of Artificial Grammars and SLA 
In an early review, McLaughlin (1980) pointed out that artificial language 
research has focused on two broad areas of inquiry. The first is concerned with how 
learning occurs and the general learning mechanisms underlying this process. The 
second hinges on the intrapersonal and situational variables that mediate the process 
of learning. Given the focus and scope of this research agenda, it might seem that the 
results from artificial language studies should be relevant to all fields related to 
education and learning, including SLA. However, the validity and generalisability of 
the results of artificial language experiments have been challenged in SLA, 
particularly due to the differences in complexity between artificial language and 
natural language systems (DeKeyser, 1994; N. Ellis, 1999; McLaughlin, 1980; 
Schmidt, 1994b; Winter & Reber, 1994). 
These differences in complexity have not resulted in the abandonment of 
artificial language research within SLA, and recent years have witnessed an 
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increasing interest in this methodology, presumably because of the significant 
advantages offered by using artificial systems. Firstly, potentially confounding 
variables, such as prior knowledge, can effectively be accounted for, and input 
variables such as frequency of the target structure can be readily manipulated. In 
short, artificial systems provide the experimenter with complete control over the 
characteristics of the input (Cook, 1988). Secondly, to return to a previous point, the 
artificial language paradigm has generated very robust and easily replicable findings 
since the 1960s (Braine, 1963, 1966; Moeser & Bregman, 1972; Reber, 1967; Segal 
& Halwes, 1965, 1966; Smith, 1966). Furthermore, the general methodology has 
proven to be flexible and adaptable to different experimental contexts (see Gómez & 
Gerken, 2000 and Ziori & Pothos, 2015, for reviews of artificial language and 
artificial grammar research, respectively).  
Given the methodological advantages of the AGL paradigm, a number of SLA 
studies have taken early criticisms of artificial languages (Schmidt, 1994a) into 
account and have utilised artificial languages with natural referents in the form of 
miniature language systems or semi-artificial languages in an attempt to bridge the 
gap between construct validity and experimental control. These studies have 
contributed to the body of knowledge on a wide range of issues related to 
psycholinguistics and SLA, including the degree to which various aspects of L2 
grammar can be acquired under incidental learning conditions (Alanen, 1995; 
DeKeyser, 1994, 1995; Hama & Leow, 2010; Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012; 
Rebuschat, 2008; Rebuschat, Hamrick, Sachs, Riestenberg, & Ziegler, 2013, 2015; 
71 
 
Rebuschat & Williams, 2006, 2009, 2012; Robinson, 2002, 2005, 2010; Williams, 
2004, 2005; Williams & Kuribara, 2008). 
3.4.1. Miniature Language Systems 
Miniature language systems, simply put, represent simplified versions of a 
single natural language. Typically, these include a restricted number of lexical items, 
as well as controlled morphosyntactic features. For example, a study by Robinson 
(2002) utilised a miniature Samoan system, consisting of one article, 11 verbs, and 15 
nouns, to examine the acquisition of L2 morphology, specifically locative, ergative 
and noun incorporation case markers. Other studies have successfully developed 
miniature systems across a wide range of artificial languages (Andringa & Curcic, 
2014; de Graaf, 1997; DeKeyser, 1995, 1997; MacWhinney, 1983) as well as natural 
languages, including Finnish (Alanen, 1995), Russian (Brooks & Kempe, 2013), 
Samoan (Robinson, 2002, 2005, 2010), and Basque (Tagarelli, 2014; Tagarelli et al., 
2014). 
In an exemplary series of experiments, Patricia Brooks, Vera Kempe, and 
their associates (Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Brooks, Kempe, & Donachie, 2011; 
Brooks, Kempe, & Sionov, 2006; Kempe & Brooks, 2001; Kempe, Brooks, & 
Kharkhurin, 2011; Kempe, Brooks, & Pirott, 2001) have used several variations of a 
miniature linguistic system based on Russian to investigate issues related to the early 
stages of both first and second language acquisition. For example, Kempe and Brooks 
(2001) tested the degree to which diminutive endings might facilitate the acquisition 
of Russian gender agreement patterns for adult L2 learners. Drawing inspiration from 
L1 acquisition research that has revealed that child-directed speech (CDS) might 
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facilitate the acquisition of L1 phonology, Kempe and Brooks (2001) set out to 
explore this effect among adult L2 learners (see also Kempe, Brooks, & Gillis, 2007 
for a review of research on the benefits of diminutives for language acquisition). 
Building on their previous research on L1 acquisition (Kempe et al., 2011; see also 
MacWhinney, 1995), this study investigated whether characteristics of CDS in 
Russian might facilitate the acquisition of aspects of L2 Russian grammar. 
As Kempe and Brooks (2001) noted, Russian diminutive forms are appealing 
in CDS because they carry connotations of endearment, affection, and smallness. 
These diminutives, however, also increase morphophonological transparency in that 
they help to regularise suffixes related to Russian gender marking. For example, in 
Russian, feminine nouns tend to end in -a, and masculine nouns tend to end in a non-
palatised consonant in their nominative, simplex forms. Examples of these are lisa 
[fox] and ptica [bird] for feminine nouns and zhuk [beetle] and slon [elephant] for 
masculine nouns. These four nouns can be said to be transparent with regard to 
gender because their endings in the simplex forms make their gender category readily 
available. Despite having some gender marking regularities, several masculine and 
feminine nouns are non-transparent in their nominative, simplex forms. When 
confronted with these nouns in their simplex forms, it would be unclear to a learner 
whether they should be classified as masculine or feminine. Examples of this are 
korabl' [boat], which is masculine, and krovat' [bed], which is feminine. However, 
diminutive forms in Russian are highly regular in their endings. Feminine nouns in 
their diminutive form typically end in -ka, while masculine nouns in their diminutive 
form tend to have endings such as -ik, -ek, or -ok (Kempe & Brooks, 2001). To return 
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to these examples, lisa [fox], ptica [bird], and krovat' [bed] become lisichka, ptichka, 
and korvatka, respectively. The masculine nouns zhuk, slon, and korabl become 
zhukok, slonik, and korablik, respectively. As can be seen, the diminutive forms of 
Russian nouns are longer than their simplex forms; however, the diminutive endings 
regularise the noun endings within genders, so that that all diminutive forms are 
transparent in their gender marking, even for nouns that are non-transparent in their 
simplex forms. 
As previously stated, the purpose of Kempe and Brook’s (2001) study was to 
investigate whether characteristics of the Russian CDS, in this case diminutive noun 
forms, can facilitate the acquisition of Russian grammar, in this case gender 
agreement, among adult L2 learners of Russian. For this study, they utilised a 
miniature linguistic system, based on Russian. This system consisted of 40 Russian 
nouns, 20 masculine nouns and 20 feminine nouns. Fifteen of the masculine nouns 
and 15 of the feminine nouns were transparent with regard to gender in their 
nominative, simplex forms. Five of the feminine nouns and five of the masculine 
nouns were non-transparent. All the nouns in this study were also matched with a 
diminutive form. There were two groups in this study, both of which received training 
on the miniature system over four training sessions spread over a period of 10 days. 
The difference between the two groups was that one was exposed to the simplex 
forms of the nouns only, whereas the other received training only on the diminutive 
forms.  
The results of this study indicate that the simplex group outperformed the 
diminutive group in terms of learning the correct pronunciation of Russian words. 
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This result is perhaps unsurprising, given that the simplex forms of Russian words are 
much shorter and would thus be easier to learn to pronounce correctly. Nonetheless, 
the diminutive group significantly outperformed the simplex group in learning the 
gender categorisations that occurred in the training phase and in applying this 
knowledge to new nouns in the testing phase. This result suggests that exposure to the 
morphological regularities of the diminutive forms in the training phase helped the 
participants in the diminutive group to learn the genders of the nouns, and to then 
generalise this knowledge. These results are in line with other research (Monaghan, 
Christiansen, & Fitneva, 2011) that has indicated that greater systematicity among 
word forms facilitates the ability to group words according to category (such as 
gender), whereas greater arbitrariness between word forms of the same category 
promotes learning the meaning of individual words. 
In summary, Kempe and Brooks' (2001) use of a miniature Russian system 
allowed an investigation into the early stages of language acquisition with a high 
degree of experimental control. By limiting the number of nouns in the study, they 
were able to have complete control over variables that could potentially impact on 
learning, such as the frequency of exposure to individual lexical items. In addition, 
limiting the scope of the stimulus array allowed for more practical experimentation 
because it was then possible for participants to learn the target structures within a 
shorter time than would be expected when exposed to an unsimplified natural 
language system.  
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3.4.2. Semi-artificial Language Systems 
As an alternative to miniature systems, such as the miniature Russian system 
in Kempe and Brooks' (2001) study, semi-artificial systems have also proven useful 
in investigating the initial stages of language acquisition. Semi-artificial languages 
combine aspects of two or more natural languages. Typically, the lexis in semi-
artificial languages is presented in the L1, or a well-known L2, of the participants of 
the study. This ensures that participants can pay attention to the meaning of the 
stimuli, and it greatly reduces the need for vocabulary pre-training or multiple 
training sessions, as was the case with Kempe and Brooks (2001) above. While the 
vocabulary of semi-artificial languages is presented in a familiar language, this lexis 
is also often combined with the morphosyntactic features of a different language, 
which represent the learning target of the experiment. For example, in an experiment 
with native speakers of Dutch, Hulstijn (1989) used a semi-artificial language 
consisting of Dutch vocabulary with the addition of artificial morphemes and an 
artificial word order. Rebuschat (2008; see also Rebuschat & Williams, 2006, 2009, 
2012) developed a language system consisting of English words with German syntax 
to investigate the incidental learning of L2 word order. 
 Another example of a study using a semi-artificial language is Williams and 
Kuribara’s (2008) investigation of the acquisition of L2 Japanese word order. For this 
study, Williams and Kuribara developed a semi-artificial language of English words 
and Japanese syntax, with some of the English words also being marked by a 
Japanese case marker according to their function within the sentence; for example, 
Student-ga dog-ni what-o offered?, Vet-ga injection-o gave, and That sandwich-o 
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John-ga ate. As can be deduced from these examples, the -ga marker indicates the 
subject of the sentence, -o the object, and -ni the indirect object. In the experimental 
phase, participants were exposed to target sentences both visually and auditorily via a 
plausibility judgement task. Following the common procedure within the incidental 
paradigm, the participants were not informed that they would later be given a test on 
the underlying syntactic system. The learning of the underlying syntactic rule system 
was assessed using a surprise GJT. The results demonstrated a positive learning effect 
for the target syntactical structures, suggesting that incidental learning conditions can 
lead to the acquisition of L2 word order.  
In summary, the use of miniature systems and semi-artificial languages has 
grown out of the cognitive tradition, which is willing to sacrifice some degree of 
external validity in exchange for reliability and experimental control (Hulstijn, 2015; 
Hulstijn et al., 2014). Artificial systems allow researchers to focus their experiments 
on the acquisition of specific linguistic features (such as gender categories in Kempe 
& Brooks, 2001; word order regularities in Williams & Kuribara, 2008), and 
effectively control for participants' prior knowledge. As such, miniature systems and 
semi-artificial languages appear to be particularly well-suited to investigating the 
initial stages of language learning, most notably the effects of first-exposure on the 
acquisition of various aspects of L2 grammar (Grey et al., 2014, 2015). 
Looking critically at miniature systems and semi-artificial languages, 
miniature systems could be argued to be the more valid alternative because they more 
closely reflect the complexity of a natural language system. From a methodological 
point of view, however, miniature systems come with several drawbacks. In 
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particular, as the lexis in miniature systems is in an entirely unfamiliar L2, these 
studies require either an extensive vocabulary pre-training phase (Robinson, 2002) or 
a more prolonged exposure phase (Kempe & Brooks, 2001) to allow participants 
enough time to learn the vocabulary used in the experiment. By contrast, semi-
artificial languages, as noted above, typically utilise lexis from the participants L1, 
thus obviating the need for any vocabulary pre-training. In this regard, semi-artificial 
languages have a clear methodological advantage over miniature systems because 
they provide more ease of experimentation, and allow for the possibility of an entire 
experiment being completed in a short, single session. Semi-artificial languages 
appear particularly well suited to the AGL methodology and, when taken together, 
can provide insight into the earliest stages of language learning.  
This section has provided a brief overview of two common types of stimulus 
arrays typically used in studies investigating the construct of awareness in SLA. The 
next section continues to focus on research methodology and outlines several 
instruments that are used to gauge awareness. 
3.5. Measuring Implicit and Explicit Knowledge 
3.5.1. Online versus Offline Measures of Awareness 
Several instruments have been developed to tap into awareness, both in the 
cognitive sciences and in SLA. These instruments can be roughly categorised 
according to the point at which they are administered within the experimental design. 
Online, or concurrent, measures of awareness are administered concurrently; that is, 
during the exposure phase of the experiment (Bowles, 2010a, 2010b; Bowles & 
Leow, 2005; Leow, 2000, 2015a, 2015b). Think-aloud protocols (Bowles, 2008; 
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Hama & Leow, 2010; Leow, 1998, 2000; Rebuschat et al., 2013, 2015) and, more 
recently, eye-tracking software (Godfroid et al., 2015; Godfroid & Schmidtke, 2013; 
Godfroid & Winke, 2015) are examples of online measures of attention and 
awareness that have been used within the field of SLA. In contrast to online 
measures, offline, or retrospective, measures of awareness are administered following 
the exposure phase, typically following the testing phase at the conclusion of an 
experiment (Payne, 1994; Rebuschat, 2013). Of the offline instruments that have been 
used to measure awareness retrospectively, verbal reports have been the instrument 
most commonly used in both the cognitive sciences (Seth et al., 2005) and SLA 
(Rebuschat, 2013). In addition to verbal reports, recent years have also seen the use of 
subjective measures of awareness (Dienes & Scott, 2005) as alternate offline 
instruments. 
It is important to note that both concurrent and retrospective measures seek to 
provide information about the participants' level of awareness during the experiment. 
However, the fact that these instruments are administered at different points in the 
learning process suggests that they provide data on different constructs (Hama & 
Leow, 2010; Leow, 2015a, 2015b). As noted, concurrent measures of awareness are 
taken as incoming information is being encoded (Hama & Leow, 2010). As such, the 
data provided by these measures can only be used as evidence of a participant's level 
of awareness at the same time the measurement was taken—in other words, during 
the encoding process. Thus, concurrent measures are best suited to experiments 
investigating issues related to implicit versus explicit learning, such as the role of 
attention and awareness during the learning process (see the work of Ron Leow, 
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1997, 1998, 2000, for examples). Conversely, the degree to which retrospective 
measures, which are taken at the end of the experiment, can provide accurate insight 
into the role of attention and awareness during the encoding process is questionable 
given that much of the information that is noticed during the encoding stage is 
unlikely to be remembered at a later stage in the experiment (Leow, 2002; Leow & 
Hama, 2013; Hama & Leow, 2010; Schmidt, 1994b; Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
Retrospective measures can, however, provide some information of the participants' 
level of awareness during the retrieval of stored knowledge (Leow, 2015b). In other 
words, retrospective measures are best suited to experiments investigating issues 
related to the product of learning, such as implicit versus explicit knowledge. As the 
focus of this thesis is on the development of implicit and explicit knowledge, only 
instruments related to measurement of the product of learning are discussed. For 
reviews of concurrent measures of awareness, see Bowles (2010b), Godfroid and 
Winke (2015), and Bowles and Leow (2005). 
3.5.2. Retrospective Verbal Reports 
Historically, retrospective verbal reports have been the most common 
instrument for assessing awareness in empirical research studies within the cognitive 
sciences (Seth et al., 2005; Leow, 2015b; Reber, 1993; Rebuschat, 2013). As part of 
the verbal reports, participants are asked at the end of the experiment to verbalise any 
rules or regularities they might have noticed during the experiment. Knowledge is 
typically considered implicit if participants are able to demonstrate knowledge (such 
as via their performance on a grammaticality judgement test), but cannot verbalise the 
underlying rule guiding their performance (Rebuschat & Williams, 2012; Robinson, 
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1997, 2002, 2005, 2010; see also Rebuschat, 2013 for a review). The results of verbal 
reports can be used to group participants dichotomously as being "aware" or 
"unaware" of the underlying rule system (Grey et al., 2014; Williams, 2005) or along 
a continuum based on the amount of information they are able to report (Brooks & 
Kempe, 2013). 
One study that used retrospective verbal reports was Williams' (2005) 
investigation into the incidental learning of a semi-artificial noun-determiner system. 
In this study, participants were exposed to a relatively simple system that consisted of 
four determiners (gi, ro, ul, and ne) that were paired with a variety of English nouns 
(for example ro bull). Participants were told that the determiners functioned in the 
same manner as English determiners, except that these determiners also carried 
meaning in relationship to distance, with gi and ro being used for near objects and ul 
and ne being used for objects that were far away. What the participants were not told 
was that the determiners also encoded animacy, with gi and ul being used with 
animate objects and ro and ne with inanimate objects. 
In the training phase of the experiment, participants listened to a sentence 
containing the noun-determiner system (As I was passing I knocked over ro vase). 
They were then asked to judge whether the determiner carried meaning for near or 
far, to repeat the sentence aloud in its entirety, and then to form a mental image of the 
situation described in the sentence. The first section of the testing phase of the 
experiment consisted of a sentence completion task. In this task, participants read the 
first half of a sentence, such as the drunk fell over, and then had to choose which of 
two options best completed the sentence; for example, ro stools or gi stools. 
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Following this task, the participants were interviewed to establish who had become 
aware of the underlying animacy rule system. The unaware participants were then 
given the same test sentences again, this time with the instruction to seek out the 
rules. Participants were then interviewed again to determine if they had become 
aware of the underlying system. The results of this experiment indicated that 
participants who remained unaware of the underlying rule system were still able to 
perform at levels significantly above chance on the sentence completion task. 
Williams has argued that these results provide some evidence that learning without 
awareness is possible. 
Williams' (2005) study sparked considerable debate within SLA (Faretta-
Stutenberg & Morgan-Short, 2011; Hama & Leow, 2010; Leow & Hama, 2013; 
Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014; Rebuschat et al., 2013, 2015). A point of 
particular controversy was Williams' claim that the findings of his 2005 study pointed 
towards a dissociation between learning and awareness. The issue here was that 
Williams' (2005) study relied on retrospective verbal reports as the sole measure of 
awareness. As noted previously, the degree to which retrospective verbal reports can 
accurately plumb whether learning has occurred implicitly has been hotly contested 
(Hama & Leow, 2010; Leow, 2015a, 2015b; Leow & Hama, 2013). This is not to say, 
however, that Williams' (2005) study would have necessarily escaped criticism if he 
had simply asserted that the knowledge resulting from the training phase was implicit, 
rather than that learning had taken place implicitly. Several researchers (Leow, 2002; 
Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Schmidt, 1994a; Shanks & St. John, 1994) have 
challenged the interpretation of a lack of verbalisation in retrospective verbal reports 
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as indicative of implicit knowledge. For instance, participants may choose to 
withhold information for a number of different reasons, such as lacking the meta-
language needed to describe linguistic rules or regularities (Schmidt, 1994a). As such, 
interpreting a lack of verbalisation as being indicative of implicit knowledge should 
be viewed with some caution (see Leow, 2015b for a review). 
In an attempt to address this lack of sensitivity, some researchers, such as 
Williams (2005), have modified the general procedure of retrospective verbal reports 
to allow participants multiple opportunities to uncover and report the underlying rule 
system. Other studies (Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014; Rebuschat & Williams, 
2012) have encouraged participants to guess in the event that they do not know the 
underlying rule system. Despite such attempts to address the shortcomings of 
retrospective verbal reports, relying on these instruments as the sole measure of 
awareness remains problematic. As noted, the absence of verbalisation in itself is not 
compelling evidence that knowledge is implicit. Conversely, the presence of 
verbalisation might not necessarily indicate that the knowledge is completely explicit 
(Rebuschat et al., 2015).  
3.5.3. Subjective Measures of Awareness 
More recent experiments have begun to triangulate data by employing 
subjective measures of awareness in addition to retrospective verbal reports (see 
Dienes, 2008b, 2010, 2013; Rebuschat, 2008, 2013 for overviews). Subjective 
measures of awareness are predicated on the results of subliminal perception research 
(see Rebuschat, 2013; Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015 for summaries), in which it 
has been suggested that the conscious/unconscious distinction should be defined in 
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terms of subjective thresholds as opposed to objective thresholds (Cheesman & 
Merikle, 1986; Merikle, 1982, 1992; Reingold & Merikle, 1993; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2009; Velmans, 1999, 2009a, 2009b). Simply defined, objective methods of 
assessing the conscious status of knowledge rely on carefully constructed tasks that 
are believed to reflect conscious or unconscious knowledge. For example, within 
SLA, it has been argued that learners are more likely to draw on implicit knowledge 
when faced with elicited imitation tasks and timed grammaticality judgement tests, as 
opposed to untimed grammaticality judgement tests that educe more explicit 
knowledge (R. Ellis et al., 2009; Godfroid et al., 2015). 
Unlike objective methods, which determine whether knowledge is implicit or 
explicit based on task performance alone, subjective methods of awareness compare 
performance on a task with the degree to which the participants are able to verbalise 
the knowledge guiding their performance. Subjective methods can be further 
classified according to whether they assess first-order levels of awareness or 
metacognitive levels of awareness (Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015). First-order 
awareness represents knowledge that the learner is able to report. An example is the 
ability to state the underlying grammatical rule in a retrospective verbal report. By 
contrast, metacognitive levels of subjective awareness refer to awareness of the 
existence of knowledge—for example, the learner is aware that he or she has learned 
something, but is unable to verbalise exactly what it is he or she has learned. An 
example of subjective metacognitive awareness in practice might occur when a 
learner is absolutely certain that an item on a GJT is incorrect, despite not knowing 
why, and thus being unable to verbalise the knowledge guiding his or her judgement. 
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Building further on the distinction between first-order and metacognitive 
subjective awareness, Dienes and colleagues (Dienes, 2004, 2008b, 2010, 2013; 
Dienes, Altman, Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Dienes & Berry, 1997; Dienes & Scott, 
2005) have attempted to demarcate the threshold between implicit and explicit 
knowledge in terms of metacognitive subjective experience within implicit learning 
research. Within this body of research, it has been argued that the results of subjective 
measures of awareness reflect two different types of knowledge: structural knowledge 
and judgement knowledge (see Dienes, 2004, 2008b, 2010, 2013; Rebuschat, 2013; 
Rebuschat et al., 2013 for discussions). According to Dienes (2004), structural 
knowledge represents knowledge that participants acquire about the underlying 
structure of the stimuli during the experiment; for example, knowledge of the 
sequence of letters in an AGL experiment. Later, when confronted with a new string 
(in the testing phase of an experiment), participants are able to develop a new type of 
knowledge, judgement knowledge, whereby they judge whether the structure of the 
new item shares the same structural characteristics as the items in the training phase 
(Dienes, 2013). Although it is assumed that conscious structural knowledge leads to 
conscious judgement knowledge (Dienes & Scott, 2005), it has been argued that 
unconscious structural knowledge can lead to judgement knowledge that is either 
conscious or unconscious (see Rebuschat et al., 2013 for a discussion). If we take the 
example of performance on a grammar test, unconscious structural knowledge and 
unconscious judgement knowledge would be realised in situations in which someone 
truly believed him or herself to be guessing, yet his or her performance indicated that 
he or she possessed knowledge of the grammatical items being tested. On the other 
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hand, unconscious structural knowledge and conscious judgement knowledge would 
manifest as "fringe feelings" of correctness (Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 
2007); in other words, the person would have a feeling (intuition) that a particular 
item is grammatical or ungrammatical, but would not know the reason (Dienes, 
2010). Thus, it is possible for subjective measures of awareness to indicate that 
knowledge is fully conscious (conscious structural knowledge and conscious 
judgement knowledge), fully unconscious (unconscious structural knowledge and 
unconscious judgement knowledge), or partially unconscious (unconscious structural 
knowledge and conscious judgement knowledge). In other words, subjective 
measures of awareness allow for a finer-grained interpretation of the conscious status 
of knowledge than can be inferred from retrospective verbal reports. 
There are two main types of subjective measures: source attributions and 
confidence ratings. Source attributions, which are designed to assess judgement 
knowledge, can be obtained alone (Dienes, 2004; Marsden, Williams, & Liu, 2013) or 
in addition (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012) to confidence 
ratings. Source attributions ask participants to identify the source of their judgement 
by identifying the basis of their decision (for example, guessing, intuition, memory, 
or rule knowledge). Knowledge can be considered implicit if the performance is 
significantly above chance levels when participants are basing their decisions on 
intuition or when they believe themselves to be guessing (Dienes et al., 1995). 
Above-chance performance when participants believe themselves to be guessing is 
called the guessing criterion. Confidence ratings, which can be used to assess the 
conscious status of judgement knowledge (Dienes et al., 1995), ask participants to 
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indicate their level of confidence (no confidence, somewhat confident, very 
confident, absolutely certain) for each decision they make during the testing phase 
(judging a sentence to be grammatical or ungrammatical). Dienes et al. (1995; see 
also Sandberg et al., 2010; Dienes, 2008; Rebuschat, 2013; Overgaard, Timmermans, 
Sandberg, & Cleeremans, 2010, for discussions) hold that knowledge can be 
considered unconscious if there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
level of confidence and performance. This is called the zero-correlation criterion.  
Several recent studies within SLA have included subjective measures of 
awareness in their experimental design (Grey et al., 2014; Hamrick, 2013; Hamrick & 
Rebuschat, 2012, 2013; Rebuschat, 2008; Rebuschat & Williams, 2006, 2009, 2012; 
Serafini, 2013). For example, a recent study by Rebuschat and Williams (2012) 
investigated the acquisition of L2 German word order under incidental learning 
conditions. In this study, native English participants were exposed to a semi-artificial 
language comprised of English lexis, but governed by a syntactical rule system based 
on German word order; an example is Usually defended Brian many shots during his 
matches. The exposure phase required participants to listen to a sentence, repeat the 
sentence aloud, and to then make a semantic plausibility judgement based on the 
content of the sentence. Following the exposure phase, participants were given a 
surprise grammaticality judgement test in which they were asked to classify new 
sentences as grammatical or ungrammatical. Alongside each judgement on the GJT, 
participants also completed confidence intervals and source attributions. In addition, 
retrospective verbal reports were administered at the end of the testing phase. The 
results demonstrated a clear learning effect, indicating that L2 word order can be 
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acquired through incidental exposure. Furthermore, following analyses of the 
subjective measures of awareness and retrospective verbal reports, the authors argued 
that this learning effect was partly driven by unconscious knowledge of the 
underlying syntactic rule system.  
In summary, Rebuschat and Williams (2012) provided some evidence that L2 
word order can be acquired as a result of incidental exposure, and that this incidental 
exposure leads to knowledge that is at least partly implicit in nature. This finding for 
partial implicit knowledge in Rebuschat and Williams (2012), and other studies that 
have utilised subjective measures of awareness (Hamrick, 2013; Hamrick & 
Rebuschat, 2013; Marsden et al., 2013; Serafini, 2013; Tagarelli, Borges Mota, & 
Rebuschat, 2011, 2015), illustrates the advantage of using subjective measures of 
awareness in conjunction with retrospective verbal reports. As noted, subjective 
measures of awareness are argued to elicit both first-order and metacognitive 
awareness, whereas retrospective verbal reports can reveal only first-order awareness. 
Thus, subjective measures of awareness appear more suited to revealing low levels of 
awareness that might manifest as a relationship between the level of confidence and 
accuracy during performance. Also, retrospective verbal reports are conducted at the 
end of the experiment, typically at the end of the testing phase. Subjective measures, 
on the other hand, are taken on a question-by-question basis throughout the training 
phase, thus allowing a finer-grained look at how awareness is guiding performance, 
as well as whether participants develop awareness over the course of the testing phase 
of the experiment (Hama & Leow, 2010; Rebuschat, 2008).  
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Despite the benefits of using subjective measures of awareness, reservations 
have been expressed regarding the interpretation of source attribution data. In 
particular, the interpretation of "intuition" to reflect native-speaker-like implicit 
knowledge (Dienes, 2008b; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012) has been challenged on the 
grounds that intuition, at least the phenomenology of the intuition possessed by native 
speakers of a language, develops slowly over a prolonged period (DeKeyser, 1997). It 
is thus questionable whether second language learners can develop such intuition 
following a minimal amount of exposure (less than 30 minutes in the case of some 
studies) in a single laboratory training session (Dulany et al., 1984; Leow & Hama, 
2013). Following this line of argument, Serafini (2013) has suggested an alternative 
interpretation of the data that source attributions provide—specifically, that the data 
from this measure might be best interpreted in terms of degrees of explicitness, rather 
than necessarily reflecting implicit or explicit knowledge as binary alternatives. In 
other words, when using guess, intuition, memory, or rule as the possible attributions, 
guess and intuition would reflect no or a relatively low level of awareness, whereas 
memory or rule might reflect a higher level of awareness. This interpretation is 
supported by research in cognitive psychology that has examined the time course of 
the development of implicit and explicit knowledge (Ziori & Dienes, 2012), as well 
as by several studies in SLA that have utilised concurrent measures of awareness, 
such as think-aloud protocols (Leow, 1997; Rosa & Leow, 2004). These studies have 
reported that awareness is not a dichotomous construct, as the results of retrospective 
verbal reports tend to suggest (see Brooks & Kempe, 2013 for an exception), but 
instead operates on a continuum from no awareness to awareness.  
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3.5.4. Direct Versus Indirect Tests 
Following initial proposals by Reingold and Merikle (1988), the use of direct 
and indirect tests to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge has received 
support from several researchers within cognitive psychology and SLA (see 
Rebuschat, 2013 for an overview). This support within SLA is perhaps unsurprising, 
given the fact that task bias, or that some tasks promote the use of implicit knowledge 
and other tasks promote the use of explicit knowledge, has long been a point of 
discussion (Andringa & Rebuschat, 2015; Bowles, 2011; Doughty, 2003; Han & R. 
Ellis, 1998; Norris & Ortega, 2000). Broadly defined, direct tests ask participants to 
make direct use of their knowledge, and are argued to be reflective of explicit 
knowledge. By contrast, indirect tests, which are held to be more accurate measures 
of implicit knowledge, gauge knowledge indirectly, such as through behavioural data; 
for example, differences in reaction times when participants are confronted with 
regular versus irregular stimuli. An example of a direct test is a traditional 
grammaticality judgement test; an example of an indirect test is the self-paced reading 
test (both of which are discussed in Section 2.6). Within SLA, the best-known 
examples of direct and indirect tests stem from the recent psychometric studies of R. 
Ellis and colleagues (2004, 2005; Ellis et al., 2009; Godfroid et al., 2015; see also 
Isemonger, 2007; Zhang, 2015). The initial studies in this series (Ellis, 2005) 
concluded that untimed GJTs and metalinguistic knowledge tests are better measures 
of explicit knowledge, whereas timed GJTs, elicited imitation tasks, and oral 
narration tasks draw primarily upon implicit knowledge. Other SLA researchers 
(Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014; Paciorek & Williams, 2015a, 2015b) have 
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drawn upon the SRT methodology and have utilised reaction time measurements as 
indirect measures of implicit knowledge.  
Although direct and indirect tests have been argued to be more sensitive than 
retrospective verbal reports in disentangling implicit and explicit knowledge 
(Reingold & Merikle, 1990; Shanks & St. John, 1994), these tests are not without 
their limitations. Firstly, as noted in Section 2.4.6, it is generally well accepted in the 
literature that learners draw upon both implicit and explicit knowledge to complete 
any given task (DeKeyser, 2009; N. Ellis, 2005), and that the characteristics of the 
task itself influence the degree to which learners draw more heavily upon either 
implicit or explicit knowledge (Bialystok, 1979, 1982, 1986). In other words, certain 
tasks can encourage the use of either implicit or explicit knowledge in L2 
performance, but it would be erroneous to conclude that a particular task is reflective 
of purely implicit knowledge or purely explicit knowledge. To illustrate, untimed 
GJTs are argued to be reflective of explicit knowledge, and timed GJTs are argued to 
be reflective of implicit knowledge (R. Ellis et al., 2009). This distinction is 
predicated on arguments that implicit knowledge is more available for rapid, 
automatic processing, whereas explicit knowledge is available for slower, more 
controlled processing (see Section 2.3.3). Thus, it is believed that time pressure 
encourages the use of implicit knowledge, because participants do not have time to 
draw upon their explicit knowledge to complete the task. There are, however, several 
potential problems with this interpretation. Firstly, with regard to the untimed GJT, 
which is argued to be more reflective of explicit knowledge, there is no guarantee that 
participants are not drawing upon their implicit knowledge to complete the task. In 
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other words, this result from an untimed GJT could be contaminated by implicit 
knowledge (Reingold & Merikle, 1988; see also Rebuschat, 2013). In addition, the 
results of a timed GJT, which is argued to reflect implicit knowledge, could be 
contaminated by automatised explicit knowledge (DeKeyser, 2009).  
Finally, from a practical viewpoint, the amount of time provided for 
participants is problematic. This issue arises from the challenge of finding the "sweet 
spot" that allows participants to process the sentence semantically while limiting the 
time available for them to draw upon their explicit knowledge (R. Ellis et al., 2009). 
If the time limit for items on the GJT is arbitrarily assigned9, then there is no 
guarantee that the imposed time limit actually influences the manner in which the 
participants process the stimuli. Some studies, however, have gone to considerable 
lengths to establish the validity and reliability of the time limits used in their 
instruments. In Loewen's (2009) study, the test items were first trialled on native 
speakers of English who were encouraged to answer the questions as quickly as 
possible. The median response time was calculated for each item; then, due to the fact 
that L2 learners would be taking the test, an extra 20% was added to each item. This 
resulted in varying time limits for different items, which ranged from 1.8 seconds to 
6.24 seconds (Loewen, 2009). There are a number of issues here, which are not 
limited to the use of L1 norms in SLA research. Firstly, although these reaction times 
were later validated psychometrically, it is not clear whether the results here can be 
generalised beyond the participants (both L1 and L2) and the test items included in 
this particular sample. The implications of this are that SLA researchers should not 
                                                     
9 A limitation of research that has utilised timed GJTs (Han, 2000) is that these studies often provide 
no information about how they established the cut-off times as part of their instruments. 
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expect that the same time limits would necessarily be valid for a different population 
of learners, or even for the same population of learners with different test items.10  
3.5.5. Triangulating Measures of Awareness 
The measurement of awareness has long been a contentious issue in the debate 
regarding implicit and explicit processes in SLA. This debate is partly due to the 
slippery nature of implicit and explicit knowledge, and partly to issues related to the 
instruments researchers have used to distinguish between implicit and explicit 
knowledge (Andringa & Rebuschat, 2015; DeKeyser, 2003). One issue related to 
instrumentation is that, when relying on a single method for collecting data, it is often 
difficult to confirm that the observed patterns in the elicited data are not simply an 
artefact of the method itself (Chaudron, 2003; Purpura, Brown, & Schoonen, 2015). 
As such, to arrive at more valid and reliable findings, researchers investigating 
implicit and explicit processes in SLA have increasingly begun to triangulate data by 
employing multiple measures of awareness. This progression can be readily seen in 
studies that utilised a single concurrent (Leow, 2000) or retrospective (Williams, 
2005) measure of awareness, to studies that have incorporated two measures, such as 
subjective measures in addition to retrospective verbal reports (Hamrick & 
Rebuschat, 2013; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012), indirect measures in addition to 
retrospective verbal reports (Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014), and concurrent 
measures, such as think-aloud protocols, in addition to retrospective verbal reports 
                                                     
10 In addition, it might be more valid to use an untimed GJT, but to ask participants to make their 
decisions as quickly as possible. Studies such as those included in this thesis (see also Rebuschat & 
Williams, 2012) have reported that participants responded within 2000 ms, which would fall at the low 
end of the range utilised by R. Ellis et al. (2009). Answers with shorter/longer reaction times could be 
compared using subjective measures of awareness. Such an approach would obviate the need for a 
lengthy validation process in setting time limits for individual items on a GJT. 
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(Hama & Leow, 2010). More recently, researchers have taken this a step further. For 
example, Rebuschat et al. (2015) triangulated data from think-aloud protocols, 
retrospective verbal reports, and subjective measures of awareness. The results of this 
study confirmed previous findings of implicit knowledge (Rebuschat & Williams, 
2012), provided further evidence of the validity and applicability of subjective 
measures of awareness to SLA research and, most interestingly, found evidence of 
reactivity; in other words, that the measures of awareness may impact on the 
measurement of learning. Another recent study by Godfroid et al. (2015) used eye-
tracking in conjunction with direct and indirect tests. The results of this study were 
argued to confirm that these tasks measured different types of linguistic knowledge11 
(R. Ellis, 2005; R. Ellis et al., 2009; Zhang, 2015). 
3.6. Summary 
Rebuschat and Williams (2012) and the other studies listed above (such as 
those by R. Ellis et al., 2009; Godfroid et al., 2015; Hamrick, 2013; Rebuschat et al., 
2013; Rebuschat et al., 2015; Serafini, 2013; Williams, 2005 and Zhang, 2015) are 
indicative of the renewed attention in SLA towards the incidental learning of L2 
grammar, the type of knowledge that is developed over the course of incidental 
exposure, and methodological issues in the measurement of this knowledge. As can 
be gathered from the discussion, the measurement of implicit and explicit knowledge 
has proved both elusive and controversial, and more research into the effectiveness of 
measures of awareness is clearly warranted. One limitation of the extant research is 
that the vast majority of these studies have addressed the incidental learning of L2 
                                                     
11 Please refer to Section 3.5.4 for a critique of this claim. 
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word order (Rebuschat & Williams, 2012; Williams & Kuribara, 2008) or noun-
determiner systems (Hama & Leow 2010; Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012; Rebuschat 
et al., 2013; Williams, 2005). To date, very little research has investigated the 
learning of L2 inflectional morphology following incidental exposure with the aim of 
examining whether the resulting knowledge was implicit or explicit in nature (for 
exceptions, see Grey et al., 2014 and Marsden et al., 2013). The next chapter provides 
a brief review of the research that has examined the acquisition of L2 morphology, 
which is the focus of the present study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PROCESSING AND ACQUISITION OF L2 MORPHOLOGY 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis provides the background to the incidental learning of 
L2 inflectional morphology, and the role of awareness in this process. As issues 
related to processing and acquisition are intertwined, this chapter begins with an 
overview of two influential models of how learners process input in their L2: 
VanPatten's model of input processing (VanPatten, 2002a), and the shallow structure 
hypothesis (Clahsen & Felser, 2006). Following this, the chapter shifts focus and 
reviews the relevant SLA literature regarding the acquisition of L2 case markings. 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of three studies that have investigated the 
role of awareness in the learning of L2 case markers: Brooks and Kempe (2013), 
Grey et al., (2014), and an early study by Robinson (2002, 2005). Finally, the chapter 
concludes with the research questions of this thesis. 
4.1. Factors Influencing the Processing and Acquisition of L2 Morphology 
There has been long-standing interest in the acquisition of L2 morphology 
within the field of SLA. The sustained importance and relevance of the issue is well 
reflected in the fact that two journals, Language Learning and Language Teaching 
Research, have devoted special issues to research on L2 morphology in recent years. 
This continued interest can partly be attributed to the large number of published 
studies that have demonstrated that L2 learners process inflectional morphology 
differently from native speakers (Clahsen, Felser, Neubauer, Sato & Silva, 2010; 
Jiang, 2004, 2007), and face considerable difficulty in acquiring both receptive and 
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productive knowledge of L2 morphology (DeKeyser, 2005; Hopp, 2013; Larsen-
Freeman, 2010; White, 2003, 2009). Although this body of research has identified a 
wide variety of factors that impact the degree to which learners are successfully able 
to acquire morphological forms (see Section 2.9.3.3), issues related to attention and 
awareness have been strongly implicated in the success of learners in this endeavour 
(Brooks & Kempe, 2013; N. Ellis, 2006a, 2006b). Of particular importance to the 
debate regarding the role of attention and awareness in the acquisition of L2 
morphology is the synergistic relationship between L2 processing and L2 acquisition 
(Andringa & Curcic, 2015; Clahsen & Felser, 2006; VanPatten, 2002a). Of particular 
concern is the fact that learners exhibit what has been referred to as a “default 
processing bias” (Park & Han, 2008, p. 109), meaning that they tend to divert more 
attentional resources to particular elements of a sentence, such as content words, than 
they do others, such as morphological forms (see Clahsen & Felser, 2006; Sagarra, 
2008 and VanPatten, 2014 for examples). This processing bias is theorised to impact 
on the degree to which learners are able to acquire these forms successfully. In the 
next sections, I will briefly define additional terms related to the processing and 
acquisition of L2 morphology before outlining relevant models of input processing 
from SLA and psycholinguistics. 
4.2. Input Processing: Key Terms and Definitions 
It is important to define further terms related to the stages of the acquisition 
process. Firstly, it is well established that learners do not incorporate all aspects of 
what they read or hear into their interlanguage system. In this regard, we can 
distinguish between the concepts of input and intake (Corder, 1967). Input in the 
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second language acquisition literature refers to the linguistic information that the 
learner is exposed to in either oral or written form. Intake, however, represents the 
subset of input utilised in some manner by the learner prior to any learning taking 
place (Gass, 1997; Leow, 2012, 2015b; Slobin, 1985; VanPatten, 2004b, 2007). As 
can be seen, intake then represents an intermediary step between the raw linguistic 
data that are available to the learner, or input, and the incorporation of a subset of 
these data into the learner's interlanguage system. 
When we consider that intake represents only a subset of the data available in 
the input, a question arises about the process and/or mechanism that mediates the 
aspects of the input that become intake and the aspects that do not. Input processing 
in the SLA literature is theorised to take place between the input and intake stages 
outlined above (Gass, 1997; Leow, 2012, 2015b; Robinson, 2003; Schmidt, 2001; 
VanPatten, 2004b, 2007). Processing refers to mental processes through which 
aspects of the input, whether meaning or form, are selectively attended to and made 
available for further processing (VanPatten, 2004b). 
4.3. Models of Input Processing 
4.3.1. VanPatten's Input Processing Model 
Perhaps the most widely discussed model of input processing in SLA is 
VanPatten's model of input processing (1996, 2002a, 2002b; 2004b; 2005; 2007, 
2015b). As noted in the introduction to Section 4.1, learners display biases towards 
the aspects of the input to which they naturally attend. VanPatten's input processing 
model attempts to account for this "processing bias" by providing a theoretical 
framework for the default manner in which L2 learners make their initial form-
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meaning connections as they select, attend to12, and process input in an L2—in other 
words, the manner in which certain aspects of the input become intake (VanPatten, 
2002a; Sanz & VanPatten, 1998). The central claims of VanPatten's input processing 
model are that  
a) learners are driven towards meaning when attempting to comprehend input,  
b) the comprehension of input is a cognitively demanding process, particularly in the 
early stages of language acquisition (VanPatten, 2007, 2015a, 2015b), and  
c) the degree to which learners attend to grammatical form is influenced by a number 
of guiding principles (Park & Han, 2008; Sagarra, 2008; VanPatten, 2004b).  
Although a full discussion of VanPatten's model is beyond the scope and focus of this 
thesis, several of these principles appear to be both useful and relevant for 
understanding the development of knowledge of L2 case marking. These principles 
include the primacy of meaning principle and the lexical preference principle (for 
discussions of VanPatten's model, see Benati, 2013; Lee, 2015; Lee & Benati, 2013; 
Sharwood Smith, 2015; VanPatten, 1996, 2004b, 2007, 2015b; Wong, 2004). 
As noted, VanPatten's input processing model has stipulated a number of 
principles that guide how learners initially process input in the L2. What may be seen 
as the central principle in this account is referred to as the primacy of meaning 
principle, which holds that learners will first and foremost devote attentional 
resources to comprehending the meaning of an utterance (VanPatten, 2004b). This 
                                                     
12The constructs of processing and noticing are not isomorphic in this framework (see VanPatten, 
2007, 2015b). The processing of information goes beyond merely noticing features of the input (Leow, 
2015a) because it involves the learner making the connection between form and meaning. Although 
noticing can be a component of processing (Han & Sun, 2014; VanPatten, 2014), input processing can 
proceed in the absence of awareness of what is being processed (N. Ellis, 2002; see VanPatten, 2015b 
for a discussion). 
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principle is predicated on research into working memory capacity (Baddeley, 1986, 
2000, 2007, 2012; Baddeley & Hitch, 1976), particularly with regard to the concept 
of working memory as a limited capacity system that influences lexical and syntactic 
processing in an L2 (Just & Carpenter, 1992; Miyake & Friedman, 1998; see Juffs, 
2004, 2005; Juffs & Harrington, 2011; Wen, 2012; Williams, 2012 for overviews). In 
this view, a finite amount of cognitive resources is available for any given task. For 
learners to devote attentional resources to the processing of some grammatical form, 
such as redundant inflectional markers, the processing of the meaning of a sentence 
must not drain the available cognitive resources.  
Another of VanPatten's (2004b) input processing principles that appears to be 
particularly relevant to the difficulties learners face when processing L2 morphology 
is the lexical preference principle, which holds that learners tend to derive the 
meaning of a sentence from lexical items, particularly from content words, as 
opposed to from grammatical forms. Furthermore, this principle is important with 
regard to the processing of morphological forms, in that “if grammatical forms 
express a meaning that can also be encoded lexically (i.e., that a grammatical marker 
is redundant), then learners will not initially process those grammatical forms” 
(VanPatten, 2007, p. 118). An example of this principle might be how a learner 
processes a sentence such as “Last night I walked on the beach". In this case, the past 
marker –ed is redundant because past meaning is also encoded lexically through the 
phrase “last night". In this case, input processing holds that learners would process 
the redundant marker –ed at a later stage than at which they would process “last 
night”, provided that sufficient cognitive resources are available for this task. 
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 It is important to reiterate that input processing, as set out by VanPatten 
(2004b, 2007, 2015a), does not represent an overarching theory of second language 
acquisition, but is instead a model of how learners make the initial connections 
between meaning and form as they attempt to make sense of L2 input (VanPatten, 
2007). Although many have expressed concerns regarding the soundness of 
VanPatten's model on a theoretical level (Carroll, 2004; DeKeyser, Salaberry, 
Robinson, & Harrington, 2002; Harrington, 2004), several studies have provided both 
direct and indirect support for many of VanPatten's claims (Cox & Sanz, 2015; Han 
& Sun, 2014; Marsden, 2006; Marsden & Chen, 201113; Park, 2014; Sagarra, 2008; 
Sagarra & N. Ellis, 2013; Sanz & Morgan-Short, 2005; Sanz & VanPatten, 1998; 
VanPatten & Cadierno, 1993). For example, in relation to principles connected with 
redundancy, research investigating the online processing of verbal morphology has 
provided evidence that learners might not process redundant forms at all (Sagarra, 
2008; Sagarra & N. Ellis, 2013). Further indirect evidence can be found in research 
investigating the acquisition of L2 grammar that has identified redundancy as a 
mitigating factor in the acquisition of these forms (Bardovi-Harlig, 2000, 2007; N. 
Ellis, 2002, 2003, 2007a; Gass, 1997; Robinson, 2002, 2005, 2010). 
Despite finding some support in the SLA literature, VanPatten's model of 
input processing is not without its detractors, particularly regarding the degree to 
which VanPatten's model aligns with the greater body of research on input processing 
                                                     
13 It is important to note that the results of these studies do not provide unwavering support for many of 
VanPatten’s claims. See, for instance, the discussion related to the development of automatized explicit 
knowledge in Marsden and Chen (2011). 
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within psycholinguistics (Carroll, 2004; DeKeyser et al., 2002; Harrington, 2004). 
Criticisms of VanPatten's model have included the fact that  
a) this model is predicated on antiquated models of attention (DeKeyser et al., 2002),  
b) some of the guiding principles of VanPatten's model, such as the sentence location 
principle, contradict much of what is known about how learners parse syntactic 
structure (Carroll, 2004), 
c) VanPatten’s model makes no acknowledge of the role of the L1 in L2 processing 
(Carroll, 2004), 
d) this model makes no provisions for the role of explicit knowledge in L2 processing 
(Marsden, 2006), and 
e) VanPatten's model does not actually address how input is processed, but rather 
how input is comprehended (Harrington, 2004). 
4.3.2. Psycholinguistic Models of Input Processing 
Among psycholinguists, the term input processing has a comparatively broad 
definition in that it can refer to: 
...any dynamic operation in real time that converts a stimulus into a message 
or a message into a motor-articulatory plan. Among psycholinguists 
investigating speech perception and sentence comprehension, the term 
processing can refer to any dynamic operation in real time that converts a 
stimulus into a message or a message into a motor-articulatory plan. 
Processing from this perspective is stage-like and includes everything from 
the subconscious detection of phonetic distinctions relevant to word 
recognition, through morphosyntactic parsing, and message integration 
(Carroll, 2004, p. 294). 
 
Research in this area has utilised a wide range of experimental methods, such as 
event-related potentials, self-paced reading, and semantic priming as part of lexical 
decision tasks (for overviews, see Kaiser, 2013; Keating & Jegerski, 2015; Morgan-
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Short & Tanner, 2014; Roberts, 2012a) to examine the mechanisms and limitations 
that native speakers and language learners employ as they process word-level and 
sentence-level information in real time. This research is concerned with elucidating 
how learners construct linguistic representations during language comprehension and 
production (Clahsen et al., 2010). 
Although processing research is a broad area of enquiry, what is most relevant 
to this thesis are subdomains of processing research that have focused on sentence, or 
syntactic processing, and studies investigating morphological decomposition. 
Sentence processing, or syntactic processing, is concerned with how learners parse 
syntactic relationships within a sentence in real time. Here, the term parsing refers to 
how learners compute syntactic information incrementally in real time. VanPatten 
and Benati (2010) provide an example: 
...the moment a listener hears "the man...," that listener immediately projects a 
determiner phrase (DP) while simultaneously tagging it as "subject of 
sentence". If the listener hears "reduced" next, then that listener most likely 
tags the word as "verb," "past tense," thus projecting a verb phrase and 
confirms that "the man" is the subject of the verb. However, if the listener 
next encounters "to tears," then the listener's parsing mechanism stops and 
reanalyses "the man reduced to tears...” as a reduced relative clause that is the 
subject of a sentence....And so the analysis progresses as each word is 
encountered (p. 123) 
 
Hence, parsing involves a real-time process of assigning syntactic roles to 
various sentence components and making projections and predictions about syntactic 
relationships to come in an attempt to make sense of the utterance. In contrast to 
parsing, which investigates the manner and extent to which learners process syntactic 
relationships within a sentence, other research (Clahsen et al., 2010) has focused on 
morphological decomposition, or the manner in which the learner processes 
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individual words. The chief issue in this line of study is whether individual words are 
processed and stored as whole-word representations, or whether individual words are 
"decomposed" - broken down, processed and stored - according to their constituent 
parts. 
Recent research investigating syntactic processing (Bialystok & Craik, 2010; 
Dussias, 2003, 2010; Dussias & Sagarra, 2007; Felser, 2012; Felser & Clahsen, 2009; 
Felser, Roberts, Marinis & Gross, 2003; Fernández, 2003; Frenck-Mestre, 2002; 
Frenck-Mestre & Pynte, 1997, 2000; Jacob & Felser, in press; Kielar, Meltzer, 
Moreno, Bialystok, & Alain, 2014; Moreno, Bialystok, Wodniecka, & Alain, 2010; 
Osterhout, McLaughlin, Pitkanen, Frenck-Mestre, & Molarino, 2006; Roberts, 2012b; 
Roberts & Felser, 2011; Roberts & Liszka, 2013) and morphological decomposition 
(Clahsen et al., 2010; Clahsen & Neubauer, 2010; Gor & Jackson, 2013; Jiang, 2004, 
2007; Kirkici & Clahsen, 2013; Neubauer & Clahsen, 2009; Silva & Clahsen, 2008) 
has pointed to marked differences in the manner in which native speakers and adult 
second language learners process incoming linguistic information. In general, this line 
of research has indicated that L2 learners are less sensitive to both syntax (Roberts & 
Felser, 2011) and morphology (Jiang, 2004), and rely more heavily on semantic and 
lexical clues than on the grammatical information encoded in these forms. 
Several models have been proposed to document the differences in processing 
behaviour between L1 speakers and adult L2 learners14. Central to the theoretical 
discussion of morphological processing is whether learners employ a single- or dual-
                                                     
14 Since the focus of this thesis is the acquisition of L2 inflectional morphology, the discussion will be 
limited to how these theoretical models address morphological processing. For discussions of how 
these and other models account for syntactic processing, see Carroll (2001, 2007), Clahsen & Felser 
(2006), and Harrington (2010).  
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mechanism system to process regular and irregular inflectional forms. To put it 
simply, the single-mechanism account maintains that all inflected words, both regular 
and irregular forms, are processed in the same manner of associative patterning 
(Bybee, 1995; Seidenberg & Elman, 1999). By contrast, the dual-mechanism view 
(Pinker, 1999; Pinker & Ullman, 2002) maintains that regular verbs are decomposed 
and processed by symbolic rule computation, whereas irregular verbs are retrieved 
whole via associative memory. 
Which model would better fit adult SLA? It has been argued that it is 
"incontestable" that the beginning stages of L2 learning involve the rote 
memorisation of unanalysed chunks of language (N. Ellis, 2001; Gor & Jackson, 
2013), and that in order to pass beyond the beginning stages of language acquisition, 
learners need to begin to process and acquire a wide number of inflected words "for 
which they do not have stored whole-word representations" (Gor & Jackson, 2013, p. 
1066). As such, some form of a dual-system account, in which learners rely on both 
rote memorisation and increased decomposition at higher levels of proficiency, 
appears to be a better fit with regard to L2 learning.  
Two models of morphological processing, the declarative/procedural model 
(Ullman, 2001, 2004, 2013) and the shallow structure hypothesis (Clahsen & Felser, 
2006), maintain a dual-system view of morphological processing in that they hold 
that native speakers decompose regularly inflected words, whereas irregular words 
are stored as a whole in associative memory. The declarative/procedural model posits 
that L2 learners rely more heavily on declarative memory and store regular words 
whole in the beginning stages of language acquisition. It is only at higher stages of 
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proficiency that learners begin to decompose words and start to utilise procedural 
memory as they process morphological forms. By contrast, the shallow structure 
hypothesis holds that adult L2 learners process input in a shallower manner than do 
adult native speakers (see VanPatten, 2014, for a concise overview). The basic claim 
of this model is that input processing can take two different forms. The first is 
structural processing, in which syntactic structure is fully processed during 
comprehension (as per the example of parsing above). The second is shallow 
processing, in which syntactic structure is only partly processed during 
comprehension, and entails greater reliance on lexical information. While native 
speakers utilise both structural and shallow processing, Clahsen and Felser argued 
that second language learners only engage in shallow processing (Clahsen & Felser, 
2006). In its initial form, Clahsen and Felser (2006) proposed that marked differences 
between how adult native speakers and adult L2 learners process syntactic 
relationships can clearly be seen; specifically, that L2 learners rely on lexical and 
other non-structural clues in their processing of an utterance. In contrast to the 
processing of syntactic structure, Clahsen and Felser (2006) argued that adult L2 
learners appear to process simple morphological rules in a native-like fashion. 
However, in a follow-up study, Clahsen et al. (2010) found that adult L2 learners 
were less sensitive to morphological inflections than were native speakers, and tended 
to rely on lexical-semantic relationships, rather than on morphological decomposition 
in their processing of L2 input. This result has been corroborated by a more recent 
series of experiments (Krause, Bosch, & Clahsen, in press) that has indicated that 
both lexical representation and processing by non-native speakers relies less on 
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morphosyntactic information than is the case for native speakers. In summary, these 
more recent follow-up studies support the argument that non-native speakers' 
processing of both syntax and morphology is "shallow" in the sense that they rely less 
on morphosyntactic clues than do native speakers. 
4.3.3. Processing of L2 Morphology 
Despite the evidence that L2 learners at all proficiency levels appear to 
process L2 input differently than do native speakers, research to date and the 
theoretical models described above point towards a symbiotic relationship between 
grammatical competence and the degree to which these grammatical forms are 
processed in the input (Andringa & Curcic, 2015; VanPatten, 2014). In other words, 
the degree to which L2 learners process relevant grammatical forms appears to 
influence the degree to which these forms are acquired, although it is important to 
note that the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear (Mitchell et al., 2013). 
Conversely, overall proficiency level and grammatical knowledge also directly 
impact on L2 processing. It should, however, be stressed that the extent to which L2 
learners process morphological markers in an L2 cannot simply be accounted for by 
their overall L2 proficiency. Research investigating the acquisition of L2 morphology 
has pointed to several additional factors that influence the processing and acquisition 
of grammatical morphemes. These factors include the type and token frequency of the 
target inflection in the input (N. Ellis, 2002, 2003; N. Ellis & Schmidt, 1997, 1998), 
L1 background (N. Ellis & Sagarra, 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Rast, 2010; Vainio, 
Pajunen, & Hyönä, 2014), individual difference variables (Brooks et al., 2006; 
Kempe & Brooks, 2008; Kempe et al., 2010; Sagarra, 2008), metalinguistic 
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awareness of target morphological constructions (Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Grey et al., 
2014; Marsden et al., 2013; Robinson, 2005), and type of instructional condition 
(Alanen, 1995; DeKeyser, 1995; Marsden et al., 2013; Morgan-Short, Sanz, 
Steinhauer, & Ullman, 2010).  
Given the wide range of factors identified, several researchers have attempted 
to synthesise this body of research and to narrow down the variables that influence 
the processing and acquisition of L2 morphological forms. For example, drawing on 
research investigating the order of acquisition in English SLA, Goldschneider and 
DeKeyser (2001) identified five determinants that account for the variance in the 
acquisition of grammatical morphemes: perceptual salience (how easy it is to 
perceive a given structure), semantic complexity (how many meanings are expressed 
by a particular form), morphophonological regularity (the regularity with which a 
morpheme is expressed in different environments; for example, allomorphy or a 
particular morpheme), syntactic category (lexical versus syntactic morphemes, free 
versus bound), and frequency in the input. Further linguistic and extralinguistic 
factors with regard to the processing of L2 morphology were identified by Gor 
(2010), including the richness, complexity and predictability of inflectional 
paradigms in the L2 (decomposability), properties of the L1 (whether inflections exist 
in the learner’s L1; L1 transfer)15, L2 proficiency, properties of the input, amount of 
exposure, and individual differences (such as verbal working memory capacity).  
                                                     
15 See also Jarvis (2000) and Jarvis and Odlin (2000) for a discussion on the effects of the L1 on the 
acquisition of additional languages. 
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4.3.4. Input processing: Summary 
In summary, the processing and learning of L2 morphology is an area that has 
attracted considerable attention within SLA. Research in this area has testified that 
the learning of this area of grammar is not a straightforward task, but is influenced by 
a wide range of interrelated factors connected with attention and awareness, including 
the L1 and L2 of the learner, and individual difference variables, such as verbal 
working memory ability, which is unique to the learner in question. This research has 
included studies looking directly at L2 processing (Sagarra, 2008) and/or L2 
acquisition (Marsden et al., 2013), as well as various incarnations of morphology, 
such as verbal versus nominal affixation, and free versus bound morphological forms. 
Because this present thesis is directly concerned with the acquisition of L2 case-
marking systems, the next section will narrow its focus accordingly and will examine 
studies that have investigated the acquisition of L2 case markers directly, with 
particular attention being paid to empirical research that has set out with the aim of 
accounting for the role of awareness in this process. 
4.4. Learning L2 Case-marking Systems 
The majority of research that has investigated the learning of L2 case marking 
has utilised instructed or intentional learning conditions as part of its research design 
(Brooks, Kempe, & Donachie, 2011; Hinz, Krause, Rast, Shoemaker, & Watorek, 
2013; Kempe & Brooks, 2008; Kempe et al., 2010; Brooks et al., 2006; Kempe & 
MacWhinney, 1998; Rast, 2008, 2010; Rast, Watorek, Hilton & Shoemaker, 2014). 
Thus far, very little research has examined the degree to which L2 case marking can 
be acquired under incidental conditions, particularly after a minimal amount of 
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exposure, and even fewer studies have set out to examine the role of awareness in this 
process. To my knowledge, this gap in the literature, specifically concerning the role 
of awareness in learning L2 case marking, has been addressed by only three studies to 
date, two of which investigated this issue under incidental learning conditions (Grey, 
Williams, & Rebuschat, 2014, 2015; Robinson, 2002, 2005), and a single study 
reported in two separate articles under intentional learning conditions (Brooks & 
Kempe, 2013; Brooks et al., 2011).  
4.4.1. Grey, Williams, and Rebuschat (2014, 2015) 
Grey et al. (2014) adapted the artificial language developed by Williams and 
Kuribara (2008, see Section 2.7.1.2) to examine the acquisition of both L2 word order 
and case marking. As did Williams and Kuribara (2008), Grey et al. used “Japlish,” a 
semi-artificial language consisting of English words and Japanese syntax, in which 
English words were inflected according to their function in the sentence (for example, 
Stacey-ga that picture-o painted). In the training phase, participants in Grey et al.'s 
study were exposed to 128 Japlish sentences auditorily, and they were asked to judge 
the semantic plausibility of each sentence. In Williams and Kuribara’s original (2008) 
study, the testing phase consisted solely of a GJT that assessed the learning of L2 
word order. Grey et al. modified the testing phase of the study to include both a GJT, 
designed to test the learning of L2 word order, and a picture-matching task that 
assessed the learning of the morphological case markers. In the picture-matching task, 
participants had to indicate if a sentence such as Man-o woman-ga necklace-ni gave 
matched the picture displayed on a monitor; in this case, a man giving a woman a 
necklace. The testing phase of this study was further modified to include both 
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immediate and delayed post-tests. In addition, confidence ratings and source 
attributions were taken alongside the grammaticality judgement test, but not the 
picture-matching task. This was followed by retrospective reports at the end of the 
testing phase.  
The results of the GJT showed a significant learning effect of word order on 
both immediate and delayed post-tests. An analysis of confidence ratings and source 
attributions from the GJT indicated that participants were most accurate when basing 
their decisions on intuition, rather than on explicit knowledge of the L2 syntax. In 
other words, the participants developed some implicit knowledge of the L2 word 
order as a result of incidental exposure. With regard to the acquisition of case 
marking, the results from the picture-matching task showed a significant learning 
effect only for case-marking on the delayed post-test. In addition, an analysis of the 
retrospective verbal reports indicated that the overall learning effect of L2 case 
markings was driven by participants who expressed awareness of the morphological 
system. This suggests that the knowledge of L2 case markings acquired in this 
experiment was largely explicit in nature. However, since awareness was only 
measured retrospectively, it is impossible to pinpoint when the participants became 
aware of this regularity. It is possible that the participants might have become aware 
of the morphological system during the testing phase of the experiment. In addition, 
because subjective measures of awareness were only obtained for the grammaticality 
judgement test, it is not possible to say whether the participants were partly basing 
their decisions on intuition, rather than solely on explicit knowledge of the underlying 
morphological rule system.  
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 In summary, the results of Grey et al. (2014) indicate that it is possible to 
acquire some knowledge of a novel morphological system following incidental 
exposure. There were, however, a few limitations to this study in terms of the 
measurement of awareness that were not addressed by the authors. Firstly, as 
mentioned above, although subjective measures of awareness were taken alongside 
the GJT, the picture-matching task was not accompanied by such measures. As a 
result, any conclusions regarding the nature of learning with regard to case markers 
can only be inferred based on the results of the offline verbal reports, thus 
jeopardising the construct validity of the findings. Secondly, the design of the picture-
matching task did not allow for analysis of performance on individual morphological 
markers. For example, in the testing phase, participants were asked to indicate if the 
sentence presented matched the picture displayed on the screen. Because the stimulus 
sentences for this test, such as Man-o woman-ga necklace-ni gave, contained both 
nominative and objective case markers, it was not possible to distinguish the quality 
of the participants' performance on the two morphological markers. The learning 
effect on one of the case endings might have been masked by poor performance on 
the other case ending.  
4.4.2. Robinson (2002, 2005, 2010). 
In contrast to Grey et al. (2014), an earlier study by Robinson (2002, 2005, 
2010) did allow for comparisons across isolated morphological case markers. In 
Robinson (2005), a miniature Samoan system was used to examine the acquisition of 
L2 morphology, specifically locative, ergative and noun incorporation case markers. 
First, the participants, L1 speakers of Japanese, were trained to criterion on 
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translation equivalents of the Samoan lexis that would be used in the next phase of 
the study. Next, a Samoan sentence was presented to the participants on a monitor for 
10 seconds. Based on the content of this sentence, participants had to answer a yes/no 
comprehension question and were given feedback after each answer. This training 
included ten trials consisting of 45 sentences each. Thus, participants were exposed to 
a total of 450 target structures. Finally, the participants completed immediate, one-
week and six-month delayed written and auditory grammaticality judgement tests, 
guided sentence production tests, and a retrospective written awareness questionnaire. 
The results of this study indicated a significant learning effect only for the locative 
markers on the immediate and delayed post-tests. As in Grey et al. (2014), however, 
the results of the retrospective questionnaire indicated that participants were largely 
able to verbalise the rule governing the use of the locative marker, suggesting that the 
overall learning effect was driven by explicit knowledge. Robinson (2005) noted that 
the results here suggested that incidental learning might not be truly "incidental." In 
other words, incidental learning is not wholly an unconscious and implicit process, as 
assumed by previous AGL research (Reber, 1967), but that incidental learning 
encompasses both conscious and unconscious cognitive processes (N. Ellis, 2001, 
2005). 
4.4.3. Brooks, Kempe, and Donachie (2011). 
Finally, a study by Brooks et al. (2011) investigated the learning of gender 
categories, case markings, and lexis of a miniature Russian system. This study 
followed what is known as a micro-genetic design (Sielger & Crowley, 1991). In 
contrast to the AGL paradigm, which typically consists of a single, short training 
113 
 
session, micro-genetic studies typically employ multiple training sessions or trials 
over an extended time frame. Building on their previous research, which examined 
the role of diminutives in the acquisition of Russian gender marking (Kempe & 
Brooks, 2001; see Section 2.7.1), this study examined the role of diminutives in the 
acquisition of gender categories (noun-adjective agreement), case markings (genitive 
and dative cases), and Russian lexical items. Unlike their previous experiment 
(Kempe & Brooks, 2001), all participants in this study were exposed to both simplex 
and diminutive nouns of a miniature Russian system. The training and testing sets 
consisted of a total of 24 nouns (12 masculine, 12 feminine). Each training noun was 
presented in two of three contexts (dative, genitive, noun-adjective agreement) in the 
training phase. The remaining context was used in the testing set to assess the extent 
to which participants could generalise to trained nouns. The eight nouns not included 
in the training set were presented in all three contexts in the testing set. In addition, all 
nouns in this study were transparent in terms of their respective genders—all 
feminine nouns ended in -a, and all masculine nouns ended in a consonant. In the 
diminutive forms, feminine nouns ended in -ka, and masculine nouns ended in -ik. 
The training phase of this study consisted of six one-hour training sessions 
carried out over a period of 14 days. All the training sessions consisted of four blocks, 
each of which required the participants to perform different tasks. In Block 1 (listen 
and repeat), participants were presented with a line drawing while listening to a 
dialogue in Russian between a man and a woman. For example, in the dialogue, the 
participants would hear a male voice say "Otkuda ukhodit slon?" (From where is the 
elephant coming?). A female voice would answer, "ot chajnika" (From the kettle). 
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While listening to this dialogue, a picture of an elephant walking away from a kettle 
would appear on the computer screen. The participants' task was to repeat the phrase 
spoken by the female voice. The recording was then played again, and the 
participants were asked to repeat the phrase a second time. This process was repeated 
for a total of 48 items—16 items corresponding to the genitive case, 16 to the dative 
case, and 16 connected with adjective-noun gender agreement.  
In Block 2, participants were presented with two pictures. They then listened 
to a recording of a noun, such as "chajnik" [kettle], and indicated the picture that 
matched the recording. After the participants had made their choices, the noun was 
repeated and the participants were provided with feedback by being shown the correct 
picture on the monitor. Block 3 consisted of a case-comprehension task in which 
participants listened to the same dialogues that were played in Block 1. While the 
dialogues played, two pictures were presented on the screen, both showing the same 
object in different contexts for case marking (for example, an elephant walking 
towards or away from a fence) or the same object in different colours for noun-
adjective agreement. Participants listened to the dialogue, then chose the correct 
picture. After the participants made a choice, the dialogue was repeated, and they 
were provided with feedback by being shown the correct picture on the monitor. 
Finally, Block 4 was the production block. Participants were shown a picture of, for 
example, an elephant walking away from a kettle. They were provided with the name 
of the kettle in the nominative form. They then listened to the first half of the 
dialogues from Blocks 1 and 3. In this case, they would hear the male voice ask 
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"Otkuda ukhodit slon?" (From where is the elephant coming?). They would then need 
to answer this question in Russian. 
The testing phase of this study consisted of three parts. Part 1 of the testing 
phase assessed the degree to which the participants had acquired the case marking 
and gender agreement of the miniature system. This part was identical to Block 4 of 
the training phase and consisted of 96 trials, 48 trained items and 48 transfer items. 
Unlike in the training phase, no feedback was provided. In Part 2, participants were 
tested on the degree to which they had learned the Russian lexis used in the 
experiment. Participants were presented with line drawings one at a time and were 
asked to name each one. The final part of the testing phase consisted of a battery of 
tests assessing individual difference variables, and a debriefing questionnaire. The 
results of Part 3 are discussed in Brooks and Kempe (2013) below. 
The results of this study indicated a high degree of variance in the 
performance of the participants. Overall, participants were more accurate on trained 
items (77% accuracy) than they were on transfer items (42% accuracy) for case-
marking items. In addition, participants were more accurate with nouns presented in 
the diminutive form (65% accuracy) versus the simplex form (55% accuracy), and for 
masculine nouns (66% accuracy) compared with feminine nouns (53% accuracy). In 
terms of the vocabulary test, the participants were more accurate in recalling 
diminutive nouns versus simplex nouns, and masculine nouns over feminine nouns. 
Overall, the participants were more accurate when generalising case marking and 
gender with diminutive forms than they were with simplex forms, and in vocabulary 
recall. These results support previous research (Kempe & Brooks, 2001) that reported 
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positive benefits for diminutive forms in the acquisition of Russian gender agreement 
among adult learners. In the present study, however, the benefits of the diminutive 
forms also appear to extend to case-marking, an area of grammar that, as noted, is 
notoriously different for L2 learners to acquire (Larsen-Freeman, 2010; White, 2009). 
 Given the difficulty of acquiring case markings, the relatively low levels of 
accuracy should not come as a surprise, particularly when compared with previous 
research, such as that of Grey et al. (2014), who reported similar findings. It is 
important to note, however, that the training phase of Grey et al (2014) consisted of a 
single exposure session that lasted approximately 30 minutes. By contrast, Brooks et 
al. (2011) had a comparatively extensive training phase of six one-hour training 
sessions. In addition, these training sessions involved a number of tasks, including 
consciousness-raising tasks, such as the provision of feedback on participants' 
performance (see Leow, 2015a, 2015b; Leow & Hama, 2013 for discussions). Despite 
this, performance on both case marking and gender agreement remained relatively 
low. The authors noted that  
this suggests that many adult learners were unable to discover the grammatical 
categories on their own, even though the inflectional paradigm was fully 
transparent (i.e., there were no irregular nouns)…thus, in the absence of 
explicit teaching, adult learners will often fail to notice grammatical patterns 
and dependencies on their own (Brooks et al., 2011, p. 1165).  
 
This statement is predicated on previous research (Leow, 1997, 1998, 2000) that has 
demonstrated that noticing and higher levels of awareness are facilitative for language 
acquisition. In the case of Brooks et al. (2013), however, such a statement is 
speculative: In the absence of data, can it be said with any certainty that it is 
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awareness, and not another variable, that accounts for variation amongst the 
participants' performances? 
4.4.4. Brooks and Kempe (2013) 
Brooks and Kempe (2013) reanalysed the data from Brooks et al. (2011), 
including the individual difference measures and retrospective verbal reports, to 
arrive at a better understanding of what might account for the variance in the degree 
to which participants were able to acquire the case marking and gender categories of 
the miniature Russian system. Several individual difference measures were 
considered, including an auditory sequence-learning task (Misyak & Christiansen, 
2012), phonological short-term memory via a non-word repetition task (Gupta, 2003), 
verbal working memory capacity via a reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980), and nonverbal intelligence via a culture fair test (Cattell & Cattell, 1973). 
Further information about the foreign language backgrounds of the participants was 
elicited. Finally, retrospective verbal reports were taken and coded according to the 
amount of information participants were able to report. For example, participants 
received a score of zero if they were not able to provide any information. They 
received a score of one if they mentioned that the endings of the foreign words 
changed depending on whether the object was moving towards or away from another 
object, or if they listed two or more vowels that could occur at the end of words. 
Participants received a score of two if they were able to state some form of rule for 
the changing inflections, or if they were able to identify three or more of the 
inflections in the study. Thus, this research builds upon the findings of Brooks et al. 
(2011) described above, as well as on previous work by these researchers that has 
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pointed towards a link between verbal working memory capacity and the acquisition 
of both L2 lexis and gender categories (Kempe et al., 2010). 
 The results of an initial regression analysis, which excluded metalinguistic 
awareness as a predictor variable, indicated that the learning of gender was best 
predicted by the participants' familiarity with a language that has a similar gender-
marking system. Vocabulary learning was best predicted by the reading span task and 
the non-word repetition task, whereas the learning of the case marking system was 
predicted by the nonverbal intelligence task. Furthermore, the auditory sequence 
learning task predicted the level of metalinguistic awareness of the learners. A second 
regression analysis that included metalinguistic awareness as a possible predictor 
variable was conducted. The results of this analysis showed that the strongest 
predictor of the successful learning of case-marking was the extent to which learners 
became aware of the patterns in the input. In other words, metalinguistic awareness 
mediated the effects of both nonverbal intelligence and auditory sequence learning. 
Regarding vocabulary learning, however, the non-word repetition task remained the 
strongest predictor, whereas performance in the reading span task was no longer 
significant. 
 
In summary, the results of Brooks and Kempe's (2013) study indicated that the 
degree to which participants were able to acquire an L2 case-marking system was 
strongly influenced by their ability to verbalise the rules governing the case-marking 
system. Similar to the results of Robinson (2002, 2005) and Grey et al., (2014), these 
results clearly show that explicit knowledge of inflectional morphology is linked to 
improved performance. Furthermore, these results suggest that awareness plays an 
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important, if not vital, role in the learning of inflectional morphology, regardless of 
the intentionality of the learning condition. Taken together, these results could be 
interpreted in the light of the weak version of Schmidt's noticing hypothesis, in which 
awareness is facilitative for language acquisition, and perhaps even necessary for 
certain grammatical structures (Schmidt, 2010; see Section 2.3). Following this 
argument, the immediate question is whether awareness is necessary for the 
acquisition of L2 inflectional morphology and, furthermore, whether the difficulties 
learners face in learning inflectional morphology (Larsen-Freeman, 2010) could be at 
least partly attributed to issues of attention and awareness in SLA.  
Despite the consistency of these results with those of other research in this 
area (Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005) in pointing towards an important, if 
not necessary, role for awareness in the learning of L2 case markings, there are a 
number of limitations to this study. Most notably, as in previous research in this area, 
Brooks and Kempe (2013) utilised retrospective verbal reports as the sole measure of 
awareness. Although the use of verbal reports in this study did allow for a finer-
grained interpretation of the results, issues related to the veridicality of these results 
persist. In particular, the results of retrospective verbal reports provide little 
information on their own about the degree to which participants developed implicit 
and explicit knowledge during the training phase and utilised this knowledge in the 
testing phase.  
4.5. Summary 
In summary, despite the attention paid in recent years to both the incidental 
learning of L2 grammar and the acquisition of L2 morphology, few studies have 
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directly examined the acquisition of L2 case marking under incidental learning 
conditions after a minimal amount of exposure. The results of three studies that have 
set out to address this gap (Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005) paint an unclear 
picture concerning the degree to which L2 case markings can be acquired following 
incidental exposure. In Robinson’s (2002, 2005) studies, a significant learning effect 
was found for only one of three morphological case markers. In Grey et al. (2014), 
evidence of learning was only obtained from delayed, but not from immediate, post-
tests. Furthermore, in these studies, verbal reports provided little evidence to 
substantiate the claim that L2 case markers can be acquired in the absence of 
conscious awareness. The findings of these studies are corroborated by an additional 
investigation by Brooks and Kempe (2013), who found that verbalisable, explicit 
knowledge was the strongest predicator for learning an L2 case-marking system, 
albeit under incidental learning conditions.  
Building and expanding on the work of Grey et al. (2014, 2015), Robinson 
(2002, 2005), and Brooks and Kempe (2013), this thesis set out to investigate further 
the extent to which incidental learning conditions can promote the acquisition of L2 
case marking. In addition, these experiments explored whether knowledge acquired 
after incidental exposure is implicit or explicit in nature. It should be reiterated here 
that previous research by Grey et al. (2014) did include subjective measures of 
awareness for tasks measuring knowledge of the L2 word-order system, but not for 
the picture-matching task, which was designed to measure knowledge of case 
marking. Therefore, a methodological improvement of this research was that, unlike 
Grey et al., Robinson, and Brooks and Kempe, the experiments described here 
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utilised subjective measures of awareness in addition to retrospective verbal reports 
(see Rebuschat, 2013 for a review). This allowed for a fuller understanding of the 
type of knowledge that results from incidental exposure. Thus, this research not only 
contributes to the discussion surrounding the issue of incidental acquisition of L2 
morphology, but also informs the thorny debate of whether a dissociation between 
learning and awareness is possible. In particular, this study examines whether it is 
possible to learn a specific feature of L2 grammar, namely case marking, in the 
absence of conscious awareness of that which has been acquired. 
On a methodological level, this thesis presents a number of innovations. 
Firstly, Pilot Studies 1 and 2 and Experiments 1 and 2 have incorporated subjective 
measures of awareness within an AGL paradigm to investigate the incidental learning 
of L2 case markings. As noted, such an addition represents a methodological 
improvement to previous research in this area because it allows for the triangulation 
of data from multiple measures of awareness. Secondly, Experiment 3 utilises both 
direct and indirect measures of learning to further triangulate data regarding the 
conscious status of acquired knowledge. The indirect measure of learning is presented 
in the form a self-paced reading task, a novel methodology within this area of 
enquiry. The direct measure is a multiple-choice sentence completion task 
accompanied by subjective measures of awareness. Taken together, these 
methodological innovations allow for a more refined, multi-faceted perspective on the 
conscious status of the knowledge acquired as a result of incidental exposure. Such a 
perspective will not only serve to inform future research in this area, but will also add 
to the ongoing debate on the role of implicit and explicit processes in SLA. 
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4.6. Research Questions 
The following research questions were formulated. 
RQ 1: To what extent can L2 case marking be acquired under incidental learning 
conditions? 
RQ 1a: How is this knowledge reflected in direct measures of learning, such 
as grammaticality judgement tests and multiple-choice tasks? 
RQ 1b: How is this knowledge reflected in indirect measures of learning, such 
as a self-paced reading task? 
RQ 2: What type of knowledge is acquired as a result of this exposure; implicit or 
explicit? 
RQ 2a: How is/are implicit and/or explicit knowledge reflected in direct and 
indirect measures of learning? 
RQ 2b: How is/are implicit and/or explicit knowledge reflected in 
retrospective verbal reports? 
RQ 2c: How is/are implicit and/or explicit knowledge reflected in subjective 
measures of awareness? 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PILOT STUDIES 1 AND 2 
 
This chapter reports on two pilot studies that aimed to test and validate the 
experimental materials and procedure to be used as part of the experiments in this 
thesis. Both Pilot Studies 1 and 2 utilised a semi-artificial language within the AGL 
research paradigm to examine the incidental learning of an artificial morphological 
system. Although semi-artificial languages have grown in popularity in recent years 
within SLA, their use is not without methodological challenges. One important but 
rarely discussed aspect of this line of research is the important step of establishing an 
initial learning effect. That is, in order to work with artificial systems, researchers 
need first to ensure that the systems are actually learnable by participants under 
experimental conditions. Once the learning effect has been observed, it is then 
possible to observe, in subsequent experiments using the same artificial language, 
how different manipulations impact on learning (see Rogers, Révész, & Rebuschat, 
2015 for a brief discussion). As such, one of the primary aims of the pilot studies was 
to establish an initial learning effect. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, a brief overview of the purpose and 
experimental design of Pilot Study 1 is given. Next, a more detailed description of the 
population, methods, materials, and experimental procedure is provided, with the aim 
of providing sufficient detail so that future replication is possible. Before discussing 
the results of this pilot study, a brief rationale is given for the various statistical 
analyses utilised. This is followed by an interim discussion, in which the effectiveness 
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of this experimental design is evaluated critically. This general outline is then 
repeated for Pilot Study 2. This chapter concludes with a brief summary of both pilot 
studies, which includes a discussion of the implications of these studies for the 
experimental design of the experiments in this thesis. 
5.1. Pilot Study 1  
Pilot Study 1 focused on the incidental learning of morphological rules, 
specifically the nominative marker –a, the accusative marker –u, and the instrument 
marker –ou, of a semi-artificial language based on Czech morphology. Czech 
morphology was selected as the target for the following reasons. First, Czech is a more 
morphologically rich than English, and it contains a rich case-marking system that is 
not present in the L1 of the participants of this study. Secondly, it is a language that 
would be unfamiliar to the majority of the members of the population pool. As such, 
using an unfamiliar language such as Czech allows for controlling for prior knowledge 
on the part of the participants. 
5.1.1. Overview of Czech Language 
Languages vary with regard to their use of morphology and their 
morphological structures16. Within the field of linguistic typology, languages have 
been classified historically based on the amount of accumulated information that 
words within a language are able to hold. Analytic languages, such as Mandarin, have 
a low morpheme to word ratio and rely on word order to establish grammatical 
relations within a sentence (Clark, 2001). In contrast, languages in which words are 
typically comprised of more than one morpheme are referred to as synthetic 
                                                     
16 For overviews of linguistic typology, see Comrie (2009), Song, (2011) and Velupillai, (2012). 
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languages. These languages often utilize affixes to establish morphosyntactic 
relationships (Villupillai, 2012). Extremely synthetic languages, such as Turkish, are 
referred to as polysynthetic languages. Within these languages, words are comprised 
of a complex array of morphemes that can often constitute entire clauses.  
It is important to stress that the analytic to synthetic to polysynthetic 
distinctions are relative rather than absolute in that a language never really belongs to 
one category or another. (Brown, 2011; see also Sapir, 1912). The English language, 
for instance, is more of an analytic language, despite the presence of synthetic 
elements (Slobin, 1997; Vellupillai, 2012). This is because it strongly relies on word 
order and the use of auxillary words, rather than synthesis and inflectional 
morphology, to establish grammatical relations within a sentence. In contrast, 
Slavonic languages, such as Russian, Polish, and Czech are highly synthetic in that 
they contain complex and fully-developed case-marking and gender-agreement 
systems (Comrie, 2011; Lukavský & Smolík, 2009). The following section will 
provide a brief overview of Czech, a highly synthetic Slavonic language that is the 
basis of the target linguistic structure of the experiments throughout this thesis. 
Overview of the linguistic features of Czech 
As noted above, Czech is a highly synthetic language that belongs to the 
western group of Slavonic languages (de Bray, 1980; Hanson, 2011). 
Morphologically, Czech is similar to other syntactic languages in that it contanis a 
rich, morphologically marked word class system in which verbs, nouns, adjectives, 
personal pronouns and numerals all carry inflectional markers (Hanson, 2011). Like 
most Slavonic languages, Czech has six syntactic cases as well as a vocative form, 
(Hanson, 2011; see also description of Russian in Slobin, 1997). This case system is 
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used to mark grammatical relationships within a sentence (Short, 2009). As part of 
this sytem, Czech includes a number of case-marking paradigms. Which pattern a 
particular noun follows depends on a number of different variables, such as the 
gender of the noun in question (masculine, feminine, or neutral) and whether the 
ultimate consonant in the stem is hard or soft (Comrie, 2011; de Bray, 1980). 
Declension patterns further vary for masculine nouns depending on whether the 
nouns represent animate or inanimate objects (Janda & Townsend, 2000; Short, 
2009). An example of a Czech declension pattern can be seen in Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1. Example of Declension of Feminine Hard Nouns in Czech 
 Czech 
Singular 
Czech 
Plural 
English 
Equivalent 
English Example 
Nominative žena 
(woman) 
Ženy 
(women) 
Subject The woman is here. 
Vocative ženo ženo To call out Hey! Woman! 
Accusative ženu ženy Object He kissed the woman. 
Genitive ženy žen Direction / 
without 
From/without the 
woman. 
Dative ženě ženám Indirect Object He gave the woman 
the gift. 
Instrumental ženou ženami with He went with the 
woman. 
Locative ženě ženách Direction / 
Location 
He walked towards the 
woman. 
Adapted from Short (2009); de Bray (1980), & Petr (1986). 
 
The basic word order of Czech is SVO (i.e., subject + verb + object). 
However, although SVO is standard, Czech syntax is not limited to an SVO pattern. 
For example, an OVS pattern is also grammatically possible within the Czech 
language (Lukavský & Smolík, 2009; Petr, 1986; Short, 2009). One reason for this 
flexible word order is because syntactic relationships are fully realised via the 
morphological case markings in the Czech language (see Table 1.1 above). As such, a 
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speaker of Czech would be able to identify the subject and object of a sentence based 
on the morphological marker that these words carry. This means that “A cat killed a 
mouse” and “A mouse was killed by a cat” can be realized as “Kočka zabila myšku” 
and “Myšku zabila kočka”, respectively. In this example, the inflection –a indicates 
that kočka is the subject of the sentence and the inflection –u indicates that myšku is 
the object, regardless of their relative positions within the sentence. As can be seen in 
these examples, sentence functions are clearly realized by the case markers. This 
allows for a freer word order than can be found in more analytic languages, such as 
English (Hanson, 2011; Short, 2009). However, it is important to note that free word 
order does not equate to a totally “random” word order. Much research has been 
carried out on the linguistic functions of word order in Czech. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that Czech has quite strict word order regarding some grammatical features 
not relevant to the present thesis, such as enclitics (see, e.g., Short, 2009). 
5.1.2. Methods 
This experiment followed the AGL paradigm to address the following research 
questions:  
1). To what degree can L2 case markings be learned under incidental learning 
conditions? 
2). What type of knowledge is acquired as a result of this exposure; implicit or explicit?  
As noted in Section 3.1 above, the AGL paradigm typically entails three stages: 
a training phase, a testing phase, and a debriefing session. In the training phase, 
participants are exposed to stimuli under incidental learning conditions. This training 
phase is followed by a surprise testing phase, of which participants are not informed in 
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advance. Following the testing phase, the debriefing session consists of either a written 
or an oral interview in which the participants are asked a series of questions to 
determine their level of awareness of the target rule system. 
 
5.1.2.1. Participants  
Fifty-two native speakers of English with no background in any Slavic (or other 
morphologically rich) languages took part in Pilot Study 1. The participants were 
randomly assigned to an experimental group (n = 28; 18 female, 10 male) and a control 
group (n = 24, 15 female, 9 male). The participants were recruited via email invitations 
that were sent with the assistance of the programme administrators of several academic 
departments at a university in the United Kingdom. All participants were undergraduate 
students, but none were majoring in linguistics or foreign languages. The ages of the 
participants ranged from 18 to 24 years (M = 19.7, SD = 1.8). The data set for one 
participant was discarded due to a disruption in the experimental environment; another 
set was lost due to experimenter error. Each participant was offered £10 for taking part 
in this study. 
5.1.2.2. Research Ethics 
Prior to the outset of the data collection, this experiment was approved as 
exempt by the research support office of Lancaster University17. Informed consent to 
take part in the experiment was sought from each individual participant prior to the 
start of the training phase of this study. In the first instance, each participant read a 
                                                     
17 This PhD project began at Lancaster University. As a result, ethical approval for the initial 
experiments in this thesis was granted by the research support office of Lancaster University. 
Experiments that took place after my transfer to The UCL Institute of Education, University College 
London, sought ethical approval from the Institute of Education's research support office. 
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description of the research project. Furthermore, each participant was given the 
opportunity to ask any questions or voice any concerns about the experiment or 
experimental procedure before giving his or her informed consent in writing. The 
experimenter stressed that participation in this study was voluntary, that participants 
could withdraw from the experiment at any time, without recourse of any kind (which 
included the loss of their financial reward), and without the need to give a reason for 
doing so. 
It is important to note here that the true purpose of this study was not fully 
disclosed to the participants until the end of the experiment. This is because this study 
investigated the degree to which L2 case markings can be acquired under incidental 
learning conditions. If the participants had been made aware that this was the true focus 
of the study at the outset, this would have jeopardised the construct validity of the 
research design, in that the participants would have been more likely to pay attention 
to, and deliberately attempt to learn, the target structures. Therefore, in order to disguise 
the true purpose of this study, Pilot Study 1 was presented to the participants as a study 
that was investigating the learning of foreign language vocabulary (see Appendix A for 
the information sheet and consent form). However, the true purpose of the experiment 
was fully disclosed at the end of the experiment, and participants were given a further 
opportunity to ask questions and to withdraw their consent. 
5.1.2.3. Stimulus Material 
Training Set 
A semi-artificial morphological system, based on Czech case marking, was 
used to generate the stimulus material for this experiment. As shown in Table 5.1, the 
system consisted of English phrases and a Czech noun, which was inflected according 
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to one of three cases (nominative –a, accusative –u, instrumental –ou), depending on 
its function in the sentence (subject, object, instrumental). 
Table 5.1.  
Descriptions and Examples of the Three Morphological Categories in Pilot Study 1 
Morphological 
Category 
Syntactic category in English Example 
Nominative 
 
Subject 
 
The britva cut David’s face at the 
sink last night. 
 
Accusative Direct Object Peter used a britvu in the 
bathroom today. 
 
Instrumental Adverbial  
(meaning "to do/make 
something with an X") 
Anne cut her leg with a britvou in 
the morning. 
 
A total of 48 Czech nouns, all of which were foreign to the participants, were 
used in the training set. All the Czech words were regular, feminine nouns that end with 
the inflection –a in their nominative form. All the nouns followed the same pattern of 
declension. Only nouns with relatively “concrete” meanings were chosen in order to 
ensure that the nouns could be easily represented visually through images in the training 
phase. 
For the training phase, 96 clip-art images were collected. Forty-eight of these 
images corresponded to the Czech words used in the training set, and 48 images were 
distractor images that did not correspond to any of the foreign words. Each of the 96 
images was used three times in the training phase of the study. The distribution of the 
distractor images was balanced throughout the training phase so that they did not occur 
more than once with any particular Czech noun. The complete set of images used in 
this thesis can be found in Appendix J. 
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Three stimulus sentences were created for each of the 48 Czech nouns in the 
training set. Of these three sentences, one sentence was written in such a way that the 
Czech noun occurred in the nominative case, one sentence included the noun in the 
accusative case, and one sentence had the noun marked for the instrumental case. In 
summary, each Czech noun occurred three times in the training set, each time in a 
different sentence and each time with a different function and case marking. This 
resulted in a total of 144 sentences–48 sentences for each of the three morphological 
categories. Please see Appendix C for a complete list of the stimulus array used in this 
experiment. 
In addition to the inflected Czech noun, the word order in the sentences was 
scrambled according to four syntactic patterns (see Table 5.2, below, for templates of 
syntactic patterns and example sentences). There were a number of reasons for 
scrambling the word order in these sentences. Firstly, scrambled word order is more 
reflective of natural languages with rich morphologies. As in Czech, such languages 
rely on case endings rather than on word order to mark functions within the sentence. 
Secondly, the syntactic patterns allowed for controlling the position of the foreign or 
Czech word within the sentence. This ensured that the position of the foreign word 
could not serve as a reliable indicator of its function within the sentence. Finally, it has 
been argued that stimuli need to be sufficiently complex for the development of implicit 
knowledge within short training contexts (Reber, 1993; Rebuschat, 2013). The 
reasoning behind this claim is that if the stimuli are relatively simple, it will be easy for 
participants to ‘crack the code’ and to develop a conscious understanding of the rules 
governing the stimulus domain. Furthermore, if the stimulus domain appears simple, it 
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could potentially encourage the use of explicit learning strategies, such as rule-search 
behaviour, thus jeopardising the construct validity of the incidental learning conditions. 
In summary, given the relatively limited scope of the morphological system utilised in 
the present study, varying the syntactic patterns arguably increases both the ecological 
validity of the stimulus domain and the internal validity of the research design. 
 
 
All the sentences in the training phase were written so that an approximate meaning of 
the foreign word could be inferred by the participants from the rest of the sentence. In 
the construction of the training and testing sets, care was taken to control for the length 
of the sentences. Each sentence had exactly 12 syllables, and a frequency analysis 
confirmed that the number of words per sentence was not a reliable indicator of 
morphological category during the training phase, F (2, 141) = 1.322, p = .27, η2 = .02. 
Table 5.2.  
Template, Sample Sentences, and Frequencies for the Four Syntactic Patterns in 
Pilot Study 1 
Pattern Template Frequency 
Pattern 1 [[AP]TEMP > [NP]OBJ > [VP] > [NP]SUBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. (12) 
Accusative Last month the kasu opened Patrick with the key. (12) 
Instrumental Some time ago John scared the child with a zrudou. (12) 
Pattern 2  [[AP]TEMP > [NP]SUBJ > [VP] > [NP]OBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative Last year the prodejna shipped goods to the 
shoppers. 
(12) 
Accusative All week the builder took his vrtacku to work. (12) 
Instrumental Today the wooden board cut he with a pilkou. (12) 
Pattern 3  [[NP]OBJ >[VP] > [PP] >[AP]TEMP > [NP]SUBJ]  
Nominative David's face cut at the sink at night the britva. (12) 
Accusative The zahradu planted with fruits weeks ago Beth. (12) 
Instrumental The dishes washed with a myckou last night Peter. (12) 
Pattern 4  [[NP]SUBJ >[VP] > [PP] >[AP]TEMP > [NP]OBJ]  
Nominative The kocka killed with its teeth this morning the 
bird. 
(12) 
Accusative The cat chased in the house in summer the mysku. (12) 
Instrumental Sarah shot with a flintou weeks ago a bird. (12) 
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In addition, all English words in the stimulus materials were among the 2000 most 
frequent English words, as determined by Lextutor’s vocabulary profile programme 
(Cobb, 2012). The sentences were also the same in terms of lexical diversity (types per 
tokens, M = .04, SD = .01), lexical density (content words per total number of words, 
M = .59, SD = .01), and average word length (number of syllables per word, M = 1.30, 
SD = .04).  
  
Testing Set 
The testing set of this experiment consisted of 48 new sentences. Half of these 
sentences (24) were transfer items; in other words, they consisted of novel Czech words 
and sentences that had not occurred in the training set. The other half of the sentences 
(24) were partially trained items in that the Czech word in these sentences had occurred 
in the training set, but in a different sentence context.  
All items in the testing set were designed with the same considerations as were 
those in the training set, controlling for the total number of syllables per sentence (12), 
as well as for lexical and syntactic complexity. A frequency analysis of the testing set 
indicated that the average stimulus length was the same for the grammatical and 
ungrammatical items (9.04 words per sentence). There was also no significant 
difference between the sentence length of the stimulus materials used in the training 
phase (M = 9.15 words) and in the testing phase (M = 9.04 words), t (66.901) = 1.068, 
p = .29, d = .18. This indicates that sentence length could not serve as a reliable 
predictor of grammaticality during the testing phase. 
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The ungrammatical items in the testing set were generated by replacing the 
correct case marking with one of the other two case markers that had also been present 
in the training set. Incorrect case markings were balanced across the testing phase. Of 
the 48 total items in the testing phase, 16 were nominative (-a), 16 were accusative (-
u), and 16 were instrumental (-ou). Eight of the nominative items were grammatical 
and eight were ungrammatical. Of the eight ungrammatical nominative case-items, four 
were created by replacing the nominative marker (-a) with the accusative marker (-u), 
and four by replacing the nominative marker with the instrumental marker (-ou). The 
same procedure was followed to create the accusative and instrumental items. In 
summary, care was taken to ensure that participants could only make correct 
judgements in the testing phase if they were able to identify instances of correct and 
incorrect case marking. Examples of the sentences used in the testing set can be found 
in Appendix D. 
5.1.2.4. Procedure 
As noted above, the experiment consisted of three phases: a training phase, a 
testing phase and a debriefing session, during which the participants provided 
retrospective verbal reports. The experimental group completed all three of these 
phases; the control group took part in the testing phase and the debriefing session. The 
experiment took place in a private office on campus. The training and testing phases of 
the experiment were delivered via a Dell Thinkpad T410 laptop computer, using the 
stimulus presentation software Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corp, San Pedro, CA). All audio 
for the experiment was played through a set of Audio-Technica headphones with noise-
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cancellation functionality. Following the testing phase, participants completed a short 
debriefing questionnaire, followed by an oral interview.  
Training phase 
In the training phase, participants were exposed to the stimulus material under 
incidental learning conditions; in other words, they did not know they were going to be 
tested. Furthermore, following common practice in recent studies on incidental learning 
(Hamrick, 2013; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012), the training phase was deliberately 
designed to disguise the real purpose of the training task. Participants were told that 
they were going to take part in a study on learning foreign language vocabulary. Their 
task was to listen to a sentence, then match the meaning of the foreign (Czech) word 
(such as žehličkou) to one of two pictures (see the description of the images, above) 
displayed on the monitor (for example, an iron or a broom). Participants were given no 
feedback on the accuracy of their decisions. Figure 5A, below, illustrates the training 
procedure. 
 
 
Figure 5A. Training Procedure in Pilot Study 1.  
 At no point during the training phase were participants informed that the foreign 
nouns were inflected for case, nor that they would be tested afterwards. Participants 
listened to all 144 sentences without a break. These sentences were presented in a 
Fixation Cross
Listen to 
sentence
Match foreign 
word to picture
Fixation Cross
Listen to next 
sentence
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different, randomised order for each participant. The entire training phase took about 
25 minutes to complete. Please see Figure 5B, below, for examples of the slides used 
in the training phase of Pilot Study 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5B. Example of Slides Used During the Training Phase of Pilot Study 1 
 Testing Phase 
 The testing phase for this experiment consisted of a 48-item grammaticality 
judgement task. Following the training phase, participants in the experimental group 
were informed that the sentences in the previous section were not arbitrary, but were 
part of a complex system. They were then told that they would listen to 48 new 
sentences, half of which belonged to the same system, and half of which did not. For 
each test sentence, participants had to decide if the sentence belonged to the same 
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system as quickly as possible. No feedback was provided on the accuracy of the 
participants' decisions. See Figure 5C below for an illustration of the testing procedure, 
and Figure 5D, below, for the slides that were used in Superlab for the testing phase of 
the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 5C. Testing procedure in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
 
Fixation Cross
Listen to 
Sentence
Judge Sentence
Report 
Confidence 
Report Basis of 
Judgement
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Figure 5D. Example of Slides Used in the Testing Phase of Pilot Study 1 
 At the end of the experiment, the participants were also prompted to describe, 
in both a written questionnaire and as part of a follow-up oral interview, any rules or 
patterns they might have noticed. In the oral interviews, the researcher asked the 
candidates to elaborate on their responses in the written questionnaire. Finally, the 
researcher explained the underlying rule system and asked the participants again if they 
had figured it out or had any intuition about it at any point during the experiment. 
5.1.2.5. Statistical Analyses 
 Performance on the grammaticality judgement task was initially analysed using 
mean accuracy rates and logit mixed-effects models. As mixed-effects models will be 
unfamiliar to many SLA researchers, some background to these statistical procedures 
is provided in the section below. Before examining the subjective measures of 
awareness to determine the degree to which the exposure phase resulted in implicit 
and/or explicit knowledge on the part of the participants, it must first be established 
that the incidental training conditions produced a significant learning effect. This is 
necessary because subjective measures of awareness are designed to determine whether 
knowledge acquired during an experiment is implicit or explicit in nature. If the results 
of the experiment do not indicate a significant learning effect, it can be assumed that 
no knowledge, implicit or explicit, was acquired as a result of incidental exposure (see 
Rebuschat, 2013). 
5.1.2.6. Mixed-effects Statistical Models 
Within the psycholinguistic literature, there has been a surge of interest in 
mixed-effects statistical models to the degree that mixed-effects models are now 
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considered the preferred type of analysis when dealing with judgement data, such as 
on a GJT (Schütze & Sprouse, 2013; see also Ionin & Zyzik, 2014 for a review of 
judgement tasks in SLA). This interest in mixed-effects modelling followed a special 
issue of the Journal of Memory and Language, which contained several articles 
espousing the use of this type of analysis (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Jaeger, 
2008; Quené & van der Bergh, 2008). As argued within these articles, there are a 
number of advantages in the use of mixed-effects models in psycholinguistic research 
(see Linck & Cunnings, 2015 for a discussion). Of particular relevance to the present 
thesis is that these models address what is referred to as the "language-as-fixed-effect 
fallacy" (Baayen et al., 2008; Clark, 1973; Coleman, 1964). This argument holds that, 
although significance testing is typically carried out in order to determine if the 
results of a study can be generalised beyond the participants who took part in it, little 
is known regarding whether the results of experiments can be generalised beyond the 
linguistic items included in them. In other words, "there is little statistical evidence 
that such studies could be successfully replicated if a different sample of language 
materials were used” (Coleman, 1964, p. 219). Mixed-effects models are able to treat 
both subjects and items as random variables, thus allowing for a better generalisation 
of the results (Gagné & Spalding, 2009).  
At this point, it is worth defining some terms that will aid in understanding 
mixed-effects statistical models. SLA researchers will be familiar with the terms 
dependent variable and independent variable. Dependent variables are the variables 
of focus in a particular experiment. Independent variables are variables that are 
selected and manipulated by the researcher to determine the effect these 
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manipulations have on the dependent variable (Brown, 1998). Mixed-effects models, 
on the other hand, adopt different terminology and are discussed in terms of fixed 
effects and random effects (see Cunnings, 2012, for an overview of mixed-effects 
models in second language research). In mixed-effects models, fixed effects are 
typically the points of interest in a study, and are often equivalent to the independent 
variable in an experiment. Random effects are variables originating from the random 
selection of subjects (such as age) and/or items (such as word length) included in a 
particular experiment (Quené & van den Bergh, 2008). 
Within this thesis, mixed-effects models were implemented using R (R Core 
Team, 2014) and lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). All models were 
set up using the maximal structure advocated by Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily 
(2013) in which the statistical model always includes a corresponding random slope 
for each fixed effect. Furthermore, these models largely followed the procedures laid 
out by Cunnings (2012; see also Baayen et al., 2008; Jaeger, 2008; Linck & 
Cunnings, 2015), and which have been adopted by a number of recent studies in SLA 
(de Zeeuw, Verhoeven, & Schreuder, 2012; Jackson, 2014; Linck, Kroll, & 
Sunderman, 2009; Sonbul & Schmitt, 2013). Following Cunnings and Sturt (2014) 
and Barr et al. (2013); if the maximal model failed to converge, the random effect that 
accounted for the least variance in the data was removed until the model converged.  
There were several steps in the process of analysing the data using these 
mixed-effects models. First, a series of analyses were carried out to determine which 
fixed effects showed a significant relationship with the dependent variable. Within 
standard regression models, such a procedure is carried out to avoid multicollinearity, 
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or the correlational between predictor variables in the model. A benefit of avoiding 
multicollinearity is that a reduction in the number of factors entered into the model 
raises the statistical power of a study; in other words, the probability of detecting 
statistical significance (Brown, 2015).  
Although mixed-effects models are considered robust against violations of 
assumptions that constrain traditional regression analyses, such as normality of 
distributions, homoscedascity and sphericity (Quené & van den Burgh, 2008), it is 
important to ensure that collinearity between the fixed effects is not impacting on the 
results of the study (Baayen, 2008). Within standard regression models, such an 
analysis is typically carried out by producing a correlational matrix, for example by 
examining the bivariate correlations within a regression model (Jeun, 2015; Pallant, 
2013; see also Brooks & Kempe, 2013 for an example). Highly correlated predictor 
variables are then either removed from the model, or are combined to form a single 
predictor variable (Jeun, 2015).  
One problem with such an approach is that a typical correlational analysis 
does not control for subject and item effects in the same manner as do mixed-effects 
models. Therefore, an alternative approach in which the predictor variables were 
analysed against a null model using the χ2 statistic of a likelihood ratio test was 
adopted here. Significant predictor variables were then compiled into a final model, 
which was formally examined for multicollinearity using Cohen's kappa (Cohen, 
1968). Such a methodology allows for an examination of the relationship between the 
dependent variable and predictor variables, albeit on an individual basis, while 
controlling for subject and item effects in the data.  
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This procedure was carried out as follows. First, a null model was built, which 
analysed the dependent variable in terms of crossed random intercepts of subjects and 
items. This model was then compared with a second model that included a fixed 
effect as well as a corresponding random slope using the χ2 statistic, as stated above. 
If this ratio test indicated a significantly improved fit for the second model, this result 
was then interpreted as a significant relationship with the dependent variable.18 This 
was done on a one-by-one basis with each of the fixed effects of interest. 
Next, the fixed effects that did show a significant relationship with the 
dependent variable were all entered into a new model, which include random slopes 
for each of these fixed effects. This model was then examined in order to determine if 
the "complete" model warranted the inclusion of all of the fixed effects. This was 
done by removing the fixed effects one at a time, and then comparing this model with 
the complete model. If a likelihood ratio test indicated that the exclusion of a 
particular fixed effect led to an improved model fit, the fixed effect in question was 
then removed from further analyses. This procedure was carried out on an individual 
basis for each fixed effect in order to arrive at the best fitting model. In all cases, the 
best fitting model was formally analysed for multicollinearity by computing Cohen's 
kappa (Cohen, 1968). Following Baayen (2008; see also Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 
1980) a kappa value of less than 6 is indicative of low collinearity, between 6 and 30 
of moderate collinearity, and over 30 of severe collinearity. 
                                                     
18 It is important to note that χ2 can also be used to interpret whether a fixed effect is significant (see 
Barr et al., 2012). However, as it has been argued that this method is anti-conservative (Pinheiro & 
Bates, 2000), particularly with smaller sample sizes (Barr et al., 2012). Here, it is interpreted as a 
significant relationship between the predictor variable and the dependent variable. 
143 
 
The next step in this process was to analyse the summary statistics for the 
best-fit model. Following Linck and Cunnings (2015; see also Baayen et al., 2008), 
significance here is interpreted as absolute t-value or z-value ≥ 2.019. It is also 
important to discuss briefly how significant main effects, as indicated by the absolute 
t-value, should be interpreted. If a fixed effect reaches significance within the model, 
then this indicates that the effect in question is significant in accounting for variance 
in the overall dataset. As an example, if a model indicates that the fixed effect of 
group is significant, this points towards a significant difference in accuracy between 
the two variables within two categories within the fixed effect of group (experimental 
and control). In addition to significant main effects, the mixed-effects model can also 
indicate a significant interaction between two fixed effects. It is important to note 
again that a significant interaction does not indicate a correlation between fixed 
effects, but that the effects interact to explain variances in the data. For example, if 
the model results in a significant interaction between group and case, then this result 
points towards differences between the experimental and control groups' 
performances with regard to the different case markers assessed in the testing phase. 
In the event of significant interactions, post-hoc Tukey tests were conducted to 
ascertain the exact nature of the relationship. These tests were carried out using the 
GLHT command of the R package "multcomp" (Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008).  
Following the example provided by Baayen (2008), effect sizes for the logit-
mixed effects model were calculated using the C index of concordance and the Hmisc 
                                                     
19 For logit mixed-effects analyses, the lmer package automatically approximates p-values based on the 
t-value or z-value. However, this is not provided for linear mixed-effects models (as used in 
Experiment 3). 
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package (Harrell & Dupont, 2015). C index values range from .5 to 1, with .5 
representing no fit and 1 representing a perfect fit of the data.  A C-index of .7 is 
interpreted as a moderate fit, .8 and above as a good fit, and .9 and above as an 
excellent fit for the data (Gries, 2013). Effect sizes for the post-hoc Tukey tests were 
calculated using Cohen's d. Following Plonsky and Oswald's (2014) 
recommendations, Cohen's d of .40 is considered small, .70 medium, and of 1.00 and 
higher as a large effect size. 
5.1.3. Results 
5.1.3.1. Retrospective verbal reports 
An analysis of the retrospective verbal reports (both written and oral) revealed 
several important points. Firstly, with regard to the stimulus set, all the participants 
(28/28) commented on the syntactic patterns, with a number of comments related to the 
fact that some of the patterns were “strange” or “different from English.” Several of the 
participants (12/28) suggested that these sentences were more challenging to 
understand. In other words, they noted that the varying syntactic patterns made it more 
difficult to comprehend the overall meaning of the sentence. With regard to the case 
markers in particular, none of the participants (0/28) in the experimental group were 
able to verbalise the target morphological rules at the end of the experiment, even when 
the experimenter prompted them to guess. In addition, after the experimenter explained 
the rules to the participants and asked if they had thought of these rules previously, 
none of the participants stated that they had done so. Also, only around half (13/28) of 
the participants reported noticing the endings of the foreign words and the fact that the 
endings were different on different words. Furthermore, when prompted to guess why 
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the endings of the foreign words were changing, slightly more than half of the 
participants (16/28) guessed that the changing inflections were related to noun gender 
in some manner.  
5.1.3.2. Picture-matching task 
The analysis of the participants' performance on the picture-matching task in the 
training phase of the experiment indicated that they were able to match the foreign 
word with its corresponding picture correctly and with great accuracy (M = 95.93%, 
SD = 3.50%).  
5.1.3.3. GJT 
Descriptive statistics were compiled to examine the performance of the 
experimental and control groups on the GJT. These statistics were generated both with 
regard to overall performance, and with regard to performance in the various sub-
categories of the GJT, as can be seen in Table 5.3 below.  
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Table 5.3.  
Results of Pilot Study 1: Descriptive Statistics (%) for Experimental and 
Control Groups across Sub-components of GJT 
 
Item Type  Descriptive Statistics (%)  
Group  M SD SE  
Grammatical      
Experimental  50.80 10.54 2.07  
Control  47.47 10.92 2.23  
Ungrammatical      
Experimental  55.45 8.56 1.68  
Control  53.65 10.38 2.19  
Nominative      
Experimental  49.76 11.25 2.21  
Control  50.00 11.06 2.26  
Accusative      
Experimental  53.85 8.12 1.59  
Control  51.56 13.82 2.82  
Instrumental      
Experimental  55.96 10.85 2.13  
Control  51.75 13.83 2.82  
Trained Items     
Experimental  50.80 7.17 1.41 
Control  48.78 8.99 1.83 
Transfer Items     
Experimental  55.45 7.70 1.53 
Control  52.43 7.05 1.44 
Pattern 1     
Experimental  56.09 9.88 1.94 
Control  52.79 16.97 3.46 
Pattern 2     
Experimental  51.92 9.22 1.81 
Control  52.78 9.41 1.92 
Pattern 3     
Experimental  54.49 11.84 2.32 
Control  46.18 14.94 3.05 
Pattern 4     
Experimental  51.60 13.75 3.00 
Control  51.39 12.45 2.54 
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 At a cursory glance, the overall performance of the experimental group (M = 
53.13%, SD = 3.79%) appeared to be only slightly higher than was the performance of 
the control group (M = 50.60%, SD = 5.72%). However, examination of the sub-
analyses revealed larger differences in the performance of the experimental versus that 
of the control group for Type 1 and Type 3 syntactic patterns, as well as for instrumental 
case items. In order to determine whether these differences in performance were 
statistically significant, a logit mixed-effects regression model (Jaeger, 2008) was 
carried out using the lme package (Bates et al., 2014) within R (R Core Team, 2014) to 
examine the relationship between group (experimental versus control) and accuracy in 
the GJT. At this point, initial analyses were carried out to determine which fixed effects 
had a significant relationship with the dependent variable; in other words, performance 
in the GJT via a series of logit mixed-effects analyses. For each of these analyses, a 
null model was constructed, which analysed performance on the GJT as a binary 
outcome (correct versus incorrect) in terms of subject and item as crossed random 
intercepts. Additional models were then built for each fixed effect. The fixed effects 
included in this model incorporated group (experimental versus control), 
grammaticality (grammatical versus ungrammatical test items), case (nominative 
versus accusative versus instrumental), syntax (Type 1, Type 2, Type 3, Type 4), and 
transfer (trained versus transfer items). Each of these models included the variable as a 
fixed effect, as well as a random slope (Barr et al., 2013). These models were then 
compared individually against the null model using the χ2 statistic. The results of these 
comparisons can be seen in Table 5.4 below. 
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Table 5.4. 
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests on Predictor Variables on the Logit Mixed-
effects Model of Pilot Study 1 
Predictor 
Variable 
χ2 df p C 
Group 90.35 3 ˂ .001*** .67 
Case 1.65 7 .98 .66 
Syntax 0.30 3 .96 .65 
Grammaticality 7.23 3 .06+ .67 
Transfer 1.12 3 .77 .65 
+p˂.1, *p˂.05, **p˂.01, ***p˂.001 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.4 above, only the fixed effect for group showed a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable. However, as the fixed effect of 
grammaticality appeared to be trending towards significance, this fixed effect was 
included in the combined model on an exploratory basis. Thus, a new model was 
constructed, which included group and grammaticality as fixed effects, crossed 
random intercepts for subjects and items, a random slope for grammaticality by 
participant, and a random slope for group by item. A likelihood ratio test indicated 
that this model was a significantly better fit for the data than was the original null 
model, χ2 (7) = 101.55, p ˂ 0.001, C =.71. Multicollinearity was formally assessed 
using Cohen's kappa. This resulted in a kappa value of 2.91 which, according to 
Baayen's (2008) guidelines, indicates a very low level of collinearity between the 
fixed effects in the model. A summary of this model can be found in Table 5.5 below. 
 
 
 
149 
 
 
 
Table 5.5. 
Results for the Best-fitting Logit Mixed-effects Model Examining Performance in 
the GJT for Pilot Study 1 
       Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By 
subject 
 By 
items 
Parameters  Estimate SE z p  SD  SD 
Intercept  -.02 .13 -.12 .90  .26  .51 
Group  .12 .24 1.24 .62  –  .94 
Gram  .23 .18 1.24 .22  .48  – 
Group: Gram  -.03 .35 -.09 .93     
 Note. Factors were coded using contrast coding20, as follows: Group (−.5 = 
Control, .5 = Experimental), Grammaticality (-.5 ungrammatical, 
.5=grammatical), formula: "correct~group*grammaticality + 
(grammaticality|subject) + (group|item), family=binomial). 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.5 above, neither the fixed effects of group, 
grammaticality, nor the interaction between group and grammaticality reached 
significance within this model. Therefore, it can be inferred that the performance of the 
experimental group did not differ significantly from that of the control group. In other 
words, the results of the logit mixed-effects analysis do not provide evidence of 
learning of the case marking system. 
However, it should be mentioned that further breakdowns of the performance 
of the experimental group pointed towards an interesting finding. In particular, this 
analysis indicated that participants might have displayed a bias in their responses in the 
GJT that was not made apparent by the initial sub-analyses. One such pattern that 
emerged was that the participants displayed a clear bias in their responses towards 
                                                     
20 As noted by Linck and Cunnings (2015), contrast coding aids in ensuring that the mixed-effects 
model compiles successfully and also helps to reduce multicollinearity between the predictor variables. 
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foreign words that they had previously encountered in the training phase. For Transfer 
grammatical items, namely test sentences with Czech words that were not included in 
the training set, participants classified only 34.58% (SD = 11.71) of the sentences 
correctly. By contrast, for Trained grammatical items, or sentences with Czech words 
that the participants had encountered in the training phase, participants classified 
76.28% (SD = 15.75%) of the sentences accurately. These results suggest that the 
participants were more likely to judge a sentence as grammatical if the Czech word was 
familiar, and ungrammatical if the Czech word was unfamiliar. The same pattern held 
for ungrammatical items, where participants classified 66.99% (SD = 16.24) of transfer 
items correctly and 34.60% (SD = 15.40) of trained ungrammatical items correctly, 
again suggesting that participants were basing their judgements on the familiarity of 
the foreign word, rather than on the grammaticality of the case marker. In short, the 
results for the target case markers seem to have been skewed due to a shortcoming in 
the experimental design.  
5.1.4. Interim Discussion 
As noted above, there were two research questions for this study. Research 
question 1 examined the degree to which inflectional morphology can be acquired as a 
result of incidental exposure. Research Question 2 asked whether the knowledge gained 
as a result of this exposure is implicit or explicit in nature. Given the fact that no overall 
learning effect was demonstrated, it is assumed that no knowledge, neither implicit nor 
explicit, was acquired as a result of the training phase in Pilot Study 1. Therefore, the 
results of this experiment will not be discussed in the light of Research Question 2.  
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Regarding Research Question 1, the degree to which L2 inflectional 
morphology can be learned under incidental learning conditions, an analysis of the 
performance of the experimental participants did not reveal an overall learning effect. 
As noted above, further breakdowns of the performance of the experimental group 
revealed that their performance was highly skewed according to whether the test item 
contained a noun that was familiar; in other words, that had also been included in the 
training set. Taking the overall lack of a significant learning effect into account, it 
would appear that the training task might not have been sufficient to promote the 
learning of the target morphological structures. Of interest here is the experimental 
group’s performance in the picture-matching task during the training phase of the 
experiment. As noted in the results section above, the experimental group demonstrated 
almost perfect accuracy when asked to match the picture to the meaning of the foreign 
word after listening to each sentence in the training set. This near ceiling-level 
performance suggests that this task met its original intention–each sentence was written 
so that an approximate meaning of the foreign word could be deduced from the context. 
Despite this, when we consider that the experimental group’s performance 
during the testing phase of the experiment was not significantly different from that 
predicted by chance, it would appear that the training phase of the experiment did not 
result in the participants developing knowledge of the underlying morphological rule 
system. However, the question of why this was the case remains. As noted in Section 
4.1 above, inflectional morphology is an aspect of grammar that is notoriously difficult 
for L2 learners to acquire (DeKeyser, 2005). To account for this difficulty, a number 
of variables have been hypothesised to impact on the degree to which learners process, 
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and successfully acquire, inflection morphology in an L2. For example, as noted in 
Section 4.3.3, Goldschneider and DeKeyser (2001) found that perceptual salience, 
semantic complexity, morphophonological regularity, syntactic category and 
frequency all play a role in acquisition. In the present experiment, three different case 
endings were used; nominative -a (/ə/), accusative -u (/u/) and instrumental –ou (/oʊ/).  
Still more factors that have been argued to impact on the degree to which L2 
learners notice and process morphological form were discussed by Gor (2010). This 
review highlighted that individual difference variables, properties of the L1, the 
properties of the L2, and the properties of the input itself, such as modality, all affect 
the degree to which the learners process inflected forms in the input. In the case of the 
present experiment, it seems plausible that the properties of the input might have played 
an important factor in the degree to which the participants needed to attend to the 
relevant features of the input. As noted in Section 4.3.1, theories of input processing 
(Van Patten, 2004b) hold that learners are unlikely to process morphological markers 
that have a redundant function and/or semantic mapping (Sagarra, 2008; Van Patten, 
2004b). In other words, if participants are able to decipher the meaning of an utterance 
through lexical means, they are less likely to attend to grammatical markers that encode 
the same meaning. For example, if we analyse a sentence from the training set of Pilot 
Study 1, Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field, the verb eat typically entails 
an animate agent. Given that grass is inanimate, a participant would be able to surmise 
that koza is most likely the subject of the sentence. Thus, this utterance contains two 
redundant cues that provide information about the subject of the sentence: the 
inflectional marker –a and the verb “ate”. This redundancy could then be interpreted as 
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suggesting that the participants in Pilot Study 1 might not have noticed the case markers 
in the training phase of the experiment because they were able to comprehend the 
sentence via lexical means. Similar interpretations can be found in previous studies that 
examined the learning of L2 inflectional morphology. For example, Robinson (2002, 
2005) noted that the higher performance on locative case markers, as opposed to 
ergative and noun-incorporation markers, could be explained in relation to the opacity 
of the form-meaning mapping carried by these markers. 
In short, when taking into account the fact that the participants were able to 
complete the picture-matching task in the training phase with a high degree of accuracy, 
it appears that the training conditions did not necessitate that the participants attended 
to the morphological markers in order to complete the given task. Given theoretical 
arguments that noticing is a facilitative, if not essential, condition for learning to occur 
(Schmidt, 2001), future experimental designs would be strengthened by modifying the 
training conditions to provide more opportune conditions for noticing to take place. In 
previous studies of incidental learning (Rebuschat, 2008; Rebuschat & Williams, 
2012), in which no learning was detected in initial experiments, the researchers were 
able to trigger development by modifying the training task to include elicited 
repetitions (asking participants to repeat the stimulus sentence aloud) in addition to 
making a judgement based on the content of the sentence. 
In addition to the semantic redundancy present in the stimulus sentences, the 
syntactic complexity of the stimulus array may also have impacted on the degree to 
which the participants attended to the relevant morphological markers during the 
training phase of Pilot Study 1. Supporting this claim are the results from the verbal 
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reports of Pilot Study 1, in which several participants commented that the “strange” 
word order made it more difficult to follow the overall meaning of the sentences. It 
would appear logical that more complex sentences place greater demands on attentional 
resources in order to comprehend them. This interpretation also appears to concur with 
points discussed above in relation to input processing, in particular to claims that 
learners prioritise meaning over grammatical form during input processing, as well as 
to arguments for attention being characterised as a limited-capacity system (Baddeley, 
2012; see also Neumann, 1996; Schmidt, 2001; Tomlin & Villa, 1994 for a general 
discussion of the nature of the construct of attention). Following this line of argument, 
if the more complex, less “English-like” sentences were more difficult for the 
participants to understand, they would be unlikely to direct their attention towards the 
morphological markers. It would then stand to reason, in the case of the present study, 
that limiting the syntactic complexity of the sentences could potentially reduce the 
processing load during the training task, thus freeing up cognitive resources to attend 
to the relevant morphological markers. 
Taking the points above into account, it appears that one way to move forward 
in the present line of investigation would be to modify the conditions of the training 
phase of the experiment with the aim of increasing opportunities for learners to attend 
to the relevant forms in the input. It would also seem likely that reducing the overall 
complexity of the syntactic patterns might aid in promoting noticing during the training 
phase of the experiment, and thus trigger learning. 
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5.2. Pilot Study 2 
As with Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2 set out to address RQ 1 and RQ 2 in order 
to investigate the extent to which Czech morphology, specifically the nominative 
marker –a, the accusative marker –u, and the instrumental marker –ou, can be acquired 
under incidental learning conditions. As in Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2 followed the 
AGL paradigm to address the following research questions:  
1). To what degree can L2 case markings be learned under incidental learning 
conditions? 
2). What type of knowledge is acquired as a result of this exposure: implicit or explicit?  
Pilot Study 2 was identical to Pilot Study 1, with the exception of three 
alterations that are outlined below.  
5.2.1. Methods 
5.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-eight native speakers of English participated in Pilot Study 2. These 
participants were randomly assigned to experimental (n = 14; 9 female, 5 male) and 
control (n = 14; 8 female, 6 male) groups. The demographics of the participants were 
similar to those of the participants in Pilot Study 1. The ages of the participants 
(English L1) ranged from 18 to 24 years (M = 20.22, SD = 1.71).  
The data collection for this experiment stopped short of the intended target (a 
minimum of 20 participants per group) due to the lack of a significant learning effect 
and small effect sizes. 
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5.2.1.2. Research Ethics 
As with Pilot Study 1, this experiment was approved as exempt by the 
research support office of Lancaster University. Informed consent to take part in the 
experiment was sought from each individual participant prior to the start of the 
training phase of this study. Furthermore, the same ethical procedures were followed 
as described in Section 5.1.2.2, above. 
5.2.1.3. Stimulus Material 
Two modifications were made between Pilot Study 1 to 2 with regard to the 
stimulus materials for the training and testing sets. Firstly, in order to reduce the 
overall level of complexity of the stimulus material, the number of syntactic patterns 
for both the training and the testing sets was reduced from four to two, as can be seen 
in Table 5.6, below.  
 
It was hypothesised that limiting the syntactic structures in Pilot Study 2 to 
two patterns would help to reduce the cognitive demands of the stimulus domain, thus 
Table 5.6.  
Templates, Sample Sentences, and Frequencies for the Two Syntactic Patterns Included in 
the Training and Testing Sets for Pilot Study 2 
Pattern Template Frequency 
Pattern 1 [[AP]TEMP > [NP]OBJ > [VP] > [NP]SUBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative 
 
Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. (24) 
Accusative 
 
Last month the kasu opened Patrick with the key. (24) 
Instrumental Some time ago John scared the child with a zrudou. (24) 
Pattern 2  [[AP]TEMP > [NP]SUBJ > [VP] > [NP]OBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative 
 
Last year the prodejna shipped goods to the shoppers. (24) 
Accusative 
 
All week the builder took his vrtacku to work. (24) 
Instrumental Today the wooden board cut he with a pilkou. (24) 
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freeing up cognitive resources, which could then potentially be allocated to attend to 
the target morphological structures. In addition, a second modification was carried 
out with regard to the stimulus sentences in the testing set of Pilot Study 2. As noted 
in the discussion in Section 5.1.4, above, participants in Pilot Study 1 displayed some 
bias in their responses depending on whether or not the test item contained a familiar 
or an unfamiliar Czech noun. Because of this, it was apparent that participants were 
not basing their judgements on the grammaticality of a sentence, but rather on 
whether or not the sentence contained a foreign word that they had encountered 
before. To address this issue, the testing set of Pilot Study 2 was modified so that it 
included only novel Czech nouns, namely Czech nouns that were not used in the 
training set. 
5.2.1.4. Procedure 
The final alteration to Pilot Study 2 was that the procedure for the training phase was 
modified to include elicited imitations; in other words, participants were asked to 
repeat the entire sentence aloud prior to judging which of the two pictures more 
closely matched the meaning of the foreign word. This procedure can be seen in 
Figure 5E below. 
 
Figure 5E. Procedure of the Training Phase in Pilot Study 2 
The rationale for including elicited imitations was that requiring participants 
to repeat the entire sentence aloud would necessitate attending to the entire sentence. 
Listen to 
sentence
Repeat sentence 
aloud
Match foreign 
word to picture
Fixation Cross
Listen to next 
sentence
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Thus, even if participants were to rely on lexis to interpret the overall meaning of the 
sentence, repeating the sentence aloud would help to ensure that the participants were 
attending to the surface features of the input, including the target morphological 
markers. In addition, as noted in the discussion of Pilot Study 1, when confronted 
with non-significant findings, previous incidental learning research (Rebuschat, 2008) 
managed to instigate learning by including elicited imitations in subsequent 
experimental designs. Examples of the slides used in the training phase of Pilot Study 
2 can be found in Figure 5F below. 
 
Figure 5F. Example of the Slides Used in the Training Phase of Pilot Study 2 
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5.2.1.5. Statistical Analyses.  
Similar to Pilot Study 1, performance on a grammaticality judgement task was 
analysed in the first instance using mean accuracy rates and logit mixed-effects 
statistical modelling. 
5.2.2. Results 
5.2.2.1. Retrospective Verbal Reports 
An analysis of the debriefing questionnaire revealed several interesting 
findings. Firstly, all the participants in the experimental group (14/14) reported 
noticing that the word order of the sentences was changing. However, in contrast to 
Pilot Study 1, these participants did not report that the changing syntax made it more 
difficult to comprehend the sentences, or to complete the training task. With 
particular reference to the case-marking system, none of the participants (0/14) 
reported becoming aware of the underlying rule system during the experiment. 
However, a majority (11/14) reported noticing that the endings of the foreign words 
were changing during the training phase of the study. When pushed to explain the 
rule underlying the changing case-endings, many of these participants (7/11) said that 
they assumed it was related to the gender of the noun. The remainder (4/11) reported 
that they thought that the foreign words might be changing, but were unsure as to 
whether they had misheard previous instances of the foreign words. When 
participants were asked what prompted them to notice the case markers, several of 
them stated that they only noticed the changing case-endings when the foreign words 
were repeated across different sentences in close proximity to each other, and several 
mentioned that they noticed the case markers on shorter foreign words, namely words 
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consisting of two syllables (such as myska), as opposed to words with three syllables 
(such as zahrada), during the experiment.  
5.2.2.2. Picture-matching task 
An analysis of the participants' performance on the picture-matching task in the 
training phase of the experiment indicated that they were able to match the foreign 
word with its corresponding picture correctly and with great accuracy (M = 98.30%, 
SD = 1.14%). This result is similar to the results from Pilot Study 1, and it suggests that 
the participants were able to work out part of the intended meaning of the sentences in 
the training phase of the experiment. Furthermore, it was noted in the experimenter’s 
report that the participants were able to repeat the sentences aloud successfully, despite 
the scrambled syntax and the inclusion of a foreign word. Taken together, these results 
suggest that the addition of the elicited imitations did not affect the degree to which the 
participants were able to complete the picture-matching task in the training phase of 
the experiment. 
5.2.2.3. GJT 
 As was the case with Pilot Study 1, descriptive statistics were generated to 
compare the performance of the experimental and control groups. As in Pilot Study 1, 
the overall accuracy on the GJT of the experimental group (M = 51.34%, SD = 
5.52%) was similar to that of the control group (M = 47.92%, SD = 7.30%). In 
addition, as can be seen in Table 5.7 below, the performance of the experimental and 
the control groups appeared similar across the different case markers and syntactic 
patterns, as well as for grammatical and ungrammatical test items.  
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Table 5.7.  
Results of Experiment 2: Descriptive Statistics (%) and Results of Independent 
Sample T-tests for Experimental and Control Groups across Sub-components of 
the GJT 
 
Item Type  Descriptive Statistics (%)  
Group  M SD SE  
Nominative      
Experimental  47.22 15.83 4.23  
Control  48.21 9.31 2.49  
Accusative      
Experimental  53.57 16.02 4.28  
Control  50.45 10.82 2.89  
Instrumental      
Experimental  53.13 10.62 2.84  
Control  45.09 9.55 2.55  
Grammatical     
Experimental  51.79 9.90 2.65 
Control  47.02 15.80 4.22 
Ungrammatical     
Experimental  50.89 8.52 2.28 
Control  48.81 11.37 3.04 
Pattern 1     
Experimental  53.87 7.92 2.12 
Control  49.40 9.92 2.65 
Pattern 2     
Experimental  48.81 7.29 1.97 
Control  46.43 8.15 2.18 
 
 As was the case in Pilot Study 1, a logit mixed-effects regression model (see 
Section 5.1.2 above for a discussion of mixed-effects modelling) was constructed using 
R (R Core Team, 2014) and lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) to examine whether any 
statistically significant differences existed between the performance of the 
experimental and of the control groups. Within this model, performance was modelled 
as a binary-outcome (correct versus incorrect), subjects and items were included as 
crossed random effects, and group (experimental versus control), case (nominative, 
accusative, instrumental), syntax (Type 1 versus Type 2) and grammaticality 
(grammatical versus ungrammatical test items) were analysed as fixed effects. 
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 Initial analyses were carried out to determine which fixed effects had a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable, namely the performance in the 
GJT. To this end, a series of logit mixed-effects analyses were carried out. For these 
analyses, a null model was constructed, which analysed performance on the GJT as a 
binary outcome (correct versus incorrect) in terms of subject and item as crossed 
random intercepts. Additional models were then built for each fixed effect. Each of 
these models included the variable as a fixed effect, as well as a random slope (Barr 
et al., 2013). As was done with the previous analyses in this thesis, these models were 
then compared individually against the null model using the χ2 statistic. The results of 
these comparisons can be seen in Table 5.8 below. 
Table 5.8. 
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests on Predictor Variables in the GJT in Pilot Study 2 
Predictor Variable χ2 df p C 
Group 215.14 3 ˂ .001*** .81 
Case 4.28 7 .75 .72 
Syntax 0.19 3 .98 .70 
Grammaticality 5.88 3 .12 .72 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.8, only the fixed effect of group showed a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable. Therefore, a model that included 
group as a fixed effect and as a random slope by item was the best fit model for this 
dataset. Multicollinearity was formally assessed using Cohen's kappa. This resulted in 
a kappa value of 1.19 which, according to Baayen's (2008) guidelines, indicates a 
very low level of collinearity between the fixed effects in the model.  However, as 
Table 5.9 below shows, a summary of this model indicates that the fixed effect of 
group did not reach significance. Thus, the results provide no evidence of a difference 
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in performance between the experimental and the control groups, and therefore no 
evidence of the learning of the target morphological structures. 
Table 5.9. 
Results for the Best-fitting Logit Mixed-effects Model Examining Performance on 
the GJT for Pilot Study 2 
       Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By 
subject 
 By 
items 
Parameters  Estimate SE z p  SD  SD 
Intercept  -.04 .12 -.31 .75  ˂ .001  .74 
Group  -.05 .08 -.62 .53  –  .51 
 Note. Factors were coded using contrast coding, as follows: Group (−.5 = 
Control, .5 = Experimental), Grammaticality (-.5 ungrammatical, 
.5=grammatical), formula: "correct~group*grammaticality+ 
(grammaticality|subject) + (group|item), family=binomial). 
 
5.2.3. Discussion 
Despite the various changes made to the stimulus materials and experimental 
procedure, the training phase did not result in a clear learning effect in Pilot Study 2. 
This nonsignificant result held true with regard to both the overall performance of the 
experimental group, and to their performance in the various sub-categories of the 
GJT.  
Although a learning effect was not found in the present experiment, it is worth 
evaluating the effectiveness of the changes that were made between Pilot Studies 1 
and 2. In particular, it is important to determine whether these changes were 
successful with regard to the original rationale(s) for making these modifications. As 
has been described above, there were two major changes to the training phase of the 
experiment from Pilot Study 1 to Pilot Study 2. First, in order to reduce the overall 
complexity of the stimulus domain, the number of syntactic patterns was reduced 
from four to two. The second change was that the procedure during the training phase 
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was modified to include elicited imitations. This change was carried out under the 
assumption that asking the participants to repeat the sentences aloud would lead to 
more noticing of the target morphological markers. 
Concerning the first change (reducing the number of syntactic structures), it is 
worth noting that all of the participants in Pilot Study 2 freely reported noticing the 
changing word order of the stimulus sentences. However, unlike Pilot Study 1 in 
which participants reported having difficulty following the meaning of the sentences, 
the participants in Pilot Study 2 did not report such difficulties. Based on these 
reports, reducing the complexity of the stimulus array could be seen as a successful 
alteration, due to the fact that reducing the syntactic complexity appears to have 
reduced the difficulty that the participants had in comprehending the stimuli.  
Although syntactic complexity undoubtedly contributed to the relative 
difficulty of the training task in Pilot Study 2, another variable that may have 
impacted on the findings concerns the number of times each syntactic pattern was 
repeated throughout the training phase. It should be noted that Pilot Study 1 consisted 
of four syntactic patterns, which were repeated 36 times each for a total of 144 
exposures. In order to keep the total number of exposures constant across 
Experiments 1 and 2, the two syntactic patterns in Pilot Study 2 were each repeated 
within 72 sentences. Given the argument that repetition plays an important role in 
SLA (N. Ellis, 2006), it seems plausible that the repetition here might also have had 
some impact on the degree of difficulty of the training task. In particular, repetition 
might have led to the participants growing more accustomed to these patterns over the 
course of the training phase. 
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Concerning the second modification (adding elicited imitations to the training 
set), it is less certain whether this change was successful as per the original 
assumptions. As noted above, the experimenter’s report noted that the participants 
were able to repeat the sentences aloud, including the inflected foreign word. When 
we compare the results of the retrospective verbal reports, it appears that a higher 
proportion of participants in Pilot Study 2 (11/14) reported noticing the changing 
inflections than was the case with the proportion of participants in Pilot Study 
1(12/28). It is important to stress, however, that this finding should not be interpreted 
as direct evidence that the elicited imitations led to more noticing on the part of the 
participants, particularly given the limitations of retrospective verbal reports. As 
noted in Section 3.5.2 above, retrospective verbal reports have frequently been 
criticised as an insensitive measure of awareness, especially with regard to concurrent 
awareness during the training phase of an experiment. Given the multiple changes 
between Experiments 1 and 2, it is not possible to say which change, or combination 
of changes, led to more noticing being reported in the retrospective verbal reports. 
However, it should be stressed that the data here suggest that, although the changes 
from Pilot Study 1 to Pilot Study 2 did not lead to a significant learning effect in the 
GJT, these changes do appear to have fostered more reported noticing (Schmidt, 
1990) of the target morphological markers during the training phase of the 
experiment. 
Despite the evidence above, which suggests that more noticing of the target 
structures took place in Pilot Study 2, it appears that the training conditions were not 
sufficient to spark a learning effect amongst the participants. At this point, it is worth 
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returning to the retrospective verbal reports for guidance as to how future experiments 
might be modified to promote learning. As noted in the results section above, several 
of the participants commented during the debriefing session that they noticed the 
endings of the shorter foreign words, such as kocka and myska, during the training 
phase. Although the length of the foreign word was not a variable that was controlled 
for in either Pilot Study 1 or 2, previous research into the acquisition of inflectional 
morphology (Brooks et al., 2006) has indicated that word length does impact on the 
acquisition of word form. This impact is partly attributable to the fact that longer 
words place more demands on phonological short-term memory (N. Ellis, 1996; 
Gupta, 2003). Thus, controlling for word length might be an avenue to explore in 
future experiments, in that using only shorter words might free up additional 
cognitive resources that could, in theory, be allocated towards more in-depth 
processing of the target morphological markers. 
In addition to word length, some participants also reported that they only 
noticed the endings when the base forms of the foreign words were repeated with a 
different case marker. It seems then, as per one of this study’s original assumptions, 
that the repetition of a foreign word across different morphological categories might 
promote noticing of the changing case ending. Furthermore, future experiments might 
benefit in additional ways from manipulating the training phase in light of the 
positive effects of repetition. For example, the order of the sentences in the training 
set could be pseudo-randomised, so that the three instances of each foreign word 
occur within close proximity. Another possibility might be to insert more repetition 
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directly into the training set, for instance by reducing the total number of sentences, 
but repeating each of these sentences several times in the exposure phase. 
5.3. Summary of Pilot Studies 1 and 2 
In summary, the results of Pilot Study 1 and Pilot Study 2 serve to illustrate 
that the learning of a semi-artificial system under incidental learning conditions might 
not be a straightforward matter; no learning effect was observed in either study, 
despite the fact that the morphological system used in both studies represented a 
greatly simplified version of a natural linguistic system. The linguistic system in Pilot 
Study 1 consisted of three morphological patterns that were used individually within 
sentences that followed one of four syntactic patterns. The training task in this 
experiment was designed so that participants' attention was focused on the meaning 
of the foreign word, rather than on the grammatical form. Participants listened to a 
sentence, and then indicated which of two pictures best matched the meaning of the 
foreign word in the given sentence. The results of the GJT indicate that the training 
conditions were not sufficient to promote learning of the morphological system. Pilot 
Study 2 simplified the linguistic system of Pilot Study 1 by reducing the number of 
syntactic patterns from four to two. In addition, the training phase of Pilot Study 2 
was modified so that the participants listened to a sentence, repeated the sentence 
aloud, and then indicated which of two pictures best matched the meaning of the 
foreign word in the sentence. It was hypothesised that these two changes would result 
in more conscious noticing, and subsequent learning, of the target morphological 
markers. This was, however, not the case. 
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It is clear at this stage that changes need to be made to future experiments if 
these experiments are to be successful in promoting the learning of the semi-artificial 
system utilised here. Based on the evidence collected via the retrospective verbal 
reports, it appears that one way forward is to further simplify the linguistic system in 
this study, as well as to make additional changes to the training task to promote the 
degree to which participants attend to the case endings present in the input. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
 
This chapter presents two of the experiments of this thesis, which are referred 
to henceforth as Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. As with Pilot Studies 1 and 2, both 
Experiment 1 and 2 followed the AGL paradigm to address the following research 
questions:  
1). To what degree can L2 case markings be learned under incidental learning 
conditions? 
2). What type of knowledge is acquired as a result of this exposure; implicit or 
explicit?  
 This chapter is organised as follows. First, the chapter begins by providing a 
brief rationale for Experiment 1, which is followed by a more detailed description of 
the population, methods, materials, and experimental procedure. The results of 
Experiment 1 are then presented, followed by an interim discussion and summary. 
This general outline is then repeated for Experiment 2. This chapter concludes with a 
brief summary of both experiments, including a critical evaluation of the research 
design utilised within them, as well as recommendations for future experiments. 
6.1. Experiment 1 
 As in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, Experiment 1 set out to address RQ 1 and RQ 2 in 
order to investigate the degree to which Czech morphology, specifically the nominative 
marker –a and the accusative marker –u, can be acquired under incidental learning 
conditions. Experiment 1 was identical to Pilot Study 2, but for three alterations. The 
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first alteration was that the number of morphological categories was reduced from three 
to two. The second was that the number of exemplars, namely unique sentences, was 
decreased from 144 to 48. Each of these exemplars was then repeated three times to 
keep the total amount of exposure constant across the experiments. Finally, concerning 
the task in the training phase, participants were asked to repeat the sentence aloud, and 
to then repeat the foreign word in isolation before finishing the sentence-completion 
task. These changes between the experiments are explained more thoroughly in the 
sections that follow, and they are summarised in Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1.  
 
Summary of Changes to Training and Testing Phases between Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2, and Experiment 1 
  
Training Phase 
  
Testing Phase 
 Exemplars Repetition Total 
Exposure 
Case 
markers 
Syntactic 
Patterns 
Training Task(s)  Testing Instruments 
Pilot Study 
1 
144 0 144 
sentences 
(auditory 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
Instrumental 
4 1. Picture-matching  1. 48-item auditory GJT  
(24 trained, 24 transfer) 
2. Confidence ratings 
3. Source attributions 
4. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
 
Pilot Study 
2 
144 0 144 
sentences 
(auditory 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
Instrumental 
2 1. Picture-matching 
2. Elicited imitations 
(repeat entire sentence 
aloud) 
 1. 48-item auditory GJT  
(48 transfer items) 
2. Confidence ratings 
3. Source attributions 
4. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
         
Experiment 
1 
48 3x 144 
sentences 
(auditory 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
 
2 1. Picture-matching, 
2. Elicited imitations 
(repeat sentence), 
3. Elicited imitations 
(repeat foreign word) 
 
 1. 48-item auditory GJT  
(48 transfer items) 
2. Confidence ratings 
3. Source attributions 
4. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
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6.1.1. Method 
6.1.1.1. Participants  
Fifty-one undergraduate native speakers of English at a university in the United 
Kingdom volunteered to take part in this study. Nine of these volunteers were excluded 
from the present study on the basis of having previous experience with a language with a 
rich morphological system, such as Latin. The remaining 42 participants (26 female, 16 
male) were randomly assigned to an experimental (n = 21; 14 female, 7 male) or a control 
(n = 21; 12 female, 9 male) group. None of the participants selected for this study majored 
in linguistics or foreign languages. The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 25 years 
(M = 20.03, SD = 1.86). 
6.1.1.2. Research Ethics 
As in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, this experiment was approved as exempt by the research 
support office of Lancaster University. For each participant, informed consent was sought 
prior to beginning the experiment. Each participant was allowed to read through the 
information sheet describing the study, and he or she was given an opportunity to ask 
questions or voice any worries or concerns about the experiment. Furthermore, as in the 
previous pilot studies, it was stressed that participation in this study was voluntary, and that 
participants could withdraw at any point.  
 It should again be noted that the information sheet for this study disguised the true 
purpose of this experiment. As with Pilot Studies 1 and 2, Experiment 1 was presented as 
a study on learning foreign language vocabulary. Again, this deception was necessary to 
ensure the construct validity of the incidental learning conditions. It was only at the end of 
the debriefing session that participants were fully informed of the focus of this experiment, 
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and were given an additional opportunity to ask questions, voice concerns, or withdraw 
their consent. 
6.1.1.3. Stimulus Material  
The first two alterations to Experiment 1 were made to further reduce the overall 
complexity of the training and testing sets. First, the number of morphological categories 
was reduced from three (nominative, accusative, instrumental) to only two (nominative, 
accusative) in both the training and testing sets (see Table 6.2, below, for sample 
sentences). 
 
Table 6.2.  
Template, Sample Sentences, and Frequencies for the Syntactic Patterns and 
Morphological Categories in Experiment 1 
Pattern Template Frequency 
Pattern 1 [[AP]TEMP > [NP]OBJ > [VP] > [NP]SUBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. (12) 
Accusative Last month the kasu opened Patrick with the key. (12) 
Pattern 2  [[AP]TEMP > [NP]SUBJ > [VP] > [NP]OBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative Last year the prodejna shipped goods to the shoppers. (12) 
Accusative All week the builder took his vrtacku to work. (12) 
 
 
 In addition, the training set was halved from 48 nouns to include only 24 nouns. 
Only nouns with two syllables were retained. These 24 nouns were repeated three times 
for both nominative and accusative cases across three training blocks for a total of 144 total 
stimulus sentences (72 nominative and 72 instrumental). This maintained the same total 
amount of input as in Experiments 1 and 2, but represented an increase in exposure for 
each morphological category. The complete stimulus set can be found in Appendix C. 
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6.1.1.4. Procedure  
As with Pilot Studies 1 and 2, Experiment 1 took place in a private office on 
campus. The training and testing phases of the experiment were delivered via a Dell 
Thinkpad T410 laptop computer, using the stimulus presentation software Superlab 4.5 
(Cedrus Corp, San Pedro, CA), together with a Cedrus model RB-834 response pad. The 
benefit of the response pad for the current experiment is with regard to the ease of 
experimentation. In comparison to using a keyboard, the response pad has large keys with 
good spatial orientation, thus making it easier for participants to identify and press the 
appropriate key during the experiment (see Figure 6A, below, for a depiction of the 
response pad as used in the present thesis). All audio for the experiment was played through 
a set of Audio-Technica headphones with noise-cancellation functionality. Following the 
testing phase, participants completed a short debriefing questionnaire, followed by an oral 
interview. All participants in this study, that is in both the experimental and control groups, 
gave their informed consent prior to the start of the experiment. 
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Figure 6A. Cedrus model RB-834 Response Pad 
 
 
 
Training Phase 
The final alteration concerned the training procedure, which was modified from 
Experiment 2 in that the participants had to repeat the foreign word in isolation, in addition 
to repeating the entire sentence. A visual representation of this procedure can be seen in 
Figure 6B below. 
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Figure 6B. Training procedure in Experiment 1.  
 As Figure 6B above illustrates, the training procedure required the participants to 
listen to the sentence (for example, The britva cut David’s face at the sink last night), to 
repeat the entire sentence aloud (The britva cut David’s face at the sink last night), and to 
then repeat the foreign word in isolation (britva), before judging which of the two pictures 
on the monitor (a razor or a gun) best matched the meaning of the foreign word. The entire 
training phase took, on average, about 30 minutes to complete. The slides used for 
Experiment 1 were identical to those used in Pilot Study 2. Examples of these slides can 
be seen in Figure 6C, below. 
Listen to 
sentence
Repeat 
sentence aloud
Repeat foreign 
word aloud
Judge Picture
Fixation 
Cross
Listen to next 
sentence
177 
 
 
Figure 6C. Example of the Slides Used in the Training Phase of Experiment 1 
6.1.1.5. Statistical Analyses 
As in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, performance on the grammaticality judgement task in 
Experiment 1 was analysed using a logit mixed-effects model (Jaeger, 2008; Linck & 
Cunnings, 2015). The procedure for building this model was identical to the procedure in 
Pilot Studies 1 and 2. In building the model, statistical significance for the overall model 
fit was determined using the χ2 statistic of likelihood ratio tests. Following the example 
provided by Baayen (2008), effect sizes for the logit-mixed effects model were calculated 
using the C index of concordance and the Hmisc package (Harrell & Dupont, 2015). C 
index values range from .5 to 1, with .5 representing no fit and 1 representing a perfect fit 
of the data. As noted in the preceding chapter, a C-index of .7 is interpreted as a moderate 
fit, .8 and above as a good fit, and .9 and above as an excellent fit for the data (Gries, 
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2013). Statistical significance for any interaction effects were calculated using post-hoc 
Tukey tests. Effect sizes for these tests were calculated using Cohen's d. Following 
Plonsky and Oswald's (2014) recommendations, Cohen's d of .40 is considered small, .70 
medium, and 1.00 and higher as a large effect size. 
6.1.2. Results of Experiment 1 
6.1.2.1. Retrospective Verbal Reports 
An analysis of retrospective verbal reports indicated that all participants (21/21) 
reported noticing the morphological inflections at the end of the foreign words during the 
training phase of the experiment. Comments such as "the foreign words always ended in 
vowels" or, more specifically, "all the words ended in -u or -a" as well as "the endings of 
the words changed" were taken as evidence that the learners had attended to and 
subsequently become aware of the surface features of the morphological markers. 
Furthermore, these comments also suggested that the learners had developed some 
awareness beyond the surface forms – specifically, that these inflections were part of a 
pattern or behaved in a certain way. Despite this, none of the participants were able to 
demonstrate an understanding of the underlying rule system by verbalising the rules 
governing the use of inflections. When prompted to guess, 13 participants stated that the 
affixes might have represented a noun class, such as gender. Two other subjects 
mentioned that they thought that the inflection might be connected in some way to the 
position of the foreign word in the sentence, but could not explain the nature of this 
connection. At the very end of the experiment, when the rules were explained to the 
participants, none of the participants claimed that they had thought of the rules at any 
point during the experiment. In summary, the analysis of the retrospective verbal reports 
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thus suggests that participants exhibited awareness at the level of noticing, but below the 
threshold of verbalisation (Schmidt, 1990). In addition, as in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, all of 
the participants (21/21) commented on the changing word order of the stimulus 
sentences. As in Pilot Study 1, several (5/21) of the participants noted that the word order 
was "strange" and that the unnatural word order made it more difficult to follow the 
meaning of these sentences at the start of the experiment. 
6.1.2.2. Picture-matching task 
 As in Experiments 1 and 2, the participants were able to complete the picture-
matching task in the training phase with a near perfect level of accuracy (M = 99.08%, 
SD =0.82%). This suggests that the participants' attention was oriented towards the 
training task in that they were able to follow general meaning of the sentences in the 
training phase of the experiment. 
6.1.2.3. GJT 
 As was the case in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, descriptive statistics were generated to 
analyse the performance of the experimental and control groups in the GJT. In contrast to 
the previous experiments, the results revealed that the experimental group (M = 55.44%, 
SD= 7.00%) appeared to outperform the control group slightly (M = 49.71%, SD = 
5.80%). Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 6.3 below, the experimental group appeared 
to outperform the control group across a number of sub-categories of the GJT, including 
for items targeting the accusative case, and for items that followed an O-V-S word order. 
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Table 6.3.    
Descriptive Statistics (%) for Experimental (n=21) and Control (n=21) Groups 
across Grammatical, Ungrammatical, Nominative, Accusative, O-V-S and S-V-O 
Test Items 
 
Item Type  Descriptive Statistics (%)  
Group  M SD SE  
Grammatical      
Experimental  57.14 9.94 2.17  
Control  51.79 14.54 3.17  
Ungrammatical      
Experimental  54.76 10.63 2.32  
Control  47.52 9.58 2.09  
Nominative      
Experimental  50.89 10.13 2.21  
Control  48.02 8.53 1.86  
Accusative      
Experimental  61.01 14.10 2.40  
Control  52.38 8.50 1.85  
Type 1 S-V-0      
Experimental  54.76 11.84 2.58  
Control  49.40 9.66 2.11  
Type 2 0-V-S      
Experimental  57.14 10.88 2.37  
Control  50.00 8.62 1.88  
 
 In order to determine whether these apparent differences in performance between 
the control and experimental groups were statistically significant, a logit mixed-effects 
regression model (Jaeger, 2008) was carried out using R (R Core Team, 2014) and lme4 
(Bates et al., 2014). As noted, this model was constructed following the general 
procedure used within Pilot Studies 1 and 2. First, analyses were carried out to determine 
which fixed effects had a significant relationship with the dependent variable, namely 
performance on the GJT. To this end, a series of logit mixed-effects models were built. 
For these analyses, a null model was constructed, which analysed performance in the GJT 
as a binary outcome in terms of subject and item as crossed random intercepts. Additional 
models were then built for each fixed effect. Each of these models included the variable, 
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such as case, as a fixed effect, as well as a random slope (Barr et al., 2013). As was done 
with the previous analyses in this thesis, these models were then compared individually 
against the null model using the χ2 statistic. If the model that included the fixed effect 
was significant against the null model, this result was then interpreted to indicate that the 
fixed effect in question had a significant relationship with the dependent variable, and 
should be included in subsequent analyses. If the result was non-significant, this was 
interpreted as there being no significant relationship, and this fixed effect could be 
excluded from the models that followed. The results of these comparisons can be seen in 
Table 6.4 below. 
Table 6.4. 
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests on Predictor Variables in the GJT 
Predictor Variable χ2 df p C 
Group 205.05 3 ˂.001*** .79 
Case 10.17 3 .02* .67 
Syntax 0.65 3 .88 .64 
Grammaticality 4.01 3 .26 .67 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.4 above, the results of these comparisons indicated that 
the fixed effects of case (nominative versus accusative) and group (experimental versus 
control) showed a significant relationship with performance in the GJT. Therefore, a new 
model that included both of these variables as fixed effects was constructed. In addition, 
following the maximal model as suggested by Barr et al. (2012), the fixed effect of case 
was included as a random slope by participant, and group as a random slope by item. A 
maximum likelihood ratio test indicated that this model was significant against the null 
model, χ2 (7) = 218.22, p ˂ .001, C=.80. Further comparisons indicated that the inclusion 
of both case and awareness as fixed effects was warranted in the model, and the removal 
of either fixed effect did not lead to an improved model fit. Multicollinearity within this 
182 
 
model was formally assessed using Cohen's kappa. This resulted in a kappa value of 6.88 
which, according to Baayen's (2008) guidelines, indicates a reasonable level of 
collinearity between the fixed effects in the model. Thus, this model of the data from the 
GJT is henceforth referred to as the best-fit model, the results of which are presented in 
Table 6.5 below.  
Table 6.5. 
Results for the Best-fitting Logit Mixed-effects Model Examining Performance in the 
GJT 
       Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By 
subject 
 By 
items 
Parameters  Estimate SE z p  SD  SD 
Intercept  0.75    0.18   4.05  <.001***  .19  2.81 
Group  -0.40   0.11  -3.61  <.001***  –  .13 
Case  1.08    0.37   2.92  <.01**  .55  – 
Group: Case  -0.51    0.22  -2.31  .02*     
 Note. Factors were coded using contrast coding, as follows: Case (−.5 = Nominative, 
.5 = Accusative), Group (-.5 control, .5=experimental), formula: 
"correct~case*group + (case|subject) + (group|item), family=binomial". 
 
 As noted in the table above, the fixed effect of group was significant, which 
indicates that the performance of the experimental group was significant against the 
performance of the control group. In addition, the fixed effect of case was significant. 
This indicates that the overall performance of both the experimental and control groups 
differed significantly with regard to nominative versus accusative items. However, there 
was also a significant interaction between the fixed effects of group and case. This points 
towards differences in performance between the control and experimental groups on 
either nominative or accusative items. Looking at the descriptive statistics in Table 6.6 
below, there is a clear difference in the performance of the experimental group in terms 
of accusative (~60% performance) versus nominative (~50% performance) items. By 
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contrast, the control group's performance regarding accusative items (~52%) appears 
similar to its performance for nominative items (~48%). This suggests that the significant 
finding for "case" was driven by the performance of the experimental group for 
accusative items. To analyse whether these differences were statistically significant, post-
hoc Tukey tests were calculated using the GLHT command of the R package "multcomp" 
(Hothorn et al., 2015). These results revealed that the performance of the experimental 
group was significant against the performance of the control group for accusative test 
items, but not for nominative items. These results can also be seen in Table 6.6 below. 
Table 6.6.  
Descriptive Statistics (%) and Results of Post-hoc Tukey Tests for Experimental (n=21) 
and Control (n=21) Groups across Nominative and Accusative Items 
Item Type  Descriptive Statistics 
(%) 
 Results of Post-hoc Tukey Tests 
Group  M SD SE  B SE z p d 
Nominative           
Experimental  50.89 10.13 2.21  
-0.15 0.16 -0.94 0.78 0.31 
Control  48.02 8.53 1.86  
Accusative           
Experimental  61.01 14.10 2.40  
-.66 0.16 4.14 <.001*** 0.66 
Control  52.38 8.50 1.85  
   
6.1.2.4. Subjective Measures of Awareness 
As Experiment 1 resulted in a significant learning effect, it is possible to analyse 
the results of the subjective measures of awareness. As noted in Chapter 3, subjective 
measures of awareness are designed to determine whether resulting knowledge is implicit 
or explicit in nature. These were not discussed in Pilot Studies 1 and 2 due to the lack of a 
learning effect within these two experiments. Recall that subjective measures of 
awareness consist of two separate instruments: source attributions and confidence ratings 
(see Section 3.5.3 for a discussion). Source attributions ask participants to indicate the 
basis for each of their decisions in a test (such as a GJT). In the case of the present 
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experiment, the participants had to choose between guess, intuition, memory, or rule for 
each of their decisions in the GJT. Confidence ratings asked participants to indicate how 
confident they were regarding their decision. In Experiment 1, participants had to choose 
between no confidence, somewhat confident, very confident, or absolutely certain. Two 
separate criteria for interpreting the results of subjective measures of awareness are 
argued to be indicative of implicit knowledge. The first of these criteria, the guessing 
criterion, is when there is a performance that is significant against chance levels when 
attributing decisions to guess or intuition (Dienes et al., 1995). This analysis is typically 
carried out using one-sample t tests, comparing accuracy against chance level 
performance (50%). The second, the zero-correlation criterion, is when there is no 
relationship between accuracy and the level of confidence. In other words, if knowledge 
is explicit, we would expect that accuracy would increase when participants report higher 
levels of confidence regarding their decisions. This analysis is commonly carried out by 
including confidence as a predictor variable within the logit mixed-effects model (see 
Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleitner, in press; Sandberg, Bibby, and Overgaard, 2013; 
Wierzchoń, Asanowicz, Paulewicz, & Cleeremans, 2012, for examples). 
Source attributions. As can be seen in Table 6.7 below, an analysis of the source 
attribution data revealed that participants relied largely on their intuition rather than on 
explicit rule knowledge in their judgements. In addition, one-sample t tests revealed that 
the accuracy of the participants' judgements was only significantly above chance levels 
when they indicated that they had made their judgements based on intuition. This means 
that the guessing criterion of implicit structural knowledge was not met. However, there 
are two pieces of evidence that lend support to the claim that the participants developed 
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some unconscious grammatical knowledge. Firstly, the performance of the experimental 
group was significant against chance on intuition judgements, which has been argued to 
be reflective of conscious judgement knowledge combined with some unconscious 
structural knowledge (Dienes, 2010, 2013). In other words, significant performance when 
attributing decisions to intuition points towards the fact that participants did not know 
why a particular item on the GJT was correct or incorrect (unconscious structural 
knowledge), yet they had an intuition or a feeling regarding whether the items were 
correct or incorrect; in other words, conscious judgement knowledge (see Section 3.5.3 
for a discussion). This is in contrast to participants' nonsignificant performance when 
attributing decisions to rule – thus providing evidence that participants had not acquired 
explicit structural knowledge of the underlying rule system. 
Table 6.7.  
Accuracy (%) and Number of Responses from Experimental Group 
Participants across Confidence Ratings and Source Attributions 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Confidence Rating    
No confidence 51.9 155 .70 
Somewhat confident 56.3 501 .02 
Very confident 57.1 310 .04 
Absolutely certain 59.3 42 .35 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Source Attribution    
Guess 50.5 150 .92 
Intuition 56.3 511 .02 
Memory 57.6 184 .08 
Rule 58.8 163 .06 
 
Confidence ratings. As shown in Table 6.7 above, one-sample t tests indicated that the 
participants’ performance was significantly better than chance levels when indicating that 
they were somewhat confident or very confident about their decisions. However, as noted 
in Section 3.5.3, the criterion for implicit knowledge as measured by confidence ratings is 
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the zero-correlation criterion (Dienes & Scott, 2005), which holds that knowledge can be 
considered implicit if there is no relationship between reported levels of confidence and 
accuracy (for example, in a GJT). To determine if the zero-correlation criterion was met, 
a logit mixed-effects model with crossed random effects of subjects and items (Jaeger, 
2008) was built in order to analyse if there was any underlying interaction between 
confidence and accuracy. This model was implemented using R (R Core Team, 2014) 
and lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) to examine the relationship between the level of confidence 
(no confidence versus somewhat confident versus very confident versus absolutely 
certain) and performance. Within this model, performance was modelled as a binary-
outcome, ‘confidence’ as a fixed-effect, and ‘Item’ and ‘Subject’ as crossed random 
intercepts with random slopes. First, a null-model that incorporated only the random 
effects for the intercepts of “Item” and “Subject” was computed. Following this, a second 
model was calculated, which included “confidence” as a fixed effect. A likelihood ratio 
test was carried out to compare the null model to the model incorporating the effects of 
confidence. The results of this test did not reveal a relationship between confidence and 
accuracy, χ2 (1) = 0.60, p =.44, C=.59. This result satisfies the requirements for the zero-
correlation criterion (Dienes & Scott, 2005), and provides further evidence that the 
participants' judgement knowledge of the target case markers was, at least partially, 
unconscious in nature. 
6.1.3. Interim Discussion of Experiment 1 
The results of this experiment demonstrated that participants can develop some 
knowledge of L2 case markings after a minimal amount of incidental exposure. 
Concerning the relationship between learning and awareness in this study, an analysis of 
187 
 
the retrospective verbal reports indicates that this learning effect was realised in the 
absence of verbalisable rule knowledge, but in the presence of low levels of awareness; in 
this case, the participants reported becoming aware of the surface features of the inflected 
forms during the training phase of the experiment. Furthermore, traditional analyses of 
subjective measures of awareness (guessing criterion, zero-correlation criterion) suggest 
that the exposure phase had resulted in some implicit knowledge of L2 morphology 
amongst the experimental subjects. 
Research Question 1: To what extent can L2 case marking be acquired under 
incidental learning conditions? 
One finding of particular interest was that the performance of the experimental 
group was significantly better than that of the control group for accusative case items, but 
not for nominative items. As noted above, this differential performance accords with the 
findings of Robinson’s (2002, 2005) study, which reported improved performance only 
for the locative marker, but not for the noun-incorporation and ergative markers in the 
miniature Samoan system he utilised to examine the acquisition of L2 morphology. 
Robinson (2002) speculated that the superior performance and concomitant awareness of 
the form-function mapping associated with the locative marker could be attributed to the 
amount of processing required by the locative training items. As Robinson (2002) noted, 
in order to answer the comprehension question related to the locative case items, 
participants had to attend to the information conveyed by the case marker. On the other 
hand, comprehension questions targeting the ergative case items, which showed the 
lowest levels of learning, could be solved without attending to the ergative marker due to 
the opacity and communicative redundancy of this construction. Unlike in Robinson's 
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research, a differential amount of semantic processing does not seem to offer an 
explanation of the patterns observed in the present study. Here, it does not appear that the 
participants necessarily needed to attend to the semantic information conveyed by either 
the nominative or the accusative case markers during training. The training task required 
participants to match the meaning of the foreign word to one of two pictures, which 
could, in theory, be performed by relying solely on the lexical clues available within the 
sentences.  
What, then, could account for the different performance for the nominative versus 
the accusative items? A possible explanation could be attributed to what has been 
labelled in cognitive psychology literature as the “bizarreness effect” (Riefer & Rouder, 
1992); specifically, the finding that distinctive stimuli are better recalled than are more 
common stimuli. In the case of the present study, this effect could potentially be 
connected with the phonological characteristics of the morphemes used to mark the two 
cases. The phoneme associated with the nominative marker, –a (/a/), was probably 
perceived by English speakers as more natural in a word-final position than the phoneme 
used to realise the accusative marker, –u (/u/), given the phonotactic rules of the English 
language. Thus, the ‘oddity’ of the accusative morpheme /u/ might have resulted in 
increased salience, leading to more noticing of the accusative marker during the training 
phrase. This interpretation is also lent some support by the fact that participants in the 
experimental group were able to perform with more accuracy than were their counterparts 
in the control group for items with an O-V-S word order (a non-typical English word 
order), but not for items with an S-V-O word order (the prototypical word order in 
English). Although this difference did not reach significance within the mixed-effects 
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model, it seems possible that the ‘foreign-ness’ of the O-V-S items might have resulted in 
increased attention during exposure.  
Finally, given the multiple changes to the training procedures and stimulus 
materials between Pilot Study 2 and Experiment 1, it is not possible to pinpoint which 
component, or which combination thereof, is responsible for the incidental learning that 
was observed in this study. It seems likely that the repetition of the exemplars in the 
training set (both as part of the sentence and individually), and the elicited imitations as 
part of the training condition, were likely to have played a role in achieving a learning 
effect, given the role that frequency arguably plays in L2 acquisition (N. Ellis 2002, 
2005, 2008). As previously discussed, the procedure of repeating the sentence aloud has 
also been used in previous experiments operating within the AGL paradigm (see, for 
example, Rebuschat & Williams, 2012). It could be argued that repetition led to an 
increased amount of rehearsal within short-term memory, creating additional 
opportunities for noticing to occur at the time of encoding.  
One criticism that could be levied against the results of this experiment is that the 
performance of the experimental group was only slightly above chance levels 
(approximately 56%); thus, the advantage observed for the experimental group could 
possibly have been the result of a sampling error. While this criticism is best addressed 
through replication, these results should not be surprising given the difficulty in acquiring 
inflectional morphology (Larsen-Freeman, 2010), as well as the minimal amount of 
exposure the participants received in the present study (approximately 30 minutes). 
Furthermore, it is worth comparing the results of this experiment to those of previous 
research operating within the AGL paradigm, as well as within SLA. Artificial grammar 
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learning studies typically result in a 55 to 80 per cent performance on grammaticality 
judgement tests (DeKeyser, 2003). Also, the results obtained here appear similar to those 
in Grey et al. (2014), the study that is most directly comparable to the current research. In 
Grey et al., the mean accuracy (M = 56.3%) in the delayed picture-matching task roughly 
corresponds to the mean average observed in the GJT in the present study (M = 55.4%). 
Although caution needs to be exercised when making comparisons across studies due to 
differences in their designs, participants and contexts, these trends indicate that the 
findings of the present study are not atypical within the AGL paradigm, nor in SLA 
research investigating the acquisition of L2 case marking following incidental exposure.  
Research Question 2: What type of knowledge is acquired:implicit or explicit? 
With regard to the second research question, the results of the retrospective verbal 
reports indicated that none of the participants had become aware of the morphological 
rule system. The lack of verbalisable knowledge shows that subjects can develop 
knowledge of L2 morphology without being able to account for their performance 
verbally. Although none of the participants in this study were able to verbalise the 
underlying rule system, all of them reported noticing, or becoming aware of, the changing 
inflections during the training phase of the experiment. This report of noticing is 
indicative of a low level of awareness of the target linguistic forms (Schmidt, 1990). 
While the results of the retrospective verbal reports point to a low level of 
awareness on the part of the learners, the results of the subjective measures of awareness 
paint a slightly more complex picture regarding the nature of the knowledge acquired in 
this experiment. Firstly, concerning the confidence ratings, the immediate results suggest 
that participants developed both conscious and unconscious knowledge; in other words, 
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the knowledge was partly conscious, as demonstrated by increasing accuracy when 
participants indicated some confidence in their decision. However, the process was also 
partly unconscious in that there was no significant relationship between confidence and 
accuracy, thus satisfying the zero-correlation criterion, which holds that a lack of 
correlation between confidence and accuracy is indicative of implicit knowledge (Dienes 
& Scott, 2005). Supporting the interpretation of the presence of implicit knowledge, an 
analysis of the data from the source attributions indicated that participants performed at 
above chance levels when making judgements based on intuition, which has also been 
argued to be reflective of unconscious judgement knowledge (Dienes, 2008). In 
summary, traditional analyses of the subjective measures of awareness demonstrate that 
the incidental exposure in the present study resulted in both conscious and unconscious 
knowledge on the part of the participants.  
Assuming that these results do in fact reflect implicit knowledge, this finding runs 
partly counter to the results from Robinson (2002, 2005) and Grey et al. (2014), where 
the detected learning effects were found to be largely driven by explicit knowledge. This 
divergence from previous findings could be attributed to the smaller amount of input to 
which the participants were exposed in the training phase than was the case in other 
studies. In this study, participants received 72 exposures to each of the two case markers 
in the training set, or a total of 144 exposures. By contrast, in Robinson’s (2002, 2005) 
study, participants received 450 total exposures, 150 for each of the three case endings. It 
seems plausible that such a difference in the total amount of input could result in 
increased opportunities to notice the morphological forms during the training phase, and 
to develop greater awareness of the underlying morphological rule system. 
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In Grey et al. (2014), however, the training phase consisted of only 128 exposures 
presented auditorily, which is comparable to the type and amount of exposure in the 
present study. It is worth noting, however, that the stimulus material in Grey et al.’s study 
comprised English words with Japanese case markers added to the end (Vet-ga injection-
o gave). A number of studies have demonstrated that enhancing the target structure in the 
input, for example by underlining the target form within a reading text or presenting the 
target structures in bold, can promote the noticing, and subsequent acquisition of the 
target linguistic structure (Alanen, 1995; Leow, 2001). Given the results of these studies, 
and the argument that salience is a contributing factor to whether particular linguistic 
structures are noticed in the input (N. Ellis, 2006a; Peters, 1985; Schmidt, 2001; Slobin, 
1985), it follows that attaching the morphological marker to the end of the English word 
could have increased the salience of the case markings, thus leading to heightened levels 
of awareness throughout the exposure phase. 
However, at this point, it is worth offering an alternative interpretation of the 
patterns observed above by questioning the assumption that the results of the confidence 
ratings and source attributions are necessarily indicative of unconscious knowledge. 
While the data from the confidence ratings met the zero-correlation criterion, the lack of 
a relationship between confidence and accuracy could be a relic of the slight overall 
learning effect. This interpretation of the results reflects the view that it is probably not 
possible to develop grammatical, native-speaker-like intuition as a result of a single 
laboratory training session (Leow & Hama, 2013), and a recent suggestion by Serafini 
(2013) is that source attribution data could be interpreted differently. According to 
Serafini, source attributions can reflect 'degrees of explicitness', with above-chance 
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performance for intuition responses indicating low-levels of awareness or knowledge that 
has been noticed, while above-chance responses for rule responses reflect awareness at a 
higher level of understanding. This interpretation runs counter to the traditional 
interpretation regarding the phenomenology of intuition reflecting native-speaker-like 
implicit knowledge (Dienes, 2008; see also Rebuschat & Williams, 2012). Serafini's 
(2013) interpretation would appear to sit well with the results of the present study, 
particularly regarding the reports of noticing in the retrospective verbal reports. Taken 
together, the results from both the subjective measures and the retrospective verbal 
reports in the present study would point towards low levels of awareness amongst the 
participants in this study. Subsequently, the results here would fit well with those of 
previous research (Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Grey et al., 2014), which revealed an 
important role of awareness in the acquisition of inflectional morphology. 
6.1.4. Summary and suggestions for future research 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that participants developed some knowledge 
of the case-marking system as a result of incidental exposure, and in the absence of 
verbalisable rule knowledge. This knowledge, however, appears to be partial in that 
participants' performances were only significant for test items targeting the accusative, 
but not the nominative, case marker. In addition, although participants were not able to 
verbalise the rules for the case marking system, data from the subjective measures of 
awareness indicated that the participants developed low levels of awareness as a result of 
the training phase of the experiment. Thus, in summary, the results suggest that 
inflectional morphology can be learned, at least partially, as a result of incidental 
exposure, but that awareness might play an important role in this process. 
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Despite the apparent success of Experiment 1, the results thereof raise several 
questions to be addressed by subsequent experiments. Perhaps most crucially, due to the 
relatively small learning effect demonstrated here (approximately 56%), it would be 
prudent to establish that the overall learning effect, as well as the significant performance 
for accusative and Type 1 syntactic items, was indeed present, and was not the result of a 
Type 1 error (Brown, 1988, 2015). To address this question, a replication of Experiment 
1 is warranted. As well as confirming the results of Experiment 1, a follow-up study to 
this experiment could also investigate a number of additional areas of interest that were 
raised by Experiment 1. For example, it was hypothesised that the inclusion of repetition 
in the training phase of Experiment 1 helped to lead to the learning effect demonstrated in 
this study. It would thus stand to reason that maintaining or increasing the amount of 
repetition in the study that follows would also be conducive to learning.  
Another area worth investigating might be in relation to comments about the 
"strangeness" of the O-V-S word order, and that fact that this strangeness appears to have 
aided learning within Experiment 1. Future research could capitalise on this finding by 
modifying the training tasks in a manner that makes particular elements more salient. For 
example, when we consider that the participants across all three experiments commented 
on the changing word order, one manipulation that might lead to more noticing would be 
to modify the syntactic patterns so that foreign nouns have fixed positions within the 
sentence for one of the case markers (such as instrumental), but not for the other cases 
(nominative and objective). Thus, this contrast, much like the contrast between the S-V-O 
and O-V-S word orders, might lead to increased noticing, and possibly to hypothesis 
formation during the training phase of the experiment. 
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Yet another unexplored variable is in relation to the total amount of exposure 
participants received during the training phase of the experiment. Recall that the total 
amount of exposure was kept constant at 144 sentences across Pilot Studies 1 and 2, as 
well as for Experiment 1. If we accept the truism that a sufficient amount of input is 
necessary for adult SLA to occur, then one possible explanation for the lack of learning in 
Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and the need for repetition in Experiment 1, is that sufficient 
exposure was not provided in the initial pilot studies for learning to take place 
incidentally. In addition, as discussed in Section 6.1.3 above, it has been questioned 
whether participants can develop native-speaker-like intuition as a result of the minimal 
amount of exposure that is typical of laboratory-based SLA research. The logical 
extension of this line of argument is that increasing the amount of exposure should, in 
theory, lead to more learning, and should also increase the possibility that learning might 
take place incidentally. Future experiments could attempt to capitalise on this observation 
by manipulating the experimental procedure to maximise the total amount of exposure 
within the time constraints of a single laboratory training session.
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6.2. Experiment 2 
As noted in the section above, the purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate and 
extend Experiment 1. Replication, simply defined, is the reproduction of a study in order 
to come to a fuller understanding of, or to verify, the findings of the original study (Abbuhl, 
2011; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Gass & Mackey, 2007; Mackey, 2012; Mackey & Gass, 
2005; Perry, 2011; Polio & Gass, 1997). Replications can be broadly categorised as exact, 
approximate, or conceptual (Polio, 2012; Porte, 2012). Exact replications copy the original 
experiment exactly; in other words, with exactly the same population, design, materials, 
and so on. Approximate, or partial, replications copy the original study, but change a non-
major variable, such as changing the population of the study. This allows for the results to 
be immediately comparable with the prior study, but examines whether the results can be 
generalised; for example, to a new population. Conceptual replications address the same 
problem as the original study, but typically employ a different research design to address 
the problem (Porte, 2012).21 Experiment 2, then, represents an approximate replication of 
Experiment 1 (see Table 6.8 below for a summary of the changes between these two 
experiments). 
Although researchers have historically been drawn to the "glamour" inherent in 
conducting original research using novel research designs (Earp & Trafimow, 2015; 
Valdman, 1993), there are a number of reasons that replication is important in scientific 
research. Firstly, as suggested in Section 6.1.5, above, replications can support the results 
                                                     
21 It should be noted, however, that the exact, approximate, and conceptual categories have been used 
inconsistently in the social sciences (see Polio, 2012, for a discussion), and that many so-called "replication 
studies" fall into a grey area in which it is not clear whether they represent a follow-up study or an 
examination of the generalisability of the results of the original study (Porte, 2012).  
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from the original study not being due to Type 1 or Type 2 errors; for example as a result of 
unrepresentative sampling (Mackey, 2012; Nassaji, 2012; Plonsky, 2012). Furthermore, it 
has been demonstrated that, even in the absence of Type 1 or Type 2 errors, individuals 
within a particular population, as well as individual participants when tested at different 
times, differ in ways that can impact on the results of a study (Bodenhausen, 1990). In this 
sense, replication is important not only because it increases confidence that a Type 1 or a 
Type 2 error has not occurred, but also because it allows for a more robust and accurate 
estimation of the true effect size of a particular treatment (Plonsky, 2012). In summary, 
replication studies are essential for confirming the results of research, to the point that some 
do not consider a study is complete until it has been successfully replicated (Bauernfeind, 
196822; Dienes, 2008; Engel & Schutt, 2010; Muma, 1993).  
 To return to the present experiment: As noted above, the purpose of Experiment 2 
was to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1. Such replication is deemed 
necessary due to the small learning effect (approximately 56% accuracy in the GJT) 
demonstrated in Experiment 1, and the fact that a significant learning effect was not found 
in the previous two pilot studies. In short, if the results from Experiment 1 could be 
reproduced in an additional study, it could then be said that the results of Experiment 1 
were 'real' and not due to statistical error with more confidence. 
As in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and Experiment 1, Experiment 2 set out to address RQ 
1 and RQ 2 in order to investigate the degree to which Czech morphology, specifically the 
nominative marker –a, the accusative marker –u, and the instrumental marker –ou, can be 
acquired under incidental learning conditions. There were several differences in the 
                                                     
22 Note for SLA researchers: Bauernfeind (1968) highlighted practices in the natural sciences, in which 
experiments are often repeated 10 - 20 times (!) prior to initial submission for publication. 
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experimental procedure and in the stimulus materials between Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. These changes are presented in Table 6.8 below. In addition, these changes, 
and the rationale behind these changes, are outlined in detail in the sections that follow. 
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Table 6.8.  
Description of Changes to Training and Testing Phases between Experiments 1 and 2 
  
Training Phase 
  
Testing Phase 
 Exemplars Repetition Total 
Exposure 
Case 
markers 
Syntactic 
Patterns 
Training Task(s)  Testing Instruments 
         
Experiment 
1 
48 3x 144 
(auditory 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
 
2 1. Picture-
matching, 
2. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
sentence), 
3. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
foreign word in 
insolation) 
 
 1. 48-item auditory GJT  
(48 transfer items) 
2. Confidence ratings 
3. Source attributions 
4. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
Experiment 
2 
60 4x 240 
(auditory 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
Instrumental 
2 1. Picture-
matching, 
2. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
sentence), 
3. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
foreign word in 
insolation) 
 1. 48-item auditory GJT  
(48 transfer items) 
2. Confidence ratings 
3. Source attributions 
4. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
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6.2.1. Methods 
6.2.1.1. Participants  
 Forty-six undergraduate native-speakers of English at a university in the United 
Kingdom volunteered to take part in this study. Six of these volunteers were excluded on 
the grounds of majoring in linguistics, or because they had a background in a language 
with a rich morphological system. The remaining 40 participants (24 female, 16 male) were 
randomly assigned to an experimental group (n = 20; 11 female, 9 male) or a control group 
(n = 20; 13 female, 7 male). None of the participants selected for this study majored in 
linguistics or foreign languages. The ages of the participants ranged from 18 to 27 years 
(M = 19.70, SD = 2.14). 
6.2.1.2. Research Ethics 
This experiment was covered under the exception granted to previous experiments 
in this thesis by the research support office of Lancaster University. As with the previous 
experiments, informed consent was granted by each participant prior to beginning the 
experiment. Furthermore, as was the case with previous experiments, it was stressed that 
participation in this study was voluntary and that participants could withdraw at any point. 
6.2.1.3. Stimulus Material 
The first modification to Experiment 2 was with regard to the training and testing 
sets. Firstly, the number of morphological markers was increased from two (nominative, 
accusative) to three (nominative, accusative, instrumental) in both the training and in the 
testing sets. These morphological markers were identical to those used in Pilot Study 2, 
examples of which can be seen in Table 6.9 below. 
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Table 6.9.  
Descriptions and Examples of the Three Morphological Categories 
Morphological 
Category 
Syntactic category in English Example 
Nominative 
 
Subject 
 
The britva cut David’s face at the 
sink last night. 
Accusative Direct object Peter used a britvu in the bathroom 
today. 
Instrumental Adverbial (meaning "to 
do/make something with an 
X") 
Anne cut her leg with a britvou in the 
morning. 
 
It should be noted here that the syntactic patterns were not modified between 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (see Table 6.10 below). Using the same syntactic patterns 
would entail that the instrumental marker would always appear at the end of the sentence. 
This is in contrast to the nominative and accusative markers, for which sentence position 
would not be a reliable indicator of their function. It was hypothesised that the fixed 
sentence position of the instrumental marker would result in an increased salience of the 
instrumental marker, and thus increased noticing during the training phase of the 
experiment. Given this fixed position, it was also hypothesised that participants would 
develop verbalisable, explicit knowledge of this case marker; specifically, that participants 
would be able to identify that the -ou marker always occurred in conjunction with the 
prepositional phrase at the end of the sentence. In other words, it was believed that the 
participants would be able to 'crack the code' and correctly identify the -ou marker and its 
function within the sentence. 
 
 
 
Table 6.10.  
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An additional change between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was that the training 
set was reduced from 24 nouns to include only 20 nouns.23 These 20 nouns (which are 
highlighted in Appendix C) were repeated four times in nominative, accusative, and 
instrumental cases across four training blocks, resulting in a total of 240 total stimulus 
sentences (80 for each of the three case markers). This represented an increase in both the 
number of times the individual exemplars were repeated in the training set and an increase 
in the total amount of exposure during the training set. As the repetition of exemplars was 
implicated in the learning effect of Experiment 1, it was hypothesised that increasing the 
number of repetitions of individual exemplars, as well as an increase in the total amount of 
exposure, would further facilitate the acquisition of the target morphological markers.  
6.2.1.4. Procedure 
 As was the case with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 took place in a private office on 
campus. The training and testing phases of the experiment were delivered via a Dell 
Thinkpad T410 laptop computer, using the stimulus presentation software Superlab 4.5 
                                                     
23 The decision to reduce the total number of exemplars from 24 in Experiment 1 to 20 in Experiment 2 was 
based on issues of practicality, such as maintaining the total amount of exposure that was feasible in the 
time allotted to each participant, allowing the exemplars to be neatly divided into manageable training 
blocks, and so forth. 
Templates, Sample Sentences, and Frequencies for the Two Syntactic Patterns included in 
the Training and Testing sets for Pilot Study 2 
Pattern Template Frequency in 
training set 
Pattern 1 [[AP]TEMP > [NP]OBJ > [VP] > [NP]SUBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. (24) 
Accusative Last month the kasu opened Patrick with the key. (24) 
Instrumental Some time ago John scared the child with a zrudou. (24) 
Pattern 2  [[AP]TEMP > [NP]SUBJ > [VP] > [NP]OBJ > [PP]]  
Nominative Last year the prodejna shipped goods to the shoppers. (24) 
Accusative All week the builder took his vrtacku to work. (24) 
Instrumental Today the wooden board cut he with a pilkou. (24) 
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(Cedrus Corp, San Pedro, CA), together with a Cedrus model RB-834 response pad. All 
audio for the experiment was played through a set of Audio-Technica headphones with 
noise-cancellation functionality. Following the testing phase, participants completed a 
short debriefing questionnaire, followed by an oral interview. All participants in this study, 
in both the experimental and the control groups, gave their informed consent prior to the 
outset of the experiment. 
In summary, the procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that for Experiment 1, as 
can be seen in Figure 6D below.  
 
 
Figure 6D. Training procedure in Experiment 2.  
 
At no point during the training phase were participants informed that the foreign nouns 
were inflected for case, nor that they would be tested afterwards. Participants listened to 
all 240 sentences without a break. These sentences were presented in a different, 
randomised order for each participant. The entire training phase took about 45 minutes to 
complete.  
6.2.1.5. Statistical Analyses 
As in Pilot Studies 1 and 2 and Experiment 1, performance in the grammaticality 
judgement task in Experiment 2 was analysed using mean accuracy rates and mixed-
effects models.  
Listen to 
sentence
Repeat 
sentence aloud
Repeat foreign 
word aloud
Judge Picture
Fixation 
Cross
Listen to next 
sentence
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6.2.2. Results 
6.2.2.1 .Retrospective verbal reports 
An analysis of the retrospective verbal reports indicated that all participants (20 / 
20) reported noticing the morphological inflections at the end of the foreign words during 
the training phase of the experiment. As in Experiment 1, there were comments such as 
"the foreign words always ended in vowels", "the endings of the words changed", or 
comments that specifically identified the foreign markers. Such comments were taken as 
evidence that the learners had attended to, and had subsequently become aware of, the 
surface features of the morphological markers. When specifically asked about the endings 
of the foreign words in particular, the majority (14/20) of the participants were able to 
recall all three of the morphological markers (-a, -u, -ou), with the remaining participants 
(6/20) being able to recall two of the three morphological markers. Interestingly, all six of 
these participants were able to recall the nominative marker (-a); however, only three 
participants recalled the accusative marker (-u), and three participants the instrumental 
marker (-ou). 
Despite these reports of noticing the changing morphological markers, none of the 
participants were able to demonstrate an understanding of the underlying rule system by 
verbalising the rules governing the use of the inflections. When prompted to guess, ten 
participants stated that the affixes might have represented a noun class, i.e., gender. Five 
participants mentioned that they thought that the inflection might be connected with the 
position of the foreign word in the sentence. Three of these participants (3/5) could not 
explain the nature of this connection. Two participants, however, stated that they initially 
believed that the -ou marker was occurring at the end of the sentence, but later abandoned 
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this theory because they felt it was also sometimes occurring in other parts of the 
sentence. The comments of these two participants suggest that it is possible that the 
perceptual salience of the -u and -ou markers might have led participants to conflate these 
two case endings. In addition, concerning the construct validity of the incidental training 
conditions, these comments clearly point toward conscious rule-search behaviour and 
hypothesis formation during the training phase of the experiment.  
At the very end of the experiment, when the rules were explained to the 
participants, none of the participants claimed that he or she had thought of the rules 
related to the nominative or accusative items at any point during the experiment. Five of 
the participants replied with comments such as "I thought so" or "that makes sense now" 
when the rule for the instrumental marker was explained to them. In summary, as in 
Experiment 1, the analysis of the retrospective verbal reports suggests that participants 
exhibited awareness at the level of noticing, but still below the threshold of verbalisation 
(Schmidt, 1990) for the nominative and accusative markers. However, with regard to the 
instrumental marker, it appears that some of the participants had developed awareness at 
the level of understanding; however, due to being uncertain or unsure, they did not report 
this data freely until the rule was explained to them. 
6.2.2.2. Picture-matching task 
 As was the case with Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and Experiment 1, the participants 
were able to complete the picture matching task in the training phase with a near perfect 
level of accuracy (M = 98.76, SD =0.77). This again suggests that the training task was 
successful in orienting the participants' attention towards the meaning of the sentences in 
the training phase of the experiment. 
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6.2.2.3. GJT 
 As in Experiment 1, mean accuracy rates were generated to examine the 
performance of the experimental and control groups in the GJT. With regard to the 
overall performance, the accuracy of the experimental group (M = 54.06%, SD = 7.53%) 
appeared to be slightly higher than that of the control group (M = 47.40%, SD = 9.28%). 
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 6.11 below, breakdowns of performance across the 
three case markers in this study indicate that experimental group was more accurate in 
accusative case items, than they were with nominative and instrumental items. Further 
breakdowns revealed that the experimental group performed with higher degrees of 
accuracy on ungrammatical versus grammatical items, as well as on items that followed 
an O-V-S word order, as opposed to an S-V-O word order. This is contrast to the 
performance of the control group, which appeared to perform similarly across the three 
different case markers, grammatical versus ungrammatical test items, and across the 
different syntactic patterns. At a cursory glance, these results appear very similar to the 
results from Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
Table 6.11. 
Results of Experiment 2: Descriptive Statistics (%) for Experimental and Control 
Groups across Grammatical, Ungrammatical, and Type 1 and Type 2 Syntactic 
Patterns 
Item Type  Descriptive Statistics (%)  
Group  M SD SE  
Grammatical      
Experimental  51.87 11.82 2.64  
Control  47.61 12.79 2.86  
Ungrammatical      
Experimental  56.25 14.15 3.16  
Control  47.19 13.40 3.00  
O-V-S      
Experimental  57.19 10.46 2.34  
Control  46.25 10.20 2.28  
S-V-O      
Experimental  50.83 9.42 2.11  
Control  48.75 12.54 2.81  
Nominative      
Experimental  48.44 13.43 3.00  
Control  47.19 11.38 2.54  
Accusative      
Experimental  60.31 9.13 2.04  
Control  48.44 13.29 2.97  
Instrumental      
Experimental  53.13 10.04 2.24  
Control  47.19 13.37 2.99  
 
 In order to determine whether these apparent differences in performance between 
the control and experimental group were statistically significant, a logit mixed-effects 
regression model (Jaeger, 2008) was carried out using R (R Core Team, 2014) and lme4 
(Bates et al., 2014). This model was constructed following exactly the same procedure 
used in Experiment 1. Firstly, analyses were carried out to determine the fixed effects that 
had a significant relationship with the dependent variable, namely performance in the 
GJT. To this end, a series of logit mixed-effects models were built. For these analyses, a 
null model was constructed, which analysed performance in the GJT as a binary outcome 
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in terms of subject and item as crossed random intercepts. Additional models were then 
built for each fixed effect. Each of these models included a variable, such as case, as a 
fixed effect as well as a random slope (Barr et al., 2013). As was done in the previous 
analyses in this thesis, these models were then compared individually against the null 
model using the χ2 statistic. As noted previously, if the model that included the fixed 
effect was significant against the null model, this result was interpreted as indicating that 
the fixed effect in question had a significant relationship with the dependent variable, and 
should be included in subsequent analyses. If the result was nonsignificant, this was 
interpreted as no significant relationship being present, and that this fixed effect could be 
excluded from the models that followed. The results of these comparisons can be seen in 
Table 6.12 below. 
Table 6.12. 
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests on Predictor Variables in GJT 
Predictor Variable χ2 df p C 
Group 199.24 3 ˂.001*** .78 
Case 19.20 4 ˂.001*** .78 
Syntax 18.33 6 .48 .77 
Grammaticality 5.26 7 .51 .77 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.12 above, the results of these comparisons indicated 
that the fixed effects of case (nominative versus accusative versus instrumental) and 
group (experimental versus control) showed a significant relationship with performance 
in the GJT. Therefore, a new model that included both of these variables as fixed effects 
was constructed. In addition, following the maximal model as suggested by Barr et al. 
(2012), the fixed effect of case was included as a random slope by participant, and group 
as a random slope by item. A maximum likelihood ratio test indicated that this model was 
significant against the null model, χ2 (12) = 205.89, p ˂ .001, C=.78. Further comparisons 
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indicated that the inclusion of both case and awareness as fixed effects was warranted in 
the model, and the removal of either fixed effect did not lead to an improved model fit. 
Multicollinearity within this model was formally assessed using Cohen's kappa. This 
resulted in a kappa value of 6.88 which, according to Baayen's (2008) guidelines, 
indicates an acceptable level of collinearity between the fixed effects in the model. Thus, 
this model of the data from the GJT is henceforth referred to as the best-fit model, the 
results of which are presented in Table 6.13 below.  
Table 6.13. 
Results for the Best-fit Logit Mixed-effects Model Examining Performance in the GJT 
       Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By subject  By items 
Parameters  Estimate SE z p  SD  SD 
Intercept  -0.13 .18 -.77 .44  .33  2.13 
Group  0.55 .16 3.38 <.001***  –  1.73 
Case  -.28 .23 -1.24 .21  .18  – 
Group: 
Case 
 -.63 .23 -2.74 <.01**     
Note. factors were coded using contrast coding, as follows: Case (−1= Nominative, 0= 
Accusative, 1 = Instrumental), Group (-.5 control, .5=experimental), formula: 
"correct~case*group + (case|subject) + (group|item), family=binomial, control= 
glmerControl (optimiser = "bobyqa") 
 
 As can be seen in the table directly above, the fixed effect of group was 
significant within the model. However, unlike Experiment 1, the fixed effect of case did 
not reach significance as a main effect. It is important to emphasise that "a main effect 
need not be significant if it is involved in interactions which are significant" (Baayen, 
2008, p. 166). In this regard, the model revealed that the fixed effect of case interacted 
significantly with the fixed effect of group. To analyse these results further, post-hoc 
Tukey tests were carried out to compare the performance of the experimental group and 
the control group across the three different case markers. These analyses revealed that the 
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performance of the experimental group was significant against the performance of the 
experimental group for accusative items. However, this significant performance did not 
extend to the other two case markers. A summary of the results of the Tukey tests can be 
seen in Table 6.14 below. 
Table 6.14. 
Results of Experiment 2: Descriptive Statistics (%) and Results of Tukey Post-hoc Tests for 
Experimental and Control Groups across Nominative, Accusative, and Instrumental Case 
Markers 
Item Type  Descriptive Statistics 
(%) 
 Results of Independent Samples T-tests 
Group  M SD SE  B SE z p d 
Nominative           
Experimental  48.44 13.43 3.00  
-0.08 0.16 -0.49 0.99 0.10 
Control  47.19 11.38 2.54  
Accusative           
Experimental  60.31 9.13 2.04  
0.49 0.16 2.989 0.03 1.04 
Control  48.44 13.29 2.97  
Instrumental           
Experimental  53.13 10.04 2.24  
0.35 0.16 2.115 0.27 0.50 
Control  47.19 13.37 2.99  
   
6.2.2.4. Subjective Measures of Awareness 
Source attributions. As indicated in Table 6.15 below, an analysis of the source 
attributions revealed that participants relied largely on their intuition rather than on 
explicit rule knowledge in their judgements. This finding mirrors the results of 
Experiment 1, in which participants’ source attributions also indicated that they based 
most of their decisions on their intuition. However, unlike Experiment 1, the performance 
of the participants was not significant from chance (50%) levels when basing their 
decisions on intuition, or on any of the other options available. This indicates that the 
guessing criterion for implicit knowledge was not met by the data here (this point is 
discussed further in the following table, Table 6.15 below). 
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Table 6.15.  
Accuracy (%) and Number of Responses for Experimental Group 
Participants across Confidence Ratings and Source Attributions 
(OVERALL) 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Confidence Rating    
No confidence 52.2 182 .56 
Somewhat confident 53.9 480 .09 
Very confident 54.7 260 .14 
Absolutely certain 63.4 38 .09 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Source Attribution    
Guess 50.9 221 .78 
Intuition 54.2 432 .08 
Memory 56.2 144 .14 
Rule 55.4 163 .16 
 
Confidence ratings. As shown in the table above, participants’ performances were 
nonsignificant against chance levels for all possible ratings. As in Experiment 1, an 
additional logit mixed-effects model with crossed random effects of subjects and items 
(Jaeger, 2008) was constructed in order to analyse if there was any underlying interaction 
between confidence and accuracy. In this model, accuracy was modelled as a binary 
outcome, and confidence level was analysed as a fixed effect, along with crossed random 
intercepts for subjects and items. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the levels of 
confidence and accuracy were not significantly related χ2 (1) = 0.92, p =.34, C=.67. This 
result satisfies the requirements for the zero correlation criterion (Dienes & Scott, 2005), 
and suggests that the knowledge developed by the participants was at least partly implicit 
in nature. 
 With regard to the results for the subjective measures of awareness presented 
above, it is worth returning to a previous point concerning the results of Pilot Studies 1 
212 
 
and 2. Subjective measures of awareness are typically not analysed in studies that report 
nonsignificant results. The rationale for this is that a nonsignificant finding indicates that 
no knowledge, either implicit or explicit, has been developed as a result of the exposure 
phase. In the case of the present study, analyses revealed that performance was 
significant against chance-level performance for accusative items, but not for nominative 
and instrumental items. This would suggest that the presence of the nominative and 
instrumental items might be skewing the subjective measures data. In other words, 
isolating the accusative items within the subjective measures of awareness data might 
provide a more refined picture with regard to the type of knowledge acquired by the 
participants in this study. 
Source attributions: Accusative items only. As can be seen in Table 6.16 below, an 
analysis of the source attributions for accusative test items reveals several significant 
findings. Firstly, as in the overall analysis presented in Table 14 above, participants here 
also tended to rely on their intuition when making their judgements. In contrast to 
previous findings, their performance was significant compared to chance levels when 
attributing their judgements to the categories of intuition and memory. Performance when 
attributing their decisions to guessing or rule was nonsignificant against chance-level 
performance. These data indicate that the guessing criterion for implicit knowledge was 
not met by the accusative data here. 
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Table 6.16.  
Accuracy (%) and Number of Responses of All Experimental Group 
Participants for Accusative Items across Confidence Ratings and Source 
Attributions 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Confidence Rating    
No confidence 53.5 69 .56 
Somewhat confident 58.1 162 .03 
Very confident 68.5 73 .001 
Absolutely certain 75.0 16 .041 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Source Attribution    
Guess 50.0 81 1.0 
Intuition 62.3 137 .003 
Memory 70.8 48 .003 
Rule 61.1 54 .10 
 
Confidence ratings: Accusative items only24. As shown in the table above, participants’ 
performances were significant against chance levels when indicating that they were 
somewhat confident, very confident, or absolutely certain about their decisions. However, 
their performance when indicating no confidence was not significant in contrast to chance 
levels. To examine whether there was a relationship between confidence and accuracy, an 
additional logit-mixed effects model (identical to the analysis performed on the overall 
data set above) was constructed. A likelihood ratio test revealed that the levels of 
confidence and accuracy were not significantly related: χ2 (1) = 2.31, p =.12, C=.55. This 
would suggest that the accusative data here satisfy the requirements for the zero 
correlation criterion (Dienes & Scott, 2005), and that the knowledge developed by the 
participants was at least partly implicit in nature.  
                                                     
24 Analyses of the subjective measures for nominative items and instrumental items are not included here, 
as performance on these items was not statistically significant compared to chance levels (50%). 
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This result is, however, surprising, given that there appears, prima facie, to be a 
linear relationship between the accuracy and the level of confidence, as reported in Table 
6.15 above. To investigate this further, the data related to the accusative confidence 
ratings were re-grouped into two categories, a less confident category and a more 
confident category. The less confident category included responses whereby the 
participants indicated no confidence or somewhat confident, and the more confident 
category included very confident and absolutely certain ratings. Another logit mixed-
effects model, as described above, was then constructed to compare the relationship 
between accuracy and confidence across these two categories. Here, a likelihood ratio test 
revealed a significant relationship between confidence and accuracy; χ2 (3) = 8.00, p = 
.04, C = .66). These results indicate that participants' decisions were more accurate when 
they indicated higher levels of confidence (such as very confident or absolutely certain) 
than when they indicated lower levels of confidence (no confidence or somewhat 
confident), thus providing further evidence that the participants' knowledge of accusative 
items was more explicit in nature.25 
6.2.2. Interim Discussion of Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 2 support the findings of Experiment 1; the data here 
indicate that participants can develop some knowledge of L2 case markings after a 
minimal amount of exposure, without feedback, and as a result of incidental exposure. 
With regard to the relationship between learning and awareness in this experiment, an 
analysis of the retrospective verbal reports indicates that this learning effect was realised 
in the absence of verbalisable rule knowledge. However, participants demonstrated low 
                                                     
25 It is acknowledge here that running multiple analyses on the same dataset increases the likelihood of a 
“false positive” result, namely a Type 1 statistical error (Brown, 2015). 
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levels of awareness of morphological markers, in that they became aware of the surface 
features of these forms during the training phase of the experiment. Although traditional 
analyses of the subjective measures of awareness (guessing criterion, zero-correlation 
criterion) suggest that the exposure phase had resulted in some implicit knowledge of L2 
morphology amongst the experimental subjects, finer-grained sub-analyses indicated that 
the overall learning effect was driven by conscious knowledge of the accusative marker.  
Research Question 1: To what extent can L2 case marking be acquired under 
incidental learning conditions? 
One finding of particular interest is the similarity between the results of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Specifically, in both experiments, the experimental 
groups' performance was significant for accusative, but not for nominative, case items. In 
the discussion of Experiment 1, it was hypothesised that the differential performance for 
accusative versus nominative items could be related to the phonotactic qualities of the 
respective case markers, specifically because the nominative marker, –a (/a/), was 
probably perceived by English speakers as more natural in a word-final position than was 
the phoneme used to realise the accusative marker –u (/u/), given the phonotactic rules of 
the English language. As a result, the “oddity” of the accusative marker could have made 
this marker more salient, resulting in greater attention being paid to, and awareness of, 
these items during the training phase of the experiment. While this explanation appears 
plausible, it is speculative at this point, as there is no direct evidence to support this 
interpretation. Future experiments might test this hypothesis by rotating the case endings 
between the nominative and accusative markers. This manipulation would provide direct 
support for whether the learning effect for accusative items is directly related to the 
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phonotactic qualities of the accusative marker, or whether it is due to another, 
unaccounted for, variable. 
Another explanation for why participants in both Experiments 1 and 2 developed 
some knowledge of the form-meaning mapping of accusative markers, but not of 
nominative markers, might lie in the nature of learning case-marking systems in general, 
and the universal constraints that bind this process. It has been well documented in both 
the L1 and in the L2 literature that learners incorporate different grammatical features of 
case-marking systems at different points in their development (Bardovi-Harlig, 2000; 
Eisenbeiss, Narasimhan, & Voeikova, 2008).26 In Slavic languages, such as Czech – the 
language on which the current artificial system is based - the nominative form is the 
default and is the first one incorporated into the child’s interlanguage as part of the L1 
acquisition process (Dabrowska & Szczerbinski, 2006; Gagarina & Voeikova, 2009)27. 
However, within formal linguistics, it has been argued that the accusative case is the 
default in English (Emonds, 1985; Schütze, 2001; see Eisenbeiss, Bartke, & Clahsen, 
2006 for an overview).28 A possible explanation for the fact that the population of this 
study, L1 speakers of English, appeared to acquire the accusative marker could be 
attributed to an L1 transfer effect. In further support of this point, the nature of the L1 has 
been implicated in the degree that adults process, and subsequently acquire inflectional 
                                                     
26 This is in no way meant to suggest equivalence between L1 and L2 acquisition. The L1 literature with 
regard to the acquisition of case marking in naturalistic settings is particularly rich. It is not unreasonable to 
presume that this body of literature could provide some insights that are relevant to the discussion of L2 
learning. 
27 The default nominative form has been argued to be a result of frequency in the input. For example, 
Dabrowska and Szczerbinski (2006) pointed out that nominative forms have been shown to account for 
more than 40 per cent of the inflected forms in child-directed speech. 
28 Examples of this can be seen in the use of nominative versus accusative pronouns in Czech versus 
English. In Czech, the answer to the question “Who is it?” would be “To jsem Ja!” literally, 'It am I'. In 
English, a more natural answer would incorporate the accusative pronoun "me": for example, “It’s me”. For 
a more detailed discussion, see Schütze (2001). 
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morphology in an L2 (Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Kempe & MacWhinney, 1998; see Gor, 
2010 for an overview). 
Another possible explanation might be in relation to the size of the learning effect 
exhibited in Experiments 1 and 2, the acquisition of case-marking systems is typically 
operationalised in terms of a child’s ability to produce utterances that demonstrate a 
contrast between two different forms, such as  nominative versus accusative (Penke, 
2012). In Slavic languages, such as Czech, the initial contrasts that children exhibit are 
nominative versus vocative forms, and/or nominative versus accusative forms (for an 
overview, see Gagarina & Voeikova, 2009). Children's initial L1 development of case-
marking systems is divided into two stages, a pre-morphological stage and a proto-
morphological stage (Gagarina & Voeikova, 2009; Dressler, 2012; Slobin, 1995). Within 
the pre-morphological stage, correct instances of inflectional morphology can be found in 
the child’s output, but these correct forms represent instances of rote-learned grammatical 
utterances and formulaic speech, rather than a contrast between the form-meaning 
mappings of different morphological markers. Within the proto-morphological stage, 
children begin to produce utterances that demonstrate a contrast between different case 
endings. This stage is characterised by the creative construction of morphological forms, 
although these are not error free. 
When we compare how the acquisition of case-marking is operationalised in the 
L1 literature with the results of the present study, it would appear that the participants 
here did not acquire the ability to differentiate between the nominative and accusative 
markers, given the null results for the nominative marker and the slight learning effect 
demonstrated for the accusative marker. However, when taking into account the slight 
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learning effect demonstrated in the GJT for accusative items, one might argue that the 
results here represent the very earliest stages of the acquisition process. Given the very 
limited amount of exposure in the training phase of the present study, this might seem to 
be a plausible explanation. Such an explanation appears speculative, however, given the 
lack of direct evidence that corresponds to the L1 stages of development outlined above. 
For instance, the pre-morphological stage, which represents the initial stages of learning 
in the L1 model, is characterised by rote-learned forms. However, the GJT in the present 
study consisted entirely of transfer items, or novel forms. Although great caution should 
be employed when comparing the stages of L1 acquisition with the acquisition of an L2, 
it could be said that the use of transfer items might not be a valid measure of the learning 
that did occur in the present study (Clahsen, Eisenbeiss, & Penke, 1996; see also Hulstijn, 
2013 for a discussion of transfer appropriate measures in SLA). Future experiments could 
investigate this issue by including a second GJT that contains only trained items; in other 
words, items that the participants have previously been exposed to during the training 
phase of an experiment. 
To return to the safe ground of the L2 literature, there is also support for the claim 
that adult learners go through a number of developmental stages with regard to the 
attainment of morphological accuracy. For example, in what is known as the one-to-one 
principle (Andersen, 1984), it has been documented that L2 learners first learn a single 
form-function mapping for an individual morphological form. Learners then progress 
through a number of additional stages in which they begin to use the form in an 
increasing number of contexts and functions, before finally arriving at a full form-
function mapping (Cadierno, 2000; Shirai, 2002, 2004). However, despite the fact that 
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evidence for “developmental stages” might be interpreted as suggesting that 
morphological competence develops in a steady, systematic fashion, it should be pointed 
out that morphological development is, in fact, characterised by a non-linear path of 
development marked by both decreases and increases in accuracy (Bardovi-Harlig, 2000; 
Ortega, 2009), and furthermore, it develops late, if at all, in comparison to other linguistic 
areas. Evidence for the late development of L2 morphology can be seen in a frequently 
cited, longitudinal study by Klein and Perdue (1997). In this study, the researchers 
followed the time course of second language development for a group of 40 learners from 
a variety of linguistic backgrounds. After some time, the researchers noticed that all of 
the learners' interlanguages had stabilised in a relatively simple system on which these 
learners relied to express themselves. This simple system was referred to as the basic 
variety. The authors noted that many of these learners did not progress beyond the basic 
variety, and they hypothesised that it was the need to express more complex thoughts that 
was the driving force in the development of more complex language. In other words, in 
the absence of any need to create complex utterances to express meaning, learners in 
naturalistic settings will not develop complex interlanguage. Importantly, the basic 
variety includes no morphological markers, suggesting that learners are unlikely to 
develop morphological competence, unless there is a communicative need to do so. When 
we consider the present experiment, the fact that the meaning carried by the case markers 
was redundant would have likely impeded the learning of their form-meaning mapping, 
in that there was not an immediate communicative "need" for the participants to attend to 
the meaning carried by the inflectional forms. 
220 
 
With regard to the differential performance demonstrated for the different case 
markers, another interesting finding was the lack of a strong learning effect for 
instrumental case items. As noted previously, it was hypothesised that the fixed sentence-
final position of the instrumental marker would facilitate the acquisition of this marker. 
This was not the case. One possible explanation for the low amount of learning 
demonstrated for instrumental items might be the phonological similarity between the 
instrumental (/oʊ/)and accusative (/u/) markers. Additional support for this explanation 
comes from the retrospective verbal reports, in which all participants reported noticing 
the nominative marker (-a), whereas a quarter of the participants (5/20) did not appear to 
have differentiated between the accusative and instrumental markers. Although this 
explanation would seem plausible given that phonological distinctiveness has been 
identified as a factor that impacts on the acquisition of morphology (Goldschneider & 
DeKeyser, 2001), a question worth asking is whether this also impacted on the 
performance of the experimental group for accusative items. It remains possible that the 
learning effect for accusative items was mitigated by the phonological similarities 
between the accusative and instrumental markers. Future research might investigate this 
issue by modifying the stimulus set to include more phonologically distinct 
morphological markers (Jackson, 2014). Such a modification might allow researchers to 
better account for the different performances on individual case markers that have been 
exhibited here.  
Yet another interesting finding was that the increase in the total amount of 
exposure in Experiment 2 did not lead to an increase in learning when compared to 
Experiment 1. As noted previously, the training phase of Experiment 2 included 240 total 
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exposures, whereas Experiment 1 contained only 144. It was hypothesised that this 
increase would lead to an increase in learning. However, this change did not result in a 
clear increase in performance. The simplest explanation for this is that the increase in 
total exposure was not sufficiently significant to impact demonstrably on learning. Given 
that SLA is generally held to be a slow, incremental process that takes place over 
hundreds, if not thousands of hours of learning, it would seem reasonable that the effects 
of an additional 15 minutes of exposure might not be immediately reflected in 
performance. Notwithstanding this explanation, there are a number of other factors that 
might have mitigated the benefits of the additional exposure. First, the present experiment 
investigated the learning of three morphological markers as opposed to the two markers 
in Experiment 1. This increase in complexity might have masked the benefits of the 
increased input. Another possibility lies in the U-shaped development, which has been 
argued to be characteristic of morphological development (Long, 2015; Ortega, 2009). 
Studies investigating the time course of learning (Karuza et al., 2014) have demonstrated 
that learners quickly become sensitive to the regularities of input. It seems possible that 
the increase in input led to diminishing returns on learning, in that the learners became 
used to, and subsequently paid less attention to, the input as the experiment progressed. It 
also seems possible that the present experiment might have included too much input, 
resulting in fatigue and lower rates of performance. Still another explanation might lie in 
the decreased type of variability of the Czech nouns included in the training set. Previous 
research in artificial grammar learning (Gómez, 2002) and adult SLA (Brooks et al., 
2006) has indicated that exemplar variability impacts on the degree to which learners are 
able to generalise morphological markers. In particular, Brooks et al. (2006) indicated 
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that learners who were exposed to fewer exemplars in the training set were less 
successful when generalising this knowledge to novel words.29 As the testing phase of 
Experiment 2 contained only transfer items (items that measured the participants' ability 
to generalise their knowledge), the reduction of exemplars in the training phases from 
Experiment 1 (24) to Experiment 2 (20) might have influenced the amount of learning 
across these two experiments. 
Research Question 2: What type of knowledge is acquired; implicit or explicit? 
As with the results of Experiment 1, the results of the retrospective verbal reports 
indicated that none of the participants had become aware of the morphological rule 
system with regard to the nominative and accusative markers. By contrast, for the 
instrumental markers, the reports from some of the participants indicated that they did 
possess a higher level of awareness. It should be noted, however, that this higher level of 
awareness reported for the instrumental marker did not translate into a significant 
learning effect.  Conversely, performance in the GJT was significant for accusative 
markers, for which no verbalisable rule was reported. As in Experiment 1, the lack of 
verbalisable knowledge in this experiment provides further support for the notion that 
subjects can develop knowledge of L2 morphology without being able to account for 
their performance verbally.  It is worth reiterating that although none of the participants 
in this study were able to fully verbalise the underlying rule system, all of the participants 
reported noticing, or becoming aware of, the changing inflections during the training 
phase of the experiment. This report of noticing is indicative of a low level of awareness 
of the target linguistic forms (Schmidt, 1990), thus suggesting, as do the results of 
                                                     
29 It is interesting that the effects of type variability in this study were mediated by scores on a culture fair 
test, suggesting that cognitive individual difference variables also play an important role in this process. 
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Experiment 1, as well as previous research in this area (Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Grey et 
al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005), that attention and awareness might be closely tied to 
learning this area of grammar. 
With regard to the subjective measures of awareness, initial analyses of the data in 
Experiment 2 indicated that the knowledge acquired of the morphological markers was 
implicit in nature. For example, the first mixed-effects model generated for the 
confidence ratings found no relationship between confidence and accuracy in the GJT. In 
other words, this initial analysis suggested that the zero-correlation criterion of implicit 
knowledge was met (Dienes, 2008), and that participants in this experiment were 
unaware of the knowledge they had gained as a result of incidental exposure. 
Nonetheless, it was questioned whether this result was necessarily reflective of implicit 
knowledge, or was simply a relic of the low levels of learning demonstrated in this study. 
A finer-grained analysis of the confidence ratings, which included only accusative items, 
pointed towards a different pattern in the data. The observation here was a clear 
relationship between confidence and accuracy. This observation also received  
statistical support in that an additional logit mixed-effects model indicated a 
significant relationship between confidence and accuracy. This result points to the fact 
that participants' knowledge of the accusative marker was conscious in nature.  
Supporting the interpretation of the presence of conscious knowledge, an analysis 
of the data from the source attributions indicated that participants' performance when 
attributing their decisions to chance was not significant. This means that the guessing 
criterion for implicit knowledge was not met (Dienes & Scott 2005). However, it should 
be noted that participants' performance across all source attributions was nonsignificant. 
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Again, this result is best seen as a reflection of the near chance-level performance of the 
experimental group in the GJT. As was done with the confidence ratings above, the 
source attribution data were reanalysed using only accusative-item data. The result of this 
analysis indicated that participants' performance was significant when decisions were 
attributed to intuition and memory, but not when attributing decisions to guessing or rule-
knowledge. If we return to Serafini's (2013) interpretation of source attribution data, in 
which the options of guessing and intuition reflect low levels of awareness, and the 
choices of memory and rule indicate higher levels of awareness, then it would appear that 
the source attribution data point to a low-to-medium level of awareness among 
participants in this experiment. In other words, the data suggest that the participants 
developed awareness at the level of noticing, but below the level of understanding. This 
interpretation is also corroborated by the results of the retrospective verbal reports, in 
which participants also reported low levels of awareness, but were unable to verbalise the 
rules underlying the morphological system. In summary, the results of the measures of 
awareness in Experiment 2 provide little evidence that learning occurred in the absence 
of awareness. Instead, the learning that did take place appears to be marked by low levels 
of awareness in the form of noticing (Schmidt, 1990). 
6.3. Future Directions 
 In summary, both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 demonstrated that learners can 
acquire some knowledge of L2 inflectional morphology under incidental learning 
conditions following a minimal amount of exposure. In addition, the measures of 
awareness from both studies indicated that this knowledge was accompanied by, at a 
minimum, low levels of awareness. Despite the fact that both studies demonstrated 
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similar results, it is important to note that the learning displayed in both experiments was 
minimal, suggesting that the knowledge developed by the learners of the underlying case-
marking system was only partial in nature. An important question to be raised at this 
point is whether the instrument used to measure learning in Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 necessarily provides an accurate reflection of the quality and quantity of learning that 
might have taken place in the experiment. As noted previously, the GJT was chosen for 
these experiments as it is the instrument most commonly used in the AGL paradigm. 
However, the transfer appropriateness of this instrument is worth questioning (Hulstijn, 
2013; Larsen-Freeman, 2013; Lightbrown, 2008). In other words, it has been argued that 
untimed GJTs, as used in the present study, are more likely to be accurate measures of the 
knowledge that develops as a result of explicit instruction, and may not provide an 
accurate measure of the type of knowledge resulting from incidental exposure (Norris & 
Ortega, 2000). This argument would appear to sit well with the results of Experiments 1 
and 2, in which the learning that was displayed in the present experiment was 
accompanied by low levels of awareness. It remains possible, then, that the learners 
developed some knowledge of the case-marking system, which was not revealed due to 
the relative insensitivity of the instrument used in these studies. 
 It is also worth highlighting that much of the discussion surrounding the lack of a 
significant learning effect in Pilot Studies 1 and 2 and the learning that did occur in 
Experiments 1 and 2 has focused on issues related to attention, awareness, and 
processing. More specifically, the impact that the modifications between experiments, 
such as the addition of the elicited imitations, have been discussed with regard to the 
degree to which they resulted in increased attention to and/or processing of the target 
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morphological forms during the training phase of the experiment. Again, this discussion 
has been speculative in that none of the previous experiments included any online 
measures of attention and/or processing during the training phase of the experiments. If 
attention to and the processing of the target grammatical features are driving the learning 
effect in these studies, then future experiments might benefit by employing alternate 
instruments that would allow for data to be gathered directly at the point of learning. 
Within both cognitive psychology and SLA, researchers have turned to alternate 
measures of learning that incorporate “real-time” measures of processing and learning, 
such as reaction-time data. Such methodologies have proven fruitful in SLA in 
investigating the role of awareness in the incidental learning of form-meaning 
connections (Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014), word-order regularities (Williams & 
Rebuschat, 2013), and differential object marking (Andringa & Curcic, 2015). It seems 
that one avenue for future exploration might be to address the research questions of this 
thesis from a different methodological angle, specifically by modifying the research 
design to include an online measure of processing and learning. This might shed light on 
the underlying processes that might influence the incidental learning of an L2 case-
marking system. 
  
227 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
This chapter reports on Experiment 3, the final experiment of this thesis. 
Experiment 3 utilised a self-paced reading methodology to address the following research 
questions:  
1) To what extent can L2 case markings be learned under incidental learning conditions?  
2) What type of knowledge is acquired as a result of this exposure; implicit or explicit?  
This chapter is organised as follows. It begins by providing a brief background to and 
rationale for Experiment 3, which is followed by a more detailed description of the 
population, methods, materials and experimental procedure. The results of this 
experiment are then presented, followed by a discussion. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the findings, including a critical evaluation of the research design utilised, as 
well as recommendations for future experiments. 
As noted above, Experiment 3 signals a departure from the AGL research 
methodology that was used in previous experiments in this thesis. Instead, Experiment 3 
utilises a self-paced reading (SPR) task to address the research questions set out above. The 
rationale for using an SPR task is as follows. As discussed in the literature review, SPR 
tasks have been used effectively for a variety of purposes within both psycholinguistics 
and SLA (Jegerski, 2014; Juffs, 2001; Keating & Jegerski, 2015; Roberts, 2012a), and have 
been referred to as the "most fundamental experimental measure" in psycholinguistic 
research investigating L1 and/or L2 sentence processing (Jegerski, 2014). Furthermore, 
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SPR tasks appear to be well suited to addressing the aforementioned research questions, 
for the reasons discussed below. 
Firstly, with regard to RQ 1 (To what extent can L2 case markings be learned under 
incidental learning conditions?), learning is operationalised with SPR tasks as differences 
in reaction times to grammatical versus ungrammatical utterances. Thus, SPR tasks are an 
indirect test of learning in that they measure the extent to which knowledge is deployed 
automatically. As noted previously, indirect tests have been argued to be more accurate 
measures of implicit knowledge than are traditional outcome measures, such as a GJT (see 
Section 3.2 above). This is because automaticity is considered to be a defining 
characteristic of implicit knowledge (see Section 2.3.3). However, it is important to 
acknowledge that, within alternative frameworks, specifically skill-acquisition theory, 
automaticity is indicative of proceduralised knowledge. Although the characteristics of 
procedural knowledge overlap with those of implicit knowledge, these constructs are not 
isomorphic (DeKeyser, 2009; see also Section 1.1.6). Thus, depending on one's theoretical 
orientation, different interpretations of the results from the SPR task in the present study 
are possible. 
Another advantage of SPR tasks is that these tasks can be seen as more accurate in 
gauging the knowledge acquired as a result of incidental exposure (Hulstijn, 2003, 2013). 
As noted in Section 3.2, the concept of transfer-appropriate processing holds that we are 
more likely to remember what we have learned if there is a match between the conditions 
under which the material is learned and the conditions under which it is tested. In this 
regard, the SPR task is particularly advantageous in that the training and testing phases of 
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the experiment are identical. Thus, in theory, the results of the SPR task might be a more 
accurate reflection of the learning that has taken place.  
Concerning RQ 2 (What type of knowledge is developed as a result of incidental 
exposure; implicit or explicit?), another clear benefit of the SPR task is that there is no 
clear demarcation between the training and testing phases of the experiment. This is 
advantageous for a number of reasons. Firstly, previous research (Rebuschat, 2008) has 
demonstrated that participants can develop awareness as a result of rule-search behaviour 
when they know they are being tested. Thus, any implicit knowledge, as found in an SPR 
task, is less likely to be contaminated by explicit knowledge in this way. In addition, the 
use of an SPR task does not preclude the possibility of using a direct test at a later stage of 
the experiment. Thus, following in the tradition of the complementary use of direct and 
indirect tests (R. Ellis, 2005; Reingold & Merikle, 1988), the SPR task can be contrasted 
with the results of a direct measure of learning, thus facilitating a more refined look at the 
learning that has taken place during the experiment. 
7.1. Methods 
7.1.1. Participants  
Forty-five native speakers of English at a university in the United Kingdom 
volunteered to take part in this study. Nineteen of these were excluded from the present 
study on the basis of having had previous experience of a language with a rich 
morphological system, such as Latin, Bulgarian or Russian. The remaining 26 participants 
(16 female, 10 male) were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups: Group 
A (n = 13, 4 male, 9 female) or Group B (n = 13, 5 male, 8 female)30. None of the 
                                                     
30 The issue of statistical power is addressed in the discussion section of this chapter. 
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participants selected for this study majored in linguistics or a foreign language. The ages 
of the participants ranged from 20 to 36 years (M = 24.74, SD = 4.86). The data from three 
participants were excluded due to irregular behaviour during the experiment (this point is 
elaborated upon in Section 7.2 below). 
7.1.2. Research Ethics 
Experiment 3 was approved by the research ethics committee of the Institute of 
Education, University of London. For each participant, informed consent was sought prior 
to beginning the experiment. Each participant was allowed to read through the information 
sheet describing the study, and was given an opportunity to ask questions or voice any 
worries or concerns about the experiment. Furthermore, as with the previous studies, it was 
stressed that participation in this study was voluntary, and that participants could withdraw 
at any point.  
 It should again be noted that the information sheet and consent form for this study 
were designed to mask the purpose of Experiment 3. Experiment 3 was presented as a study 
on sentence comprehension in a foreign language. Participants were told that this study 
was investigating the effects that 1) scrambled word order and 2) replacing an English word 
with a "nonsense word" had on their ability to understand the meaning of the sentence. 
Again, this deception was necessary to ensure the construct validity of the incidental 
learning conditions. It was only at the end of the debriefing session that participants were 
fully informed of the focus of this experiment, and they were given an additional 
opportunity to ask questions, voice concerns or withdraw their consent. 
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7.1.3. Stimulus Material  
The stimulus domain of Experiment 3 was a slightly modified form of the stimuli 
used in Experiment 1. Although both Experiments 1 and 2 of the present thesis achieved 
some success in promoting learning of the target morphological forms, the stimuli from 
Experiment 1 were less complex than were the stimuli used in Experiment 2. Given the 
fact that Experiment 3 utilises a novel research methodology, and the difficulties Pilot 
Studies 1 and 2 had in finding a learning effect, it was decided that Experiment 3 would 
begin with a less complex system in the first instance. Once a significant learning effect is 
found, certain variables, such as the complexity of the stimuli, can then be modified to 
examine the effects that these modifications have on learning. A summary of the changes 
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 are presented in Table 7.1 below. 
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Table 7.1.  
Summary of Changes to the Training and Testing Phases between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 
  
Training Phase 
  
Testing Phase 
 Exemplars Repetition Total 
Exposure 
Case 
markers 
Syntactic 
Patterns 
Training Task(s)  Testing Instruments 
Experiment 1 48 3x 144 
sentences 
(auditory 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
 
2 1. Picture-
matching 
2. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
sentence) 
3. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
foreign word in 
isolation) 
 
 1. 48-item auditory 
GJT  
(48 transfer items) 
2. Confidence ratings 
3. Source attributions 
4. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
Experiment 3 48 3x 144 
sentences 
(visual 
only) 
Nominative 
Accusative 
2 1. Self-paced 
reading 
2. Elicited 
imitations (repeat 
sentence) 
 
 1. Self-paced reading 
(control vs violation 
blocks) 
2. 32-item multiple-
choice task (32 
transfer items) 
3. Confidence ratings 
4. Source attributions 
5. Debriefing 
questionnaire 
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Training Set 
The training set for Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1. It included 24 bi-
syllabic, foreign nouns. Each of these nouns was used in two unique sentences in the 
training phase, one in the nominative case and one in the accusative case. In total, 48 unique 
sentences were used in the training phase of the experiment. All 48 sentences were repeated 
three times, once in each of the three training blocks, resulting in a total exposure of 144 
sentences. Examples of these sentences can be seen in Table 7.2 below. 
 
In addition, as in Experiment 1, all stimulus sentences followed one of two syntactic 
patterns. One of these patterns followed a prototypical Subject-Verb-Object (S-V-O) word 
order, and the second followed an Object-Verb-Subject (O-V-S) word order. Further 
examples of the two syntactic patterns can be seen in Table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3.  
Examples of the Two Syntactic Patterns Used in Experiment 3 
Pattern Template 
O - V - S [[AP]TEMP > [NP]OBJ > [VP] > [NP]SUBJ > [PP]] 
Nominative 
 
Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. 
Accusative Last month the kasu opened Patrick with the key. 
S - V - O  [[AP]TEMP > [NP]SUBJ > [VP] > [NP]OBJ > [PP]] 
Nominative 
 
Last year the prodejna shipped goods to the shoppers. 
Accusative All week the builder took his vrtacku to work. 
  
Table 7.2.   
Descriptions and Examples of the Two Morphological Categories in Experiment 3 
Morphological 
Category 
Syntactic category Example 
Nominative 
 
Subject 
 
The britva cut David’s face at the sink last 
night. 
Accusative Direct object Peter used a britvu in the bathroom today. 
234 
 
As in the previous experiments, care was taken in the construction of the stimuli 
to ensure a balance between the nominative and accusative items, and between the two 
syntactic patterns, as well as to provide a counterbalance between these two 
considerations. In other words, the number of nominative items that followed an S-V-O 
pattern was equal to the number of nominative items that followed an O-V-S pattern, 
(please refer to Section 5.1.3 above for a fuller description of the construction of the 
stimuli). It is also important to point out that such counterbalancing amongst the items 
also serves to control against locality effects in sentence processing. Simply put, locality 
effects refers to the fact that the distance between related sentence elements impacts on 
the ability to establish their relationship during online processing (Bartek, Lewis, 
Vasishth, & Smith, 2011; Gibson, 1998, 2000). In the case of the present experiment, 
such locality effects might manifest in relation to the distance for which participants 
would be required to hold on to the grammatical information encoded within the 
inflectional marker in relation to stimulus sentences coded as near versus far. As can be 
seen in Table 7.4 below, sentences are labelled as either near or far with regard to 
distance. Within sentences coded as near, the foreign word falls in Segment 4, in a 
position immediately after the verb, which is a location typically reserved for the direct 
object of an English sentence. By contrast, the foreign word occurs in Segment 2 of 
sentences coded as far, a location typical of the subject of an English sentence. To 
illustrate how these sentences might be processed, let us examine Example 1 from Table 
7.4 below. As participants read the first two segments of this sentence, some time ago / 
the brana, they might suspect that brana is the subject due to its position in the sentence. 
However, it is only after reading further, to Segment 4, some time ago / the brana / 
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blocked / the road that their understanding of the function of the foreign word, based on 
their incremental processing of the sentence, is either confirmed or disproved by the 
lexical clues contained in Segment 4. Thus, if participants are using the grammatical 
information encoded within the case ending, they would need to hold on to this 
information from Segment 2 until it could be verified in Segment 4. By contrast, in 
Example 2, last week / the man / changed / the plenu / in the bathroom, the foreign word 
appears in Segment 4. When the participant reaches the foreign word in the sentence, all 
of the information needed to interpret the function of the inflectional marker has already 
been encountered. This means that participants do not need to hold on to the information 
further; rather, their understanding of the sentence can immediately be corroborated or 
refuted. To summarise, sentences coded as far require participants to hold on to the 
grammatical information encoded within the inflectional marker until it can be verified at 
a later point in the sentence. Sentences coded as near do not require participants to do 
this; instead, the veracity of the participants' interpretation of the sentence based on the 
inflectional marker can immediately be identified.
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Table 7.4. 
Characteristics and Examples of Sentences Used in the SPR Task in Experiment 
       Example sentences 
 
 
 
Syntax 
  
Case 
  
Distance 
  
Segment 1 
  
Segment 2 
  
Segment 3 
  
Segment 4 
  
Segment 5 
1 
 
S-V-O  Nominative  Far  Some time ago 
 
 the brana  blocked  the road  to town. 
2 
 
S-V-O  Accusative  Near  Last week  the man  changed  the plenu  in the bathroom. 
3 
 
O-V-S  Nominative  Near  This evening  the room  cleaned  the sluzka  with water. 
4 
 
O-V-S  Accusative  Far  This morning 
 
 the stuhu  tied  the man   to the gift. 
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 As can be seen in Table 7.5 below, the SPR task in Experiment 3 was divided into 
four experimental blocks. The sentences used in Blocks 1–3 were identical, albeit 
randomised, for all participants. There were, however, two separate versions of Block 4: 
Version A and Version B. Half of the participants completed Version A, and the other half 
completed Version B.  
Table 7.5. 
Description of the Training and Testing Blocks of the SPR task in Experiment 3 
  Training phase  Testing phase 
  Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Block 4 
(Version A or 
B) 
 
Stimulus 
Sentences 
  
48 
  
48 
(identical to 
Block 1) 
 
  
48 
(identical to 
Blocks 1 & 2) 
  
48 novel 
sentences 
Comprehension 
Questions (CQ) 
 
 48 
(CQ set 1) 
 48 
(CQ set 2) 
 48 
(CQ set 3) 
 48 novel CQs 
 
 In contrast to previous experiments in this thesis, which asked participants to match 
the meaning of the foreign word to one of two pictures displayed on a monitor, Experiment 
3 included comprehension questions as part of the task in the training phase of the 
experiment. The decision to include these questions was made for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, with regard to the construct validity of the incidental learning conditions, the 
participants were told that this experiment was investigating issues related to understanding 
the meaning of sentences presented in an L2. Logically, then, a comprehension question 
seems to match the cover story given to participants. Secondly, comprehension questions 
assist in ensuring that the reaction time data gleaned from the SPR task are reflective of 
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underlying cognitive processes. Analysis of the accuracy of CQs can help to ensure that 
participants are not simply clicking through the sentences, but are instead processing them 
for meaning; therefore, the reaction times registered for each segment of the sentence are 
more likely to represent underlying cognitive processes (Keating & Jegerski, 2015; 
Roberts, 2012b). 
For this experiment, three comprehension questions were constructed for each of 
the 48 stimulus sentences used in the training phase of the experiment. As each stimulus 
sentence was repeated three times across this phase, this entailed participants having to 
answer a different comprehension question each time they encountered a particular 
stimulus sentence. In other words, although each stimulus sentence was repeated across the 
three training blocks, the comprehension questions were not. This was done on the 
assumption that changing the comprehension questions would help to ensure that 
participants maintained focus throughout the experiment. 
The overarching principle in the construction of the comprehension questions was 
that these questions should support the cover story and be focused on the meaning of the 
stimulus sentence. In addition, a number of other considerations were taken into account 
in their development. Firstly, none of the comprehension questions included the foreign 
word contained in the stimulus sentence. In addition, for each stimulus sentence, the focus 
of the comprehension questions was balanced across three different components of the 
sentence. For example, if we look at the syntactic templates in Table 7.4 above, we can see 
that each sentence contains an adverbial time phrase (designated as [AP] in the template), 
as well as a prepositional phrase (designated as [PP] in the template). As such, for each 
sentence, one comprehension question concerned the adverbial phrase (when the action 
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took place), a second question related to the prepositional phrase (where the action took 
place), and the final question concerned the action that took place in the stimulus sentence. 
The comprehension questions were balanced in this way to ensure that the comprehension 
questions were not responsible for directing participants' attention to one particular aspect 
of the stimuli, but were helping to ensure that participants attended to all parts of the 
stimulus sentences instead. Examples of the comprehension questions can be seen in Table 
7.6 below. 
Table 7.6. 
Sample of Comprehension Questions (CQ) Used in the Training Phase of Experiment 3 
Original Stimulus Sentence: Some time ago David dug a studnu at his home 
  
Focus 
  
Example 
CQ 1 Action  
 
 Did David fix something? 
CQ 2 Time 
 
  Did this happen recently? 
CQ 3 Location   Did David do something at work? 
 
Furthermore, the answers to the comprehension questions were balanced across 
the experiment so that each foreign noun included equal numbers of comprehension 
questions with "yes" and "no" answers. For example, the three comprehension questions 
for the foreign noun studnu in the accusative case would elicit the answers yes, no and 
no, respectively. By contrast, the comprehension questions for studna, the nominative 
form, had the correct answers no, yes and yes, respectively. By balancing the 
comprehension questions in this matter, the total number of yes and no answers were 
equal with regard to case (nominative versus accusative), syntactic pattern (S-V-O versus 
O-V-S), for each foreign noun, within each training block and across the entire training 
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phase of the experiment. A complete list of the stimulus sentences and corresponding 
comprehension questions can be found in Appendix G. 
The fourth and final block (Block 4)31 of the SPR task represented the testing 
phase of this stage of the experiment. Block 4 included 48 novel sentences that were not 
used in the first three blocks of the experiment. Block 4 included both grammatical and 
ungrammatical sentences, which were distributed across four stages within this block: a 
transition phase (n=16), a control phase (n=8), a violation phase (n=16) and a second 
control phase (n=8). This information can be seen in Table 7.7 below. 
 
The transition and control phases contained only grammatical items, while the 
violation phase contained only ungrammatical items. As in the GJT used in previous 
experiments in this thesis, the grammatical and ungrammatical sentences were designed 
with the same considerations as the stimulus sentences used in the first three blocks of the 
SPR task. The grammatical sentences included the correct case marker. The 
ungrammatical items in the violation phase of Block 4 were generated by replacing the 
                                                     
31 The procedure for the testing block of the SPR task was identical to that of the training blocks. This is 
discussed in more detail in the sections that follow. 
Table 7.7. 
Distribution of Stimulus Sentences and Comprehension Questions across the Testing 
Phase of the SPR Task. 
Testing Phase 
  Block 4 
  Transition   Control 1  Violation  Control 2 
 
Stimulus 
sentences 
 
  
16 gram 
  
8 gram 
 
  
16 ungram 
  
8 gram 
Comprehension 
questions (CQ) 
 
 16 
 
 8  16  8 
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correct case marking with the other case marker. Of the 16 ungrammatical sentences, 
eight were nominative and eight were accusative. The eight ungrammatical nominative 
items were created by replacing the correct nominative marker (-a) with the accusative 
marker (-u). The same procedure was followed to create the ungrammatical accusative 
items.  
In addition, as noted above, there were two separate versions of Block 4: Version 
A and Version B. The difference between these is that the violation and control items 
were rotated between these two versions. In other words, the grammatical items used in 
the control blocks from Version A were made ungrammatical by changing the case 
marker. These items were then used in the violation block in Version B. The 
ungrammatical items from Version A were made grammatical by replacing the incorrect 
case marker with the correct one. These items were then used in the control blocks in 
Version B. Counterbalancing the test items in this way helps to ensure the internal 
validity of this study; specifically, differences in reaction times for grammatical and 
ungrammatical sentences are due to the case marker, and are not the result of another 
aspect of the sentence. 
As noted previously, Experiment 3 also included a second measure of learning, in 
this case a multiple-choice task (M/C task). For this instrument, 32 novel sentences were 
constructed following the same considerations as those included in the SPR task. The 
sentences used in this task are comparable to the sentences used throughout the SPR task, 
as well as to the items included in the GJT in previous experiments in this thesis. Of the 
32 items included in the M/C task, 16 were nominative and 16 accusative. An example of 
an item from the M/C test can be seen in Figure 7A below.  
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Figure 7A. Example item from the M/C Task of Experiment 3 
 
7.2. Procedure  
Experiment 3 took place in a private room on campus. The entire experiment was 
delivered via a Dell ThinkPad T410 laptop computer, using Superlab 4.5 (Cedrus Corp, 
San Pedro, CA) for the SPR and M/C tasks on a Cedrus model RB-834 response pad. In 
addition to providing greater ease of experimentation, response pads provide far more 
accurate reaction-time measurements than can be expected when reaction times are 
measured using a computer keyboard. Following the M/C task, participants completed a 
short debriefing questionnaire, followed by an oral interview. A depiction of the stages of 
Experiment 3 can be seen in Figure 7B below. 
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Figure 7B. Stages of Experiment 3. 
 
SPR Task 
Following common practice, this SPR task followed a non-cumulative linear design with a 
segment-by-segment presentation (Jegerski, 2014; see also Section 2.6 above). An 
illustration of how the SPR was presented can be seen in Figure 7C below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SPR Task
MC Sentence 
Completion 
Task
Debriefing 
(written and 
oral)
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Figure 7C. Example of Slides Used in the SPR task in Experiment 3. 
The procedure was identical for both the training and testing blocks of the SPR 
task. The instructions given to participants stated that they should read through the sentence 
quickly, but to take care that they understood it as they proceeded; in other words, 
participants were instructed not to just click through a sentence without understanding it. 
Their task was to read through each sentence (such as Last summer / the grass / ate the 
koza / in the field), and then to repeat it silently, from memory, when prompted by 
"*repeat*" on the monitor. In the initial piloting of the procedure, participants were asked 
to repeat the sentences aloud, as in the procedure in Experiments 1 and 2. However, the 
pronunciation of the foreign word was problematic as the participants had not encountered 
it auditorily, and several participants paused to rehearse the pronunciation of the foreign 
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word when they encountered it in the SPR task. This threatened the internal validity of the 
SPR task, as the reaction times would be contaminated by issues connected with the 
pronunciation of the foreign word, rather than reflecting the cognitive processes connected 
with the comprehension of the sentence. Hence, the decision was made to have the 
participants repeat the sentence silently, rather than aloud. There were some drawbacks to 
this decision, primarily in that there was no way for the experimenter to ensure that 
participants were in fact repeating the sentences when prompted. To help to ensure that the 
participants were following the instructions provided, the experimenter observed whether 
the participants paused when prompted to repeat a sentence. Three of the participants (3/26) 
did not pause when prompted to repeat it (reaction time ≤ 500 ms) and continued to click 
through the prompt rapidly, even when reminded of the experimental procedure. Due to 
this deviation from the experimental procedure, the data from these three participants were 
excluded from further analyses. 
After repeating the sentence silently, the participants pressed a key on the response 
pad and progressed to a yes/no comprehension question based on the sentence they had 
just read; for example, "Was the grass eaten by something?" Participants answered this 
question by pressing one of two clearly labelled buttons on the response pad. As feedback 
has been identified as a potential confounding variable, particularly due to its potential for 
raising awareness (Leow & Hama, 2013; Hama & Leow, 2010), no feedback was provided 
to participants regarding the accuracy of their answers. After answering the comprehension 
question, the next sentence began and the procedure was repeated for the next sentence in 
the sequence. Figure 7D illustrates this procedure, and Figure 7E below shows sample 
slides used in the SPR task. 
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Figure 7D. Training procedure in Experiment 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7E. Example of Slides in the SPR Task in Experiment 3. 
 
 
Read Sentence
Repeat 
sentence 
Answer CQ
Fixation Cross
Read next 
sentence
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Prior to the start of Training Block 1, participants read through the instructions for 
the task and completed four practice sentences in order to become familiar with the 
experimental procedure. Participants were also given the opportunity at this point to ask 
questions if they were unsure about any aspect of the experiment or the task they had to 
perform. Following the practice sentences, and the opportunity to ask questions, 
participants began Training Block 1 of the experiment. After the completion of each 
training block, participants were given a one-minute break. This was done to combat 
fatigue, on the assumption that such breaks would help to divide the experiment into more 
manageable chunks. Following the completion of Training Block 3, participants were given 
a final one-minute break before beginning the fourth and final block of the SPR task. The 
entire training phase, exclusive of the time spent on instructions, practice sentences and 
breaks, took about 40 minutes to complete. 
 As noted above, following Training Block 3, participants were given a one-minute 
break before beginning the Testing Block (Block 4) of the experiment. It is important to 
note that there was no demarcation between the training and testing phases of the 
experiments and, as noted above, that the procedure for the testing block was identical to 
that of the training blocks. To the participants, the Testing Block appeared to be simply a 
new set of sentences and comprehension questions.  
Multiple-choice Task 
Following the end of Block 4 in the SPR task, participants in the experimental group 
were informed that the sentences in the previous section were not arbitrary, but were part 
of a complex system. For each test sentence, participants were encouraged to decide, as 
quickly as possible, which of the two choices best completed the sentence. No feedback 
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was provided concerning the accuracy of the participants' decisions. Alongside each test 
item, participants completed both confidence ratings and source attributions following each 
test item. See Figure 7F below for examples of slides that were used in Superlab for the 
testing phase of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 7F. Example of the Slides and Procedure for the M/C Task in Experiment 3. 
Verbal Reports 
Following the M/C task, participants were also prompted to describe, in both a 
written questionnaire and as part of a follow-up oral interview, any rules or patterns they 
might have noticed. In addition, the questionnaire for Experiment 3 included a question 
that asked if participants had been trying to engage in rule-search behaviour during the 
experiment. No such question was included in the previous experiments in this thesis, 
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although this has been done in other studies investigating incidental learning (Robinson, 
1997). A copy of the questionnaire for Experiment 3 can be found in Appendix I.  
In the oral interviews, the researcher asked the candidates to elaborate on their 
responses to the written questionnaire. If the participants reported noticing the 
morphological markers, the experimenter asked the participants at what point in the 
experiment they remembered first becoming aware of them. If the participants were able 
to verbalise the underlying rule system, the experimenter asked them to elaborate at which 
point in the experiment they first thought of this system, as well as what made them become 
aware of the rules. Finally, if the participants remained unaware - in other words, if they 
were unable to state a morphological rule system - the researcher explained the underlying 
rule system and again asked the participants if they had figured this out or had any intuition 
about it at any point during the experiment. 
7.3. Statistical Analyses and Data Treatment 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 utilises mixed-effects models to analyse 
the performance of the participants on both the SPR and the M/C tasks. All models were 
set up using the maximal structure advocated by Barr et al. (2013). As noted previously, 
this maximal structure requires that models include corresponding random effects for all 
fixed effects included within mixed-effects models. Following Cunnings and Sturt 
(2014), if the maximal model failed to converge, the random effect that accounted for the 
least variance in the data was removed until the model did converge. As was the case 
with the outcome measure in the previous experiments (the GJT), the M/C task in 
Experiment 3 generated categorical data in the form of correct / incorrect responses. 
Therefore, the M/C task was analysed using a logit mixed-effects model (Jaeger, 2008; 
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Linck & Cunnings, 2015). Statistical significance for the overall model fit was 
determined using the χ2 statistic of likelihood ratio tests. Following the example provided 
by Baayen (2008), effect sizes for the logit-mixed effects model were calculated using the 
C index of concordance and the Hmisc package (Harrell & Dupont, 2015). C index 
values range from .5 to 1, with .5 representing no fit and 1 representing a perfect fit of the 
data. As noted in the preceding chapters, a C-index of .7 is interpreted as a moderate fit, 
.8 and above as a good fit, and .9 and above as an excellent fit for the data (Gries, 2013). 
Following Gelman and Hill (2007) and Linck and Cunnings (2015), significance of the 
fixed effects within the best-fitting model was interpreted as an absolute t-value ≥ 2.0. 
Further post-hoc Tukey tests were carried out to examine significant interaction effects 
with this model. Effect sizes for these tests were calculated using Cohen's d. Following 
Plonsky and Oswald's (2014) recommendations, Cohen's d of .40 is considered small, .70 
medium, and 1.00 and higher as a large effect size. 
In contrast to the M/C task, the SPR task elicited continuous data in the form of 
reaction times. To analyse these data, a linear mixed-effects model was constructed to 
examine the differences in reaction times for grammatical and ungrammatical items 
(Baayen et al., 2008; Linck & Cunnings, 2015). As with the logit mixed-effects models, 
statistical significance in building the linear model was determined using the χ2 statistic 
of likelihood ratio tests, and significance for the fixed effects within the best fitting model 
was interpreted as an absolute t-value ≥ 2.0. Effect sizes in the form of R2 were calculated 
using the MuMIn package in R (Barton, 2013). R2 values, which range from 0 to 1, are an 
effect size estimate that quantifies the proportion of the variance in the data explained by 
the linear-effects model (Baayen, 2008; Cohen, 1988). The interpretation of R2 values is 
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intuitive, in that an R2 value of 1 indicates that the model accounts for 100% of the data, 
whereas a value of 0 indicates that the model accounts for 0% of the data. As Experiment 
3 is the first experiment in this series to elicit reaction-time data, the following section 
will provide a brief overview of some of the methodological issues related to the handling 
of reaction-time data prior to statistical analysis. 
7.3.1. Treatment of Data in Reaction-time Research 
Most statistical procedures, including mixed-effects models, assume that data are 
normally distributed (Osborne, 2005). This is of particular importance when working 
with reaction-time (RT) data, as they tend to be skewed and to contain outlying data 
points (Ratcliff, 1993; Whelan, 2008). Outliers, broadly defined, refer to reaction-time 
values that are generated by processes other than the one(s) under investigation (Ratcliff, 
1993). For instance, in the case of the present study, slips of the hand, or momentary 
lapses in concentration, might result in unusually low or high reaction times that do not 
reflect the real reading times accurately, or the underlying cognitive processes under 
investigation (Jegerski, 2014; Jiang, 2012; Keating & Jegerski, 2015). As should be 
apparent, identifying and dealing with outlying values has been considered to be an 
important part of reaction-time research (see Jiang, 2012, for an overview).  
Traditionally, outliers are identified as individual data points with extreme 
absolute values, either very high or very low, or data points that are extreme in relation to 
other data points in a particular data set. Treatment of outliers involves either removing 
outlying values from the data set or treating these values so that they do not skew the 
overall data set (see Leung & Williams, 2011, for an example in SLA research). It is 
important to pause here to differentiate between a priori data trimming and trimming as a 
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result of model criticism. A priori data trimming, as the name implies, refers to treating 
data prior to committing the data to statistical analysis. For example, the mean and 
standard deviation may be calculated for a particular data set. A cut-off point is set, 
typically at 2 or 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. Values greater or smaller than 
this cut-off point are then discarded, or are treated by replacing the extreme value with 
the cut-off value (see Lachaud & Renaud, 2011; Ratcliff, 1993; Whelan, 2008 for 
overviews of a priori data treatment in psycholinguistic research).  
One challenge in identifying outlying data points when working with reaction 
times is directly related to the fact that raw (untreated) RTs tend to be skewed towards 
shorter response times (Whelan, 2008). This is because there is a natural boundary at the 
low end of the distribution; in other words, there are physical limits to how fast it is 
possible to respond to a stimulus, but there is no such boundary at the high end. This 
results in a distribution with a positive skew, as exemplified by the raw RT data taken 
from the present SPR task. These data are illustrated in Figure 7G below.  
 
Figure 7G. Distribution of Raw Reaction Times from Experiment 3. 
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The problem with such a distribution is that long outliers "hide in the tail" 
(Ratcliff, 1993, p. 511). In other words, long outliers can have a dramatic effect on the 
central tendency of the data set to the point at which outliers become difficult to identify 
using the a priori treatment methods outlined above (Baayen, 2008; Baayen & Milin, 
2010; Lachaud & Renaud, 2011). To address this issue, psycholinguists typically 
transform their data in order to arrive at a data set with a normal distribution, using either 
a logarithm transformation or a reciprocal one (see Box & Cox, 1964; Kliegl, Masson, & 
Richter, 2010; Osborne, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, 2001 for overviews)32. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) argued that the shape of the distribution of the data set 
should determine the type of transformation used. For example, for positively-skewed 
distributions of shape as presented in Figure 7G above, they argued that a logarithmic 
transformation is preferred. Following transformation of the data, the researcher should 
be able to analyse the data set in order to identify and remove outliers from it.  
Although the identification and treatment of outliers is considered vital for 
parametric statistics such as ANOVAs, mixed-effects models are generally robust in the 
face of outlying data points (Baayen, 2008; Baayen et al., 2008; Jegerski, 2014; Jiang, 
2012; Keating & Jegerski, 2015), to the extent that some have argued that data trimming 
is unnecessary with these models (Jegerski, 2014; Keating & Jegerski, 2015). However, 
whether or not mixed-effects models are indeed impervious to the effects of outliers is a 
matter of debate (Baayen, 2008; Barr et al., 2013). What does appear to be important 
within fixed-effects models is checking that the assumptions of the mixed-effects model 
are met, specifically the assumption that the residuals of the fitted model are normally 
                                                     
32 See also Gries (2013) and Pallant (2010) for instructions on transforming data in R and SPSS, 
respectively. 
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distributed (Baayen et al., 2008). Common procedures of data transformation and the 
screening of outliers help to ensure that this assumption is later met. It has been argued 
that, if the residuals of a model follow a normal distribution, outliers in the data set do not 
necessarily need to be removed. By contrast, if the residuals are non-normally distributed, 
it is only then that outliers should be identified and treated. This approach is referred to as 
model criticism, and it has been demonstrated to result in better model fit and fewer lost 
data points, than does traditional a priori data screening (Baayen & Milin, 2010). 
Therefore, a model criticism approach is adopted here. 
7.4. Results  
7.4.1. Verbal Reports 
An analysis of the retrospective verbal reports revealed that eight of the 23 
participants were able to verbalise the morphological rule system in some form, and 
seven of the eight were able to state the rule when prompted by the written questionnaire. 
The remaining participant answered "Yes, I thought of that" when the experimenter 
explained the rule. These participants are henceforth classified as "aware". Comments 
related to the subject and/or object of the sentence, as well as layman's explanations, such 
as the "when it ends in -a it does the action", were taken as evidence that participants 
were fully aware of the rule system. When asked when they had worked out the 
underlying rules, two of the eight said that it was while performing the SPR task, and the 
remaining six of the eight said it was during the final M/C task. Both participants who 
became fully aware during the SPR task were asked if they had noticed anything strange 
about any of the sentences towards the end of that task. When they answered no, it was 
explained that some of the sentences in the SPR task were ungrammatical as they carried 
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the wrong morphological marker. Both of these participants claimed that they had not 
noticed any incorrect markers during the SPR task. One of these participants further 
commented that, "Maybe that's why some of the sentences seemed more difficult to 
understand." Finally, when asked if they had engaged in rule-search behaviour during the 
experiment, all eight of the aware participants answered in the affirmative, although four 
of them stated that they only began looking for rules during the M/C task, not during the 
SPR task. 
The remaining 15 participants (of 23) remained unaware of the underlying rule 
system, and are henceforth classified as being "unaware". When prompted, all 15 of these 
participants were able to identify both of the inflectional markers included in the present 
study (-a and -u). This was taken as evidence that they had, at a minimum, noticed the 
surface features of the input at some point during the experiment. Three participants 
offered incorrect rules related to word order. One of these three participants stated that 
the -a marker was used at the beginning of a sentence, and the -u marker at the end, 
regardless of word order.33 The other two participants stated that one of the markers was 
used with normal word order (S-V-O), and the other marker was used with reverse word 
order (O-V-S). When asked to guess the rule behind these markers, eight of the 15 
unaware participants guessed gender. One participant guessed that the -a marker was 
used with singular nouns, and -u with plurals. Another participant stated that these 
markers were used with nouns, but was unable to elaborate further. The remaining four 
unaware participants claimed they had no idea, even when prompted to guess. One of 
these participants remembered noticing the case endings during the SPR task, but "didn't 
                                                     
33 The experimenter followed this up to ensure that this participant was not referring to the subject/ object 
distinction. 
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think they were important". When asked if they had engaged in rule-search behaviour 
during the experiment, only two of the 15 unaware participants claimed to have done so 
in the M/C task, but none of these participants indicated that they were looking for rules 
during the SPR task. Concerning rule-search behaviour, one participant did not look for 
rules because of being "too busy concentrating on meaning" during the SPR task. In 
summary, as in previous experiments in this thesis, all of the participants in this study 
demonstrated awareness at the level of noticing (Schmidt, 1990). However, in contrast to 
previous experiments, a number of participants developed awareness of a higher order, 
which could be classified as awareness at the level of understanding following Schmidt's 
(1990) framework. 
7.4.2. SPR Task 
7.4.2.1. Comprehension Questions 
Firstly, in order to gauge the degree of difficulty that participants had in 
comprehending the stimulus sentences in the SPR task, descriptive statistics were 
calculated to examine the extent to which participants were able to answer the 
comprehension questions (CQs) correctly throughout the experiment. Such an analysis 
would not only provide information about the degree of difficulty of the stimulus 
sentences, but would also provide an indication as to whether the participants were 
simply clicking through the sentences without trying to comprehend them. The results of 
this analysis revealed that the participants answered 76.75% (SD = 17.64%) of the 
comprehension questions correctly across the entire SPR task. The performance of the 
aware participants (M = 77.17%, SD = 12.09%) was then compared to the performance of 
the unaware participants (M = 79.93%, SD = 4.55%) via a logit mixed-effects model. The 
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null model included accuracy as a binary outcome, with random intercepts for subjects 
and items. A second model was constructed, which incorporated group (aware versus 
unaware) as a fixed effect, and as a random slope by item. A likelihood ratio test revealed 
that the inclusion of group did not lead to a significantly improved fit - χ2 (1) = 1.34, p 
=0.63, C = .52 - indicating no significant difference between the performance of the 
aware and unaware participants in the comprehension questions during the SPR task. 
Accuracy on the comprehension questions was further broken down across the three 
training blocks of the study, as well as for control and violation items in the testing phase 
of the experiment. These results are presented in Table 7.8 below.  
Table 7.8. 
Percentage Accuracy of Participants on Comprehension Questions across the 
Training and Testing Blocks of Experiment 3 
Group  Training Phase  Testing Phase 
  Block 1 Block 2 Block 
3 
 Control Violation 
Total M 77.14 82.16 77.17  80.74 82.17 
 SD 10.28 9.92 8.34  11.42 13.51 
        
Aware M 75.52 80.21 73.70  80.47 80.04 
 SD 14.98 13.38 9.14  14.80 19.38 
        
Unaware M 78.00 83.20 79.03  80.89 83.31 
 SD 6.33 7.13 7.14  9.12 8.72 
        
To determine whether the variation across the training and testing blocks was 
statistically significant for either the aware or unaware groups at any point in the 
experiment, an additional logit mixed-effects model was constructed, which included a 
random effect for time (Block 1, Block 2, Block 3, Control Phase and Violation Phase). 
Although this inclusion was significant - χ2 (3) = 11.09, p =0.04, C = .64 - this effect did 
not interact with group (aware versus unaware). This indicates that the performance of 
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the aware and unaware participants was not significantly different across any of the 
training blocks. The significant main effect for time is perhaps best explained by the 
slightly reduced accuracy in Block 1 and Block 3 for aware and unaware participants 
alike during the training phase. The slightly reduced rates of accuracy in Block 1 could 
best be explained by the fact that the participants were still becoming used to the stimuli. 
Due to the repetitive nature of the experiment, the reduced rate in Block 3 could be 
attributed to either to fatigue or boredom.  
7.4.2.2. Reaction-time Data 
In order to examine the response times, it is important to identify in which 
segment of the sentence we might expect to find differences in the reaction times to 
grammatical and ungrammatical items. As can be seen in Table 7.9 below, the foreign 
word always appears in either Segment 2 or Segment 4 of the sentence. Furthermore, the 
foreign word always functioned as either the subject or as the object of the sentence. 
Regardless of whether the foreign word appeared in Segment 2 or Segment 4, the reader 
would not be able to identify whether the inflectional marker was correct until reaching 
Segment 4.  
Table 7.9. 
Sample Sentences Illustrating Pre-critical, Critical and Post-critical 
Regions of Stimulus Sentences 
  Regions 
  Pre-critical  Pre-critical  Pre-critical  Critical  Post-critical 
  Segment 1  Segment 2  Segment 3  Segment 4  Segment 5 
1 
 
 Some time ago 
 
 the brana  blocked  the road  to town. 
2 
 
 Last week  the man  changed  the plenu  in the 
bathroom. 
3 
 
 This evening  the room  cleaned  the sluzka  with water. 
4 
 
 This morning 
 
 the stuhu  tied  the man   to the gift. 
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 Thus, if the participants were processing the sentence incrementally, and were 
using the grammatical information coded within the inflectional markers in real time, 
then Segment 4 would be the first segment in which differences in reaction times to 
grammatical and ungrammatical utterances would be registered. Thus, Segment 4 can be 
referred to as the critical region, in that it is the point in the sentence at which the 
grammaticality of the utterances can be realised. However, in addition to examining the 
difference in reaction times within the critical region, it is also important to examine the 
data that both precede and follow the critical region. These regions are referred to as the 
pre-critical region and the post-critical region, respectively (Jiang, 2012). The reaction-
time data from the pre-critical region serve as a baseline, or control, to which data from 
the critical region can be compared. It is to be expected that no difference in reaction 
times to grammatical and ungrammatical sentences will be observed in the pre-critical 
region (Jiang, 2012; Jegerski, 2014). For example, if the same differences in reaction 
times between grammatical and ungrammatical utterances are found in both the critical 
region and the pre-critical region, then it is likely that these differences are an artefact of 
the testing set, or are a result of the speed at which the entire sentence was read. 
However, if there is no such difference in the pre-critical region, then it can be said with 
more certainty that the demonstrated differences in reaction times in the critical period 
are due to the grammaticality of the utterance.  
 In addition to analysing data from the pre-critical region, it is also important to 
analyse the post-critical region, or the region that follows the critical region. This analysis 
is important due to the possibility of spillover effects in reaction times (Traxler & Tooley, 
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2008). Spillover effects refer to the phenomenon when processing is delayed or is 
incomplete within a particular region and, as a result, this processing is carried over to the 
next word or segment in the sentence (see Keating & Jegerski, 2015 for a brief 
discussion). In other words, the reaction times in a particular region are influenced "not 
only by the problems in the current display but also by any backlog or processing that 
may have built up in the buffer" (Mitchell, 1984, p. 76).  
Previous research that has utilised the SPR technique (Traxler & Tooley, 2008) 
has found evidence of spillover in post-critical regions of the sentence. Thus, an analysis 
of the post-critical position, Segment 5, might reveal whether participants' demonstrated 
some form of delayed processing of grammatical and ungrammatical items. It is also 
noteworthy that it is important to control for spillover on an item-by-item basis. For 
example, the speed at which a participant processes the pre-critical region in a particular 
sentence might influence the speed at which he or she processes the critical region. Thus, 
more recent studies within psycholinguistics have attempted to control for this potentially 
confounding variable by incorporating spillover effects as a fixed effect in their mixed-
effects models (Hofmeister, 2011; Hofmeister, Jaeger, Arnon, Sag, & Snider, 2013. 
7.4.2.3. Transformation of Reaction-time Data 
Prior to any statistical analysis, the reaction-time (RT) data were initially screened 
for unrealistic values. Following Baayen (2008; see also Baayen & Milin, 2010), reaction 
times of less than 400 ms and greater than 4,000 ms were removed from the data set. This 
resulted in the removal of 12 data points from nine participants (eight values less than 
400 ms, four values greater than 4,000 ms), which represented approximately 1.7% of the 
total data points. Descriptive statistics were calculated to examine the average RTs of 
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aware and unaware participants in the critical period across the training and testing 
phases of the experiment. As can be seen in Table 7.10 below, the reaction times of the 
aware participants were consistently greater than were those of the unaware participants. 
Table 7.10.  
Average Response Time (ms) for Aware and Unaware Participants across Training and 
Testing Blocks for Segment 4 
  Training Phase  Testing Phase 
Group  Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Transition  Control  Violation 
Aware m 1262.55  1161.90  1242.94  1275.48  1237.61  1323.97 
 sd 621.28  591.22  714.99  559.98  545.91  627.96 
 
Unaware 
 
m 
 
967.75 
  
981.94 
  
947.92 
  
921.45 
  
846.62 
  
892.06 
 sd 575.42  592.90  594.53  562.97  456.65  560.18 
 
 
To examine whether this difference extended to grammatical and ungrammatical items 
during the testing phase of the experiment, additional descriptive statistics were 
calculated for the control and violation blocks, as well as for the various sub-components, 
which will be analysed later in the linear mixed-effects model. These results can be seen 
in Table 7.11 below. 
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Table 7.11. 
Reaction Times for All (Aware and Unaware) Participants for Control and Violation Items 
in Segment 4 
All 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Close Long 
Control  M  985.15 980.65 989.65 904.36 1065.94 1057.35 912.85 
 SE  28.10 39.50 40.07 33.20 44.64 42.17 36.48 
 SD  538.97 535.76 543.59 450.32 605.53 572.02 494.82 
          
Violation M  1026.07 1052.79 999.35 982.59 1069.55 1172.81 879.33 
 SE  30.904 44.55 42.87 43.03 44.26 49.34 34.53 
 SD  592.83 604.35 581.51 583.63 600.34 669.25 468.33 
Aware 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Close Long 
Control M  1237.61 1200.53 1271.45 1122.23 1349.75 1319.83 1182.16 
 SE  48.28 62.73 73.63 60.95 72.60 73.068 62.97 
 SD  545.91 501.83 589.06 487.49 580.81 584.54 503.78 
          
Violation M  1323.97 1302.19 1321.69 1254.81 1369.06 1434.28 1139.59 
 SE  52.16 73.016 71.67 72.86 71.13 80.44 55.30 
 SD  627.96 584.13 573.39 582.85 569.07 643.52 442.40 
Unaware 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Close Long 
Control M  846.62 863.38 839.36 788.17 914.57 933.51 769.23 
 SE  31.34976 47.18 41.36 34.98 51.55 48.11 38.98 
 SD  456.65 517.90 453.016 383.19 564.66 527.03 427.04 
          
Violation M  892.06 919.78 827.34 837.30 909.82 1071.36 755.86 
 SE  35.11 52.42 46.57 48.55 50.73 56.59 38.95 
 SD  560.18 574.23 510.17 531.84 555.71 619.93 426.65 
 
Following common practice in the psycholinguistic literature, the plot of the 
distribution of reaction times was generated  to examine the distribution of the 
untransformed RTs. As this plot demonstrated a positive skew, the data were log-
transformed, and were re-examined for normality. Plots of both the overall log-
transformed reaction times, as well as the log-transformed reaction times by individual 
participants, revealed that the data were now normally distributed. These plots can be 
found in Appendix K. 
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7.4.2.4. Analysis of Critical-region Data 
Performance on the SPR task was examined via a linear mixed-effects model. To 
begin, two analyses were carried out to control for potentially confounding variables. The 
reader will recall that the testing phase began with a transition block, followed by a 
control block of eight items, a violation block of 16 items and a second control block of 
eight items. In order to determine if reaction times differed between the two control 
blocks, a linear mixed-effects regression model was built using the lme4 package (Bates 
et al., 2014) in R version 3.1.2 (R Development Core Team, 2008). Within this model, 
the log-transformed reaction times for control items only were modelled as a continuous 
dependent variable together with cross random intercepts for subject and items. A second 
model, which incorporated time (control block 1 versus control block 2) as a fixed effect 
and as a random slope by participant, was then built. The addition of time as a fixed 
effect did not result in a significantly improved model when comparing control items that 
came before and after the violation block - χ2 (1) =0.43, p =.51, R2=.67 - indicating that 
there were no significant differences in reaction times between items that occurred in the 
two control blocks. Thus, the items from the two control blocks were merged into a 
single group for subsequent models. Next, and more crucially, analyses were carried out 
to examine whether the two versions of the test, Versions A and B, which were 
counterbalanced among the participants, impacted on reaction times. To this end, another 
linear model was constructed in which test version was added as a fixed effect to the 
previous model, with the addition of a test version as a random slope by item. This 
version was then compared to a null model that included only the crossed random 
intercepts of subject and items. The results of a goodness of fit analysis indicated that the 
264 
 
addition of a test version did not lead to a better fit for the data: χ2 (4) = 42.18, p = 0.70, 
R2=.69. This null result indicates that participants performed similarly on the two 
versions of the test, and thus these versions do not account for the variance in the data.  
 At this point, further models were built to determine the fixed effects that had a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable, namely differences in reaction times 
to grammatical and ungrammatical items. To do this, it was necessary to include the fixed 
effect of grammaticality in the null model. If grammaticality were excluded from the null 
model, then maximum likelihood analyses would indicate relationships between fixed 
effects and overall reaction times, and not with that of the dependent variable. First, a null 
model was constructed, which analysed the log-transformed reading times from the entire 
testing set (both control and violation items) in terms of the fixed effect of grammaticality 
(grammatical versus ungrammatical items). This model also included crossed random 
intercepts for subjects and items, as well as a random slope for grammaticality by 
participant (Barr et al., 2013). As noted previously, such a random slope by participant 
would allow the model to account for variance in grammatical versus ungrammatical 
items on a participant-by-participant basis, and a random slope by item would account for 
such variance on an item-by-item basis. Additional models were built for each fixed 
effect. Each of these models included a variable, such as case, as a fixed effect as well as 
a random slope (Barr et al., 2013). These models were then compared individually 
against the null model using the χ2 statistic. If the model that included the fixed effect 
was significant against the null model, this result was interpreted as indicating that the 
fixed effect in question had a significant relationship with the dependent variable, and 
should be included in subsequent analyses. If the result was nonsignificant, this was 
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interpreted as no significant relationship, and that this fixed effect could be excluded 
from the models that were to follow. These data are presented in Table 7.12 below.  
Table 7.12. 
Summary of Maximum Likelihood Ratio Tests on Predictor Variables in SPR Task 
Predictor Variable χ2  df p R2 
Case 20.51 9 .02* .70 
Syntax 12.14 9 .21 .69 
Locality 77.14 9 ˂ .001*** .71 
Awareness 9.76 4 .05* .69 
M/C Task 5.70 4 .22 .69 
 
As can be seen in Table 7.12 above, the results of these comparisons indicated 
that the fixed effects of case, locality, and awareness showed a significant relationship 
with the dependent variable. Therefore, a new model that incorporated these three fixed 
effects was constructed. In addition, following the maximal model as suggested by Barr 
et al. (2013), case, distance and awareness were included as random effects: case and 
distance were included as random slopes by participant, and awareness as a random slope 
by item. A maximum likelihood ratio test indicated that this model was significant 
against the null model, χ2 (23) = 126.85, p ˂ .001, and accounted for approximately 75% 
of the variance in the data, R2=.75. Further comparisons indicated that the inclusion of all 
of these effects was warranted in the model, and the removal of any resulted in a 
decreased R2 value. Multicollinearity was formally assessed using Cohen's kappa. This 
resulted in a value of 1.76 which, according to Baayen's (2008) guidelines, indicates a 
very low level of collinearity between the fixed effects in the model. Thus, this model is 
henceforth referred to as the best-fit model, the results of which are presented in Table 
7.13 below.34  
                                                     
34 The residuals of this model were inspected and found to be approximately normally distributed. A Q-Q 
plot of this distribution can be found in Appendix K. 
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Before examining the data in more detail to determine which fixed effects reached 
significance within the best-fit model, it is important to eliminate the possibility that 
spillover from the pre-critical region is the source of the variance in the critical region35. 
Spillover values were calculated on an item-by-item basis, following the R model 
provided by Jaeger (https://hlplab.wordpress.com/2008/01/23/modeling-self-paced-
reading-data-effects-of-word-length-word-position-spill-over-etc/; see also Hofmeister, 
2011). To determine whether spillover from the previous region could account for the 
variance in the previous model, a new null model, which analysed the residuals from the 
previous model with crossed random intercepts for subjects and items, was created. 
Spillover was then entered as a fixed effect into a new model with a random slope by 
subject as a random effect. The results indicate that the inclusion of spillover as a fixed 
effect did not lead to a significantly better fit for the data: χ2 (1), =0.66, p =0.42, R2=.39. 
This result indicates that spillover from the pre-critical region is not a significant 
explanatory variable for the variance in RTs in the critical region. 
 At this point, it is worth examining a summary of the best-fit model, as presented 
in Table 7.13 below. Summary statistics allow for an examination of the extent to which 
individual fixed effects, as well as interactions between fixed effects, contribute to the 
model. Following Gelman and Hill (2007) and Linck and Cunnings (2015), significance 
here is interpreted as an absolute t-value ≥ 2.0. 
 
 
                                                     
35 The post-critical region was also examined for any spillover effects from the critical region. No such 
effects were found. Please refer to Appendix K3 for more information regarding analyses carried out on the 
post-critical region. 
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Table 7.13. 
Results of the Best-fitting Linear Mixed-effects Model for the Critical Region of the 
SPR task. 
      Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By 
Subject 
 By Item 
Parameter  Estimate SE t  SD  SD 
Intercept  6.87 0.07 92.31*  0.33  0.11 
Gram  0.04 0.03 1.34  0.03   
Case  -0.02 0.04  -0.40  0.15  – 
Locality  -0.23 0.05 -4.80*  0.17  – 
Awareness  0.47 0.15  3.25*  –  0.06 
Gram: Case  -0.04 0.05 -0.85     
Gram: Locality  -0.12 0.05 -2.30*     
Gram: Aware  ˂.-001 0.04 -0.01     
Gram: Case:Aware  -0.01 0.08 -0.14     
Gram: Locality:Aware  -0.01 0.04 -0.26     
Note. All factors were coded using contrast coding, as follows: Locality (−.5 = short, .5 
= far), Case (−.5 = Nominative, .5 = Accusative), Grammaticality (−.5 = control item, 
.5 = violation item) formula: RT~gram*locality*case*awareness + 
(locality*case*gram|subject) + (aware|item).∗|t| > 2.0, indicating a significant effect 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007).36 
  
 As can be seen in Table 7.13 above, several of the main effects reached 
significance in accounting for the variance in the reaction-time data. Firstly, the data 
indicate that aware participants responded more slowly than did unaware participants. In 
addition, participants responded more slowly to "near" sentences (instances in which the 
foreign word occurred after the verb, such as this morning the man changed the plenu in 
the bathroom), than they did to "far" sentences (instances in which the foreign word 
appeared before the verb, such as some time ago the brana blocked the road to town).  
                                                     
36 Contrast coding has been argued to aid in model convergence as well as reduce the impact of 
multicollinearity in mixed-effects models (Linck & Cunnings, 2015). 
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 The reader will probably notice at this point that the fixed effect of 
grammaticality did not achieve significance as a main effect within this summary. This 
result, however, does not suggest that the grammaticality of the utterance did not impact 
on the results. It is important to re-emphasise that "a main effect need not be significant if 
it is involved in interactions which are significant" (Baayen, 2012, p. 166). In other 
words, although the differences in RTs between grammatical and ungrammatical items 
might not have been sufficiently robust to achieve significance as a main effect, the 
interaction between the grammaticality of the sentence and another main effect might 
account significantly for the variance in the data. As can be seen in Table 7.13 above, 
there was a significant interaction between grammaticality and locality. This result 
suggests that differences in reaction times to grammatical and ungrammatical utterances 
can be found in sentences in which the foreign word appears in the critical position (near) 
versus when an English word appears in the critical position (far). An interaction plot was 
generated to examine this relationship more closely. This plot can be seen in Figure 7H 
below.
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Figure 7H. Plot of Interaction between Locality, Grammaticality and Reaction Times. 
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As Figure 7H above clearly illustrates, reaction times to grammatical and 
ungrammatical utterances were nearly identical for far sentences. However, for near 
sentences, reaction times to violation items were considerably greater than were reaction 
times to control items. This result suggests that participants' sensitivity to grammatical 
violations within the foreign word was mediated by the position of the foreign word 
within the sentence. To examine this result further, post-hoc Tukey tests were calculated 
using the GLHT command of the R package "multcomp" (Hothorn et al., 2008). These 
tests confirmed that the differences in reaction times to near violation and control items 
were statistically significant, B = -. 09, SE=.04, z = -2.57, p=.04, d=.41. However, 
differences in reaction times to grammatical and ungrammatical utterances for far 
sentences were nonsignificant, B = -.02, SE = .04, z = -.57, p =. 93, d = .07.  
Finally, it is important to reiterate that, although awareness was significant as a 
main effect, it was not significant as an interaction with grammaticality. This indicates 
that the reaction times of aware participants were longer on average than were those of 
unaware participants, both for grammatical and for ungrammatical items. However, the 
fact that awareness did not interact with grammaticality indicates that aware and unaware 
participants behaved similarly with regard to differences in reaction times to grammatical 
and ungrammatical utterances. In other words, awareness does not appear to be an 
explanatory variable for the learning effect demonstrated in the SPR task.37  
Further analyses of the pre-critical and post-critical regions found no significant 
effects for grammaticality. In other words, the data indicate that differences in reaction 
times to grammatical and ungrammatical utterances did not extend beyond the critical 
                                                     
37 However, it should be noted again that this nonsignificant finding might be attributed to a lack of 
statistical power. This point is discussed in more detail below. 
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region of the sentence. Descriptive statistics and summaries of the mixed-effects models 
used to examine the pre-critical and post-critical regions can be found in Appendix K. 
7.4.3. M/C Task 
An analysis of the participants' performances in the M/C task revealed that they 
were able to classify 57.65% of the items correctly (SD = 17.17%). Descriptive statistics 
were also generated to compare the performance of aware versus unaware participants. 
Aware participants were able to identify the correctly inflected noun with 69.14% 
accuracy (SD = 20.21%), whereas unaware participants were only able to do so at a rate 
of 51.88% (SD = 12.15%). Further descriptive statistics were generated for the 
performances of aware and unaware participants across the various sub-components of 
the M/C task. These results are presented in Table 7.14 below. 
Table 7.14. 
Performance on Sub-components of the M/C Task. 
   
 
 
Case 
 
Syntax 
 
Locality 
All  
Participants  
(n=23) 
 
Total 
 
Nom 
 
Acc 
 
SVO 
 
OVS 
 
Near 
 
Far 
 M 57.65 54.19 61.31 55.67 56.71 59.48 56.01 
 SD 17.17 20.96 22.60 16.99 19.17 16.99 18.96 
 SE 3.58 4.37 4.71 3.54 4.00 3.54 3.95 
Aware 
 Participants  
(n=8) 
 
Total 
 
Nom 
 
Acc 
 
SVO 
 
OVS 
 
Short 
 
Long 
 M 69.14 63.94 74.34 62.41 66.94 71.78 66.50 
 SD 20.22 25.61 22.89 20.30 23.33 20.58 23.15 
 SE 7.15 9.05 8.09 7.18 8.25 7.18 8.18 
Unaware 
Participants 
(n=15) 
 
Total 
 
Nom 
 
Acc 
 
SVO 
 
OVS 
 
Short 
 
Long 
 M 51.67 49.92 53.42 52.08 51.26 52.92 50.42 
 SD 12.15 17.21 22.23 13.08 16.34 13.75 15.58 
 SE 3.14 4.47 5.75 3.38 4.22 3.55 4.02 
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 Analyses were carried out to determine which fixed effects had a significant 
relationship with the dependent variable, namely performance in the M/C task. To this 
end, a series of logit mixed-effects models were built. For these analyses, a null model 
that analysed performance in the M/C task as a binary outcome in terms of subject and 
item as crossed random intercepts was constructed. Additional models were then built for 
each fixed effect. Each of these models included the variable, such as case, as a fixed 
effect as well as a random slope (Barr et al., 2013). As was done with the previous 
analyses in this thesis, these models were then compared individually against the null 
model using the χ2 statistic. As noted previously, if the model that included the fixed 
effect was significant against the null model, this result was interpreted as indicating that 
the fixed effect in question had a significant relationship with the dependent variable, and 
should be included in subsequent analyses. If the result was nonsignificant, this was 
interpreted as no significant relationship, and that this fixed effect could be excluded 
from the models that were to follow. The results of these comparisons can be seen in 
Table 7.15 below. 
Table 7.15. 
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests on Predictor Variables in the M/C Task 
Predictor Variable χ2 df p C 
Case 21.28 3 ˂.001*** .71 
Syntax 0.56 3 .91 .64 
Distance 0.79 3 .85 .64 
Aware 5.26 3 .02* .66 
 
 As can be seen in the table directly above, the results of these comparisons 
indicated that the fixed effects of case and awareness showed a significant relationship 
with performance on the M/C task. Therefore, a new model that included both of these 
variables as fixed effects was constructed. In addition, following the maximal model as 
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suggested by Barr et al. (2012), the fixed effect of case was included as a random slope 
by participant, and awareness as a random slope by item. A maximum likelihood ratio 
test indicated that this model was significant against the null model, χ2 (7) = 30.41, p ˂ 
.001, C=.73. Further comparisons indicated that the inclusion of both case and awareness 
as fixed effects was warranted in the model, and the removal of either fixed effect did not 
lead to an improved model fit. Multicollinearity was formally assessed using Cohen's 
kappa. This resulted in a value of 1.52 which, according to Baayen's (2008) guidelines, 
indicates a very low level of collinearity between the fixed effects in the model. Thus, 
this model of the data from the M/C task is henceforth referred to as the best-fit model, 
the results of which are presented in Table 7.16 below.  
Table 7.16. 
Results for the Best-fitting Logit Mixed-effects Model Examining Performance on the 
M/C task 
       Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By 
subject 
 By 
items 
Parameters  Estimate SE z p  SD  SD 
Intercept  .55 .14 3.84 ˂.001***  .55  .20 
Case  -.65 .35 -1.87 .06+  1.00  – 
Awareness  .93 .28 3.36 ˂.001***  –  .13 
Aware: Case  -.37 .18 -2.06 .04*     
 Note. Factors were coded using contrast coding, as follows: Case (−.5 = Nominative, 
.5 = Accusative), Awareness (-.5 unaware, .5=aware), formula: 
"correct~case*awareness + (case|subject) + (aware|item), family=binomial, 
control=glmerControl (optimiser="bobyqa")". 
 
As can be seen in the summary in Table 7.16 above, there are a number of factors 
within this model that were significant in accounting for performance in the M/C task. 
Firstly, awareness (whether or not participants became aware of the morphological rule 
system) was significant at the p ˂.001 level, indicating that the differential performance 
of aware and unaware participants was significant. Although case only approached 
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significance as a fixed effect (p =.06), there was a significant interaction between case 
and awareness in explaining accuracy in the M/C task. This suggests that either the aware 
or the unaware participants might have performed differentially on test items that targeted 
the nominative versus the accusative markers.  
To examine this result further, post-hoc Tukey tests were carried out using the 
GLHT command of the R package "multcomp" (Hothorn et al., 2008). First, these 
analyses revealed that the aware group was significantly more accurate for accusative 
items than for nominative items, albeit with a small effect size; B = -.74, SE = .28, z = -
2.62, p = .04, d =.38. By contrast, the unaware participants’ performance on nominative 
versus accusative items did not differ significantly, B = -.15, SE = -.19, z =-.83, p = .83, d 
=.10. Statistical comparisons between the aware and unaware participants' performances 
indicated that the aware participants significantly outperformed the unaware participants 
on both nominative (B =-.58, SE = .27, z = -2.12, p = .14, d =.61) and accusative items (B 
= -1.16, SE=.29, z = -3.97, p = ˂.001, d =.88). Taken together, these results clearly 
indicate that the performance of the aware participants, particularly regarding the 
accusative test items, was the driving factor behind the overall learning effect. 
7.4.3.1. Subjective Measures of Awareness 
As the M/C task in Experiment 3 resulted in a significant learning effect, it is 
possible to analyse the results of the subjective measures of awareness. As discussed in 
previous chapters, subjective measures of awareness are designed to determine whether 
resulting knowledge is implicit or explicit in nature (see Section 3.5.3 for a discussion of 
these measures). 
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Source attributions. As can be seen in Table 7.17 below, an analysis of the source 
attributions revealed that participants relied largely on their intuition rather than on 
explicit rule knowledge in their judgements. As indicated by the results of the one-sample 
t tests, participants' performances were significant across three of the source attributions: 
intuition, memory and rule. However, their performances were not significant when 
attributing their decisions to guess. This means that the guessing criterion of implicit 
structural knowledge was not met, and thus the data from the source attributions point 
towards the knowledge reflected in the M/C task as being explicit in nature. 
Table 7.17. 
Accuracy (%) and Number of Responses for All Participants across 
Confidence Ratings and Source Attributions. 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Confidence Rating    
No confidence 55.06 154 .20 
Somewhat confident 59.62 420 ˂.001 
Very confident 53.57 139 .40 
Absolutely certain 72.73 23 .03 
 Accuracy (%) Number p-value 
Source Attribution    
Guess 51.68 147 .68 
Intuition 56.87 280 .02 
Memory 58.38 221 .02 
Rule 70.79 88 ˂.001 
  
Confidence ratings. As shown in Table 7.17 above, participants’ performances were 
significantly better than chance levels when indicating that they were somewhat 
confident or absolutely certain about their decisions. However, as noted in Section 3.5.3, 
the criterion for implicit knowledge as measured by confidence ratings is the zero-
correlation criterion (Dienes & Scott, 2005), which holds that knowledge can be 
considered implicit if there is no relationship between reported levels of confidence and 
accuracy (for example, in a GJT). Following the common statistical procedure in the 
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cognitive sciences (Rausch et al., in press; Sandberg et al., 2013; Wierzchon et al., 2012), 
confidence level was analysed as a predictor variable within a logit-mixed effects model. 
To do this, a null model that included accuracy as a fixed effect along with crossed 
random effects of subjects and items was constructed. A second model was then 
constructed, which was identical to the null model, but which also included confidence as 
a fixed effect, as well as a random slope for both subjects and items. These models were 
then compared using a likelihood ratio test. The results of this test revealed that the 
confidence level was significant in accounting for variance in the dataset (χ2 (8) = 20.50, 
p = 0.01, C = .67), indicating a relationship between confidence level and accuracy in the 
M/C task. Thus, it can be inferred that the zero-correlation criterion was not met, and that 
the knowledge represented in the M/C task was explicit in nature. 
 In summary, the results of the M/C task indicated that learning had taken place. 
However, this learning was limited to participants who had become aware of the target 
case-marking system. Analyses of subjective measures of awareness provided further 
evidence that the knowledge-driving performance in the M/C task was explicit in nature.  
7.5. Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 support the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, in 
that the data indicate that participants can develop some knowledge of L2 case markings 
after a minimal amount of exposure, without feedback, and as a result of incidental 
exposure. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 employed two measures of 
learning: an indirect measure in the form of reaction times to grammatical and 
ungrammatical utterances via a self-paced reading task, and a direct measure in the form 
of a multiple-choice sentence-completion task. With regard to the relationship between 
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learning and awareness in this experiment, an analysis of the retrospective verbal reports 
indicates that successful performance in the M/C task was driven by participants who 
were able to demonstrate verbalisable rule knowledge of the target morphological 
structures. This result was also corroborated by the subjective measure of awareness, 
which provided further evidence that the knowledge demonstrated in this task was 
explicit in nature. By contrast, the learning demonstrated in the SPR task did not appear 
to be linked to verbalisable rule knowledge, suggesting that participants, both aware and 
unaware, were utilising more automatic knowledge within this task.  
Research Question 1: To what extent can L2 case markings be acquired as a result 
of incidental exposure? 
7.5.1.1. SPR Task 
Analyses of the data from the SPR task also found evidence that learning of the 
target morphological structures had taken place. These data were analysed using a linear 
mixed-effects model with crossed random slopes for subjects and items. The real object 
of interest from the SPR task is whether participants would demonstrate knowledge of the 
inflectional markers through differences in reaction times to sentences that contained a 
foreign word with the correct case ending (grammatical sentences) versus sentences that 
contained a foreign word with an incorrect case ending (ungrammatical sentences). Such 
evidence was found in the form of a significant interaction between the fixed effects of 
grammaticality and locality. In other words, participants demonstrated learning in the 
form of extended reaction times to ungrammatical case-endings when the foreign word 
fell within the critical region (near sentences.). No such differences in reaction times 
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were found, however, when the foreign word was located in the pre-critical region (far 
sentences). An example of a near versus a far sentence can be seen in Table 7.3 above. 
This finding is intriguing, and it could be accounted for in a number of different 
ways. Firstly, differences in performance on near versus far sentences might be attributed 
to the phenomenon known as locality effect. As discussed in Section 7.1.3 above, locality 
effects refer to the fact that a greater distance between linguistically-connected sentence 
elements increases the difficulty in processing the relationship between these elements in 
real time (Bartek et al., 2011). Far sentences require that the grammatical meaning 
encoded in the inflection marker be carried from Segment 2, a pre-critical region, to 
Segment 4, a critical region. By contrast, no such distance exists in near sentences. Thus, 
one possible explanation for the results here is that the participants had developed 
knowledge of the grammatical information encoded in the case endings, but were not able 
to draw upon this knowledge in far sentences due to difficulties in retaining this 
information over the long-distance dependency. This finding appears congruent with the 
implicit learning literature, which has demonstrated that participants are better at learning 
regularities of adjacent items than they are with relation to non-adjacent items 
(Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Creel, Newport, & Aslin, 2004; Gómez , 1997, 2002; 
Howard, Howard, Dennis, & Kelly, 2008; Misyak & Christiansen, 2012; Misyak, 
Christiansen, & Tomblin, 2010; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008; Remillard, 2008; van den 
Bos, Christiansen, & Misyak, 2012). 
A different, but perhaps complementary, explanation for the differences in 
performance on near versus far items might concern the shallow processing hypothesis 
(Clahsen & Felser, 2006; see also Section 2.9.3.2 above) and/or the lexical preference 
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principle of VanPatten's model of input processing (VanPatten, 2004b; see also Section 
2.9.3.1 above). The shallow processing hypothesis (Clahsen & Felser, 2006; Clahsen et 
al., 2010) holds that L1 speakers process input deeply, using the entire range of lexical 
and grammatical clues available to them as they parse input. By contrast, L2 learners 
process input "shallowly", in that they often rely on lexical and other non-structural clues, 
rather than on grammatical clues, such as might be encoded within a case-marking 
system. Similarly, the lexical preference principle of VanPatten's input processing model 
states that learners typically utilise lexical means to comprehend a sentence, rather than 
grammatical information. If we make the assumption that the participants in the present 
study were utilising both lexical and grammatical means to comprehend the sentences, 
but that the learners were relying primarily on lexical means, the shallow processing 
hypothesis and lexical preference principle appear to provide plausible explanations for 
the results of the present study. To elaborate, participants' primary form of understanding 
the meaning of the sentence was through lexical means. The use of inflectional 
morphemes to establish subject-object relations within the sentence was secondary. 
Sensitivity to grammatical violations was only seen when the grammatical morpheme 
conflicted with the interpretation of the sentence that the participants had derived from 
lexical and non-structural clues. In near sentences, such a conflict was possible. However, 
in far sentences, the inflectional morpheme occurred in the pre-critical region, where the 
participants had not yet worked out the meaning of the sentence. In this sense, an 
ungrammatical morpheme could not serve to confirm or conflict with their interpretation 
of the meaning of the sentence. It is important to stress that, although appearing to 
account for the difference in performance between near and far items, such an account is 
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speculative in the absence of direct data. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether the 
learning effect attributed to near items might be partly attributed to the position of the 
foreign noun, i.e., whether the foreign noun was positioned before or after the verb as 
well as whether the sentence followed an S-V-O or O-V-S word order. Future research 
might investigate this issue more directly statistically via a larger data set, or 
methodologically by adding think-aloud protocols or simulated recalls to the 
methodology employed in the present experiment. Such instruments might provide more 
direct evidence of the cognitive processes that underlie the differences in performance 
demonstrated here. 
 Another interesting finding from the SPR task was the lack of a relationship 
between awareness and the learning demonstrated on near items. In contrast to the M/C 
task, in which learning was confined to participants who had developed awareness at the 
level of understanding of the target inflectional system, the analysis of the SPR task did 
not indicate such a relationship. It should be reiterated that there was a fixed effect for 
awareness. However, this effect indicates that the reading times for aware participants 
were longer for both grammatical and ungrammatical items, although this effect did not 
interact with grammaticality. In other words, there was no significant difference in 
performance between aware and unaware participants in the SPR task. To frame this 
result in a slightly different manner, awareness did not appear to play a part in the 
learning effect demonstrated in the SPR task. This finding is important, and it is 
discussed further in the section below. 
 Finally, it is worth questioning whether the reaction times in the critical period in 
Experiment 3 are necessarily reflective of the decomposition of the foreign words. 
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Psycholinguistic research in morphological processing (Clahsen & Felser, 2006; Clahsen 
et al., 2010; Gor & Jackson, 2013; Marsden, Altman, & St. Claire, 2013) has employed 
priming techniques, such as lexical decision tasks, to investigate the extent to which 
learners process inflected forms. One of the challenges in this area of research is that the 
stem of a word can act as a prime, as can the inflection. This issue is relevant to the 
present study due to the fact that the SPR task measured the reading time for the foreign 
word in its entirety, not the inflection in isolation. To address this issue, psycholinguistic 
research investigating morphological priming has typically utilised nonce words in the 
form of made-up words that obey the phonotactic rules of the language under 
investigation (Hahne, Mueller, & Clahsen, 2006), or has included completely novel 
words in the testing phase of experiments (Marsden et al., 2013). Thus, any priming 
effects observed are argued to be the result of inflection, as the stem will not have been 
encountered previously. Although future research would undoubtedly benefit from more 
fine-grained data than the SPR task is capable of providing, there are a number of reasons 
to believe that the reaction times reflect processing of the case endings. Firstly, as noted 
in the methodology section above, all of the foreign words included in the testing phase 
were novel; thus, it was not possible for the reaction times to reflect recognition of a 
previously-encountered stem. Secondly, as noted in Section 7.7 above, the stems of the 
foreign words for the control items and the stems for the violation items were rotated 
among the participants. In lieu of a control group, the rotation of the control and violation 
stems among participants increases the confidence that the reaction times are reflective of 
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the processing of morphological inflections, and are not merely artefacts of individual 
test items.38 
In summary, the fact that participants demonstrated differences in reaction times 
to grammatical and ungrammatical case markers in near sentences provides some 
evidence that the participants were engaged in online processing of the inflectional 
markers, that they had acquired some knowledge of the function of the nominative and 
accusative markers, and that they were utilising this knowledge automatically as they 
parsed the sentences in real time.  
7.5.1.1. M/C Task 
As was the case with the SPR task, the results from the M/C task indicated that 
learning had taken place. Data from the M/C task were analysed by generating 
descriptive statistics, and by using a logit mixed-effects model with crossed random 
intercepts for subjects and items. The logit mixed-effects model returned significant main 
effects for awareness (aware versus unaware participants), case (nominative versus 
accusative case), and a significant interaction between awareness and case. To illustrate 
this, with regard to overall performance, participants were able to identify a foreign word 
with the correct case ending with 57.65% accuracy (SD=17.17%). This performance is 
roughly similar to the overall performance in the GJT task in Experiments 1 and 2 (~56% 
accuracy). However, in contrast to the previous experiments, the learning effect in 
Experiment 3 appeared to be driven by aware participants; in other words, participants 
who were able to verbalise the underlying rule system. While the aware participants' 
performance was at roughly 70 per cent for the M/C task (M = 69.14%, SD = 20.22), the 
                                                     
38 It should be noted that variance due to individual test items and subjects is accounted for within mixed-
effects modeling. Thus, possible item effects were further controlled for via statistical analysis. 
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performance of the unaware participants (participants who were unable to verbalise the 
underlying rule system) was scarcely indistinguishable from chance performance (M = 
51.67, SD = 12.15). Furthermore, similar to the previous experiments, this main effect 
was driven by the aware group's performance regarding accusative sentences (M = 74.34, 
SD = 22.89), compared to the performance of unaware participants for accusative items 
(M = 53.42, SD = 22.23). It is also important to note that, unlike the results from previous 
experiments, learning in Experiment 3 did not appear to be limited to accusative items. 
Aware participants were able to supply the nominative marker correctly in 63.94% of 
cases (SD = 25.61). Again, this is in contrast to the performance of the unaware 
participants, whose performance does not appear to indicate any learning of the 
nominative marker (M = 49.92, SD = 17.21).  
 The lack of learning amongst unaware participants on the MC task in Experiment 
3 is interesting, given that Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated learning in a similar task (a 
GJT), and that none of the participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were able to verbalise the 
underlying rule structure. In other words, the participants in Experiments 1 and 2, who 
would be classified as unaware according to the criteria in Experiment 3, showed learning 
in a GJT, whereas the unaware participants in this experiment did not show learning in an 
M/C task. One possible explanation for the lack of learning demonstrated by unaware 
participants in the M/C task might be connected with the difference in modalities 
between the first two experiments and Experiment 3. As noted previously, Experiments 1 
and 2 were presented completely auditorily, as none of the stimuli were presented 
visually, whereas Experiment 3 was presented completely visually, as none of the stimuli 
were presented auditorily. It seems plausible that the auditory GJT in Experiments 1 and 
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2 encouraged participants to draw upon more implicit knowledge in the form of intuitive 
judgements. The fact that Experiment 3 was presented visually might have promoted the 
use of more explicit knowledge to complete the task. As aware participants had 
developed higher levels of explicit knowledge in the form of metalinguistic knowledge, 
they were able to complete the task with a high degree of accuracy. Unaware participants, 
on the other hand, had not developed sufficient explicit knowledge, and were therefore 
unable to perform above chance levels of performance. This interpretation is supported 
by comparing the proportions of the source-attribution data of Experiments 1 and 2 with 
the results from Experiment 3. On average, the participants in Experiments 1 and 2 
attributed approximately 30% of their decisions to memory or rule, the two choices 
indicating higher levels of awareness (Serafini, 2013). By contrast, participants in 
Experiment 3 attributed approximately 50% of their judgements to memory or rule, 
suggesting a much higher reliance on explicit knowledge than was the case in the 
previous experiments. Furthermore, as noted previously, the M/C task as used in 
Experiment 3 is a direct measure of learning which, it has been argued, draws more 
heavily on explicit knowledge. This is in contrast to the indirect measure (the SPR task), 
which is considered to be more reflective of implicit knowledge.  
 A finding of Experiment 3 that is in line with the results from Experiments 1 and 
2 concerns performance regarding items targeting the nominative and accusative markers. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, it was hypothesised that greater amounts of learning of the 
accusative markers were connected with the salience of these markers in the input; 
specifically, that the accusative marker (-u) was more morphophonologically distinct, 
which resulted in more noticing (Schmidt, 1995) and deeper processing (Clahsen & 
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Felser, 2006) during the training phase of the experiment. If, however, 
morphophonological salience was the sole explanatory variable for the learning patterns 
demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 2, this effect should have been nullified in 
Experiment 3, in which the input of the training and testing phases was presented 
visually. This was not the case. One explanation for this continued pattern of learning is 
that salience remains an important factor. For example, if one accepts the argument that, 
orthnographically, English words that end in -u (as in adieu, bayou, menu and milieu), are 
more likely to appear to be of French origin, or "foreign" to native speakers of English 
than those that end with the vowel -a (for example, tea, area, arena and mascara), it seems 
plausible that the morphotypological characteristics of the foreign words might have led 
to an increase in the attentional resources being devoted to the accusative marker. As type 
frequency in the input has been implicated in the extent to which participants are able to 
generalise grammatical knowledge to novel items (see Bybee & Thompson, 2000 and N. 
Ellis & Collins, 2009 for discussions of the effects of type versus token frequency on L2 
learning), such a skewed distribution of noticing the accusative marker rather than the 
nominative marker could have impacted on the learning of the nominative and accusative 
forms. 
It is also important to point out that the performance in the M/C task could also be 
explained as reflecting bias in favour of the accusative marker. This bias is evidenced 
directly from the differential results for test items targeting the nominative and accusative 
markers in the M/C task. To elaborate, the M/C asked participants to read a sentence (for 
example, in summer she cooked the ________ in the oven), and to then choose between 
two options, a foreign word with a nominative marker, or the same foreign word with an 
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accusative marker (such as kachna/kachnu). The test items were balanced so that the 
accusative ending was correct for half of the test items, and the nominative ending for the 
other half. Thus, if a participant indicated that the accusative ending was correct for all 
test items, then his or her results would show 100% accuracy for accusative items, but 
0% accuracy for nominative items. Although the difference in performance between 
nominative (~64%) and accusative (~74%) items for aware participants39 was slight, the 
fact that performance was higher for accusative items indicates that participants were 
more likely to choose the accusative ending than they were the nominative ending.  
There are a number of reasons that participants might have shown bias towards 
the accusative marker. One explanation might concern the morphotypological 
characteristics of the case endings, as discussed above. If the accusative marker were 
more salient in the input in the training phase of the experiment, it could be argued that 
the participants noticed the accusative marker with more regularity than they did the 
nominative marker. When we consider that repeated exposure has been shown to enhance 
feelings towards stimuli (Zajonc, 1968), increased noticing of the accusative marker 
might have led to increased feelings of appropriateness, manifested in the form of 
intuitive judgements in the M/C task. Yet another possibility lies in the form of an innate 
bias based on the L1 of the participants. As discussed in Chapter 4, several researchers 
have argued that the accusative is the default in English (Emonds, 1995; Schütze, 2001). 
In this sense, the bias towards the accusative marker could be the result of an L1 transfer 
effect. Yet another possibility is a processing bias related to the L1 of the participants in 
                                                     
39 ~54% nominative vs ~61% accusative for both aware and unaware participants. 
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this study. In this regard, the participants might have applied an S-V-O parsing strategy, 
thus interpreting the first noun in the utterance as the subject, regardless of the actual 
word order of the stimuli. Evidence for this parsing strategy might be seen in the 
difference in reaction times for SVO and OVS items in the critical region for both 
violation and control items in the SPR task (see Table 7.11). Slower reaction times to 
OVS items suggests that participants were devoting more cognitive resources to the 
processing of the critical region, perhaps due to a potential garden path effect (e.g., 
Roberts & Felser, 2011) in their parsing of the sentence. This interpretation finds further 
theoretical support in issues related to blocking and learned attention within the literature. 
Certain theoretical frameworks, such as the associative-cognitive CREED (N. Ellis, 
2007b; N. Ellis & Wulff, 2015), have argued that, through implicit learning of the L1, the 
nature of the language-learning mechanism is optimised according to the characteristics 
of the L1. In this sense, attention to certain grammatical components is learned based on 
the characteristics of the L1 (N. Ellis, 2006a, 2007b, 2008; N. Ellis & Sagarra, 2010a, 
2010b, 2011). The literature also documents that the negative impact of learned attention 
extends to the learning of morphosyntax, where redundancy of meaning can result in 
overshadowing and blocking of the morphological markers (N. Ellis, 2006a; 
Goldschneider & DeKeyser, 2001; Gor, 2010; Marsden, 2006; VanPatten, 2014). It 
follows that, if the L1 of the participants carries a default processing bias, it could be 
possible that this bias could carry over into their processing of L2 input.   
Research Question 2: What type of knowledge is acquired: implicit or explicit? 
An interesting point of departure for this section is the fact that approximately one 
third of the participants (eight of 23) were able to demonstrate verbalisable rule 
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knowledge of the target morphological structures via the retrospective verbal reports at 
the end of Experiment 3. In this sense, these participants clearly developed explicit 
knowledge, given that verbalisability has long been the main criterion for explicit 
knowledge (Rebuschat, 2013). This is in contrast to the results from Pilot Studies 1 and 2, 
as well as to the results of Experiments 1 and 2, in which none of the participants were 
able to verbalise the underlying morphological rules at the end of the experiment. The 
simplest explanation for why participants in Experiment 3 developed awareness, and 
those in the previous experiments did not, lies with the modality of the experiments. As 
noted previously, all the stimuli in Experiment 3 were presented visually, whereas all the 
stimuli in the previous experiments were presented auditorily. Although little research 
has addressed the relationship between modality and the development of implicit and 
explicit knowledge directly (Rebuschat, 2013), what little research there is has indicated 
that written input is more amenable to controlled processing, which is typically 
associated with the use of explicit knowledge, whereas auditory input is more conducive 
to more automatic processing, typically associated with the use of implicit knowledge 
(Bialystok, 1982). It seems plausible, then, that the visual stimuli promoted explicit 
processes amongst the participants, such as rule-search behaviour. These explicit 
processes thus led to increased levels of awareness, as well as to a number of participants 
"cracking the code" and developing an understanding of the underlying rule system. 
An alternative account might be that the aware and unaware participants exhibited 
different patterns of behaviour throughout the experiment. As noted above, aware 
participants demonstrated longer reaction times for both the pre-critical and critical 
regions across the testing phase of the experiment. Importantly, the analysis of reaction 
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times across the training phase of the experiment showed a similar pattern of extended 
reading times for aware participants. One explanation for this could be connected to the 
shallow processing hypothesis (Clahsen & Felser, 2006), in that the differences in 
reaction times between aware and unaware participants represent differences in the depth 
of processing (Leow, 2015b). To be more specific, aware participants may have 
processed the segments of the sentence more deeply, which was reflected in longer 
reaction times. Another explanation might concern rule-search behaviour, particularly 
because the aware participants might have been more active in trying to identify patterns 
in the input. This resulted in longer reading times as they searched for rules. At their core, 
such interpretations are of the chicken or egg variety, especially regarding whether the 
longer reading times led to increased awareness as the experiment progressed, or whether 
increased awareness from the outset was reflected in longer reading times. Such a finding 
is intriguing, and warrants further investigation. Future research might utilise additional 
measures, such as eye-tracking or perhaps simulated recall, which would assist in coming 
to a fuller, more informed understanding of any differences in the online behaviour of 
aware versus unaware participants. 
Shifting the focus to whether the exposure phase resulted in implicit knowledge, 
explicit knowledge or a combination thereof, measures of awareness associated with the 
M/C task and the SPR task provide two contrasting, but complementary, points of view. 
The results of the M/C task appear to be relatively straightforward in providing evidence 
for the development of explicit knowledge. This interpretation is gleaned from a variety 
of sources. First, the M/C task was a direct test of learning (see Section 3.5.4 above). The 
reader will recall that direct tests are tests that ask participants to make use of their 
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knowledge, and that the results of direct tests have been argued to be more reflective of 
explicit rather than of implicit knowledge (R. Ellis et al., 2009; Godfroid et al., 2015). 
Second, analyses demonstrated that the overall learning effect demonstrated in the M/C 
task was driven by aware participants, namely participants who were able to verbalise the 
underlying morphological rule structure. In other words, the learning displayed in the 
M/C task was the result of participants who demonstrated high levels of awareness of the 
target structures. Finally, with regard to the subjective measures of awareness, neither of 
the two criteria of implicit knowledge, specifically the guessing criterion or the zero-
correlation, was met. Thus, the subjective measures of awareness provide further 
evidence of explicit knowledge. These results appear to sit well with the findings from 
the previous experiments in this thesis, as well as with those of previous research systems 
(Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002), which indicated clear links 
between awareness and the learning of L2 case-marking systems. 
In contrast to the M/C task, a number of indicators suggest that performance in 
the SPR task was reflective of more automatic, implicit knowledge. With regard to the 
nature of the SPR task itself, it is an indirect test of learning in that it does not require 
participants to apply their knowledge. Instead, it measures learning indirectly via 
differences in reaction times to grammatical and ungrammatical utterances. In this sense, 
the SPR task can be argued to be more transfer appropriate (Hulstijn, 2013) to incidental 
learning research, in that it is a more sensitive measure of unconscious knowledge 
(Reingold & Merikle, 1988). Further support that the results of the SPR task reflect some 
implicit knowledge comes from the nonsignificant results for predictor variables entered 
into the linear mixed-effects model. In contrast to the results from the M/C task, the 
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linear mixed-effects model did not identify significant differences between the 
performances of aware and unaware participants. In other words, there appeared to be a 
dissociation between metalinguistic awareness and learning, as demonstrated in the SPR 
task. Furthermore, as indicated in Table 7.12 above, no evidence was found of a 
relationship between performance in the M/C task and performance in the testing phase 
of the SPR task. In other words, performance in the M/C task did not transfer to 
performance in the SPR task, suggesting that the two tasks drew on two different 
knowledge sources. 
Further support for the interpretation that performance in the SPR task was 
reflective of implicit knowledge comes from the nature of implicit versus explicit 
knowledge. As noted in Section 2.3.3 above, explicit knowledge has been characterised 
as being available for controlled processing, whereas implicit knowledge is available for 
more automatic processing (R. Ellis, 2005). Given the nature of the SPR task, it seems 
unlikely that participants would be able to draw upon explicit knowledge in order to 
complete this task. This suggests that even the aware participants were not using their 
explicit knowledge to comb through the sentences carefully in order to identify correct 
and incorrect instances of case markers. Instead, the aware participants, as did the 
unaware participants, relied on more automatic knowledge as they processed the 
sentences for meaning. 
At this point, it is worth questioning whether performance in the SPR task is 
necessarily reflective of implicit knowledge, or if it is simply indicative of more 
automatic or automatised knowledge. As noted in Section 2.4.2 above, the process of 
automatisation is often associated with DeKeyser (2001) and with skill acquisition 
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theory. Within this framework, automatisation refers to the process whereby declarative 
knowledge, such as metalinguistic knowledge, can become functionally equivalent to 
procedural knowledge as a result of time and practice (DeKeyser, 2007a; 2007b; 2014). 
Is it possible, then, that the aware participants were able to apply their explicit knowledge 
automatically? In other words, do the results of the SPR task reflect implicit knowledge 
that developed independently of explicit knowledge (Paradis, 2004, 2009), or simply 
explicit knowledge that had become automatised over the course of the experiment 
(DeKeyser, 2007a, 2007b, 2014)? If the aware participants were utilising explicit 
knowledge, this might account for the differences in overall reaction times between 
aware and unaware participants, with aware participants relying on more controlled, 
explicit processes as they processed the sentences. 
 Although appealing, such an account is speculative, as the results from the present 
thesis cannot directly answer the question in the paragraph above. What the data show is 
that the knowledge does not appear to be explicit and, most importantly, that this 
knowledge was deployed automatically. Furthermore, as noted above, this knowledge 
does not appear to be linked to the metalinguistic awareness of the aware participants. 
However, it is important to note again that awareness here was determined solely via 
retrospective verbal reports. Given the well-established criticism of the sole reliance on 
retrospective verbal reports as a measure of awareness (Shanks & St. John, 1994), as well 
recent criticisms that question their validity in online tasks (Hama & Leow, 2010; Leow 
& Hama, 2013), it would be wise to exert caution before concluding a dissociation 
between awareness and the knowledge demonstrated in the SPR task. Future research 
would undoubtedly benefit from incorporating additional measures, including a 
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concurrent measure of attention, such as eye-tracking (Godfroid et al., 2015). By so 
doing, these studies would come to a fuller understanding of the conscious status of the 
knowledge used as part of this task.  
In addition, it is important to point out that much of the evidence cited above 
towards a conclusion of implicit knowledge is, in fact, evidence against a conclusion of 
explicit knowledge. This problematic line of argument boils down to the knowledge does 
not appear to be explicit, therefore it is implicit. Such a line of argument appears to be a 
logical fallacy along the lines of a false dilemma, or a fallacy of exhaustive hypotheses 
(Searle, 1983). Similar arguments concerning the falsifiability of arguments that learning 
has proceeded, or that knowledge has been utilised in the absence of awareness, have 
been raised previously (Baars, 1996; Schmidt, 1995). Simply put, the degree to which 
evidence that suggests knowledge is not explicit should be interpreted as evidence in 
favour of implicit knowledge is questionable. 
In summary, the results of Experiment 3 point towards the development of both 
explicit knowledge and automatic knowledge. Explicit knowledge was clearly 
demonstrated by the aware participants in the M/C task. This result was substantiated by 
the results from the retrospective verbal reports and subjective measures of awareness. 
Evidence of automatic knowledge was found through performance in the SPR task, 
where differences in reaction times to grammatical and ungrammatical sentences served 
as a measure of learning. Although the fact that automatic knowledge might be argued to 
be indicative of implicit knowledge (R. Ellis et al., 2009; cf. Leow & Hama, 2013), some 
caution should be urged before arriving at a similar conclusion here, given the lack of 
direct evidence available from the present study. 
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7.6. Limitations and Future Directions 
As the results here attest, the use of the SPR task appears to be a promising 
avenue for future enquiries into the development of implicit and explicit knowledge, 
particularly when used in conjunction with an offline measure of learning. However, 
there are a few limitations to the research design of Experiment 3, which should be noted 
here. The first limitation concerns the design of the SPR task; specifically, whether the 
segment-by-segment approach was sufficiently sensitive to detect differences in reaction 
times to grammatical and ungrammatical utterances. SPR tasks can utilise either a 
segment-by-segment or word-by-word presentation format (see Jegerski, 2014; Keating 
& Jegerski, 2015; Roberts, 2012a for overviews). One advantage of word-by-word 
approaches is that such approaches are more sensitive to the detection of differences in 
reaction times to grammatical and ungrammatical utterances. By contrast, such small 
differences can potentially be lost in the noise of multi-word segments when using a 
segment-by-segment approach. Another limitation is that the design of the SPR task did 
not account for sentence "wrap-up" effects in its analysis of the post-critical region. 
Wrap-up effects refer to the phenomenon of reading speed tending to slow down at the 
ultimate segment or word in an SPR task (Jiang, 2012), thus making it more difficult to 
observe differences in reaction times due to differential amounts of processing. When we 
consider that the post-critical region was also the ultimate segment in the sentence, it is 
possible that spillover effects were undetected due to this shortcoming in the research 
design. Future research could avoid this issue by utilising a word-by-word presentation. 
Such an approach would result in data that are more robust to the effects of potentially 
confounding variables. 
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Another limitation of the present experiment is with regard to statistical power. 
Statistical power is concerned with the sensitivity of a statistical test when rejecting or 
accepting the null hypothesis of a particular experiment (Cohen, 1988, 1992a, 1992b; 
Plonsky, 2013, 2015). A study is underpowered if the sample size is not sufficient to 
indicate a significant effect with a pre-determined amount of probability (typically 80%, 
see Cohen, 1988). This can lead to a Type 2 statistical error, such as accepting the null 
hypothesis when it is, in fact, incorrect. Although other studies investigating implicit 
learning in SLA are comparable in terms of sample size (Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012), 
it should be questioned whether the current study (N = 23) was sufficiently powered to 
uncover the relationships of the fixed effects within the mixed-effects models. The 
limitations of the sample size of the present study are most apparent with regard to aware 
(n = 8) and unaware participants (n = 15), in which the number of observations 
undoubtedly impacted on the accuracy of the statistical analyses used to compare these 
two groups. For instance, following Cohen’s (1988) rules of thumb, the sample size used 
in Experiment 3 was likely to be able to uncover very large effects between groups. 
However, a larger sample is needed in order to reveal small- and medium-sized effects. 
When we consider that research has attested to the difficulties in learning L2 morphology 
(Long, 2015), it is clear that future research would be strengthened by conducting a 
power analysis (Cohen, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1994; Plonsky, 2014, 2015; Van Voorhis & 
Morgan, 2007) in the first instance to ascertain the minimum number of participants 
needed to uncover small to medium effects for the research design in question.  
Additionally, larger sample sizes both with regard to the number of participants as 
well as with regard to the number of items on the assessment measures might allow 
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future research to come to a better understanding of what it is that the participants learned 
as a result of incidental exposure. In particular, this might illuminate how any learning is 
affected by the interplay between case, syntax, sentence position, and awareness. For 
instance, more test items would allow for additional analyses on sub-categories, such as if 
the learning demonstrated on accusative items was influenced by whether the sentence 
followed an S-V-O or O-V-S word order. Such data would undoubtedly provide more 
direct evidence of what is being learned, and might help link the present study with 
previous research on the processing and learning of case marking within an O-V-S word 
order (e.g., Culman, Henry, & VanPatten, 2009; Jackson, 2007, 2008). 
Finally, future research should also continue to triangulate data from multiple 
measures. As has been pointed out by many researchers (Chaudron, 2003; Leeser, 2014), 
there is no perfect instrument, and the use of multiple measures serves to increase the 
internal validity and generalisability of the results of a study (Purpura et al., 2015). 
Experiment 3 illustrates the benefits of such an approach, in that the multiple measures of 
learning and awareness led to a more refined picture of the learning that occurred than 
would have been gathered from a single instrument used in isolation.  
 
  
297 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Summary of the Thesis 
The present thesis reports on the results of five experiments that investigated the 
learning of an L2 case-marking system under incidental learning conditions, and whether 
the knowledge resulting from this exposure was implicit or explicit in nature. The 
stimulus for all five experiments (Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2, Experiment 1, Experiment 
2 and Experiment 3) was a novel, semi-artificial language that consisted of English 
phrases with a flexible word order, and which included a single foreign word that had 
been inflected according to its function within the sentence. This series of experiments 
implemented a number of methodological improvements to previous research conducted 
in the same area. For instance, unlike previous research into the role of awareness in the 
acquisition of L2 case-marking systems, the present thesis did not measure awareness 
solely using retrospective verbal reports. Instead, all five experiments triangulated data 
from written and oral retrospective verbal reports in conjunction with subjective 
measures of awareness. Furthermore, Experiment 3 also incorporated direct and indirect 
tests of learning in addition to the measures of awareness listed above.  
The results of these experiments largely corroborate previous findings (Brooks & 
Kempe, 2013; Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005), specifically those that identified 
the important role of awareness in the learning of L2 case markers. As noted, the 
previous research found a link between verbalisable rule knowledge, such as awareness at 
the level of understanding (Schmidt, 1990), and the learning demonstrated by outcome 
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measures in the experiments. This link between metalinguistic knowledge and learning 
led Grey et al. (2014) to speculate that verbalisable rule knowledge might have been 
crucial to the learning of the case-marking system in their study. Similarly, Experiment 3 
of the present thesis found a similar link between verbalisable rule knowledge and 
performance in the M/C task.  
However, the results of the present thesis also diverged from the studies listed 
above (Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005) in that they indicated that some learning 
can occur in the absence of verbalisable rule knowledge. This result can be seen in the 
performance in the GJTs in Experiments 1 and 2, where accuracy was not linked to 
metalinguistic awareness. However, analyses of the subjective measures of awareness 
within Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that the significant performance of the experimental 
group coincided with low levels of awareness in the form of noticing. Thus, as in 
previous research, the results here point towards a relationship between awareness and 
the learning of L2 case markers; however, the data from this study indicate that lower 
levels of awareness than suggested by previous research might be sufficient for learning 
to take place. This result is consistent with research investigating the incidental learning 
of L2 noun-determiner systems (Leung & Williams, 2012; Williams, 2005) and L2 
syntax (Rebuschat & Williams, 2012), which has indicated that participants can acquire 
some knowledge of L2 grammar without being able to verbalise the rules of the 
grammatical system in question. 
Finally, the results from the SPR task in Experiment 3 indicate that knowledge of 
L2 case markers acquired as a result of incidental exposure can be deployed 
automatically. This result is similar to previous research (Leung & Williams, 2011, 2012, 
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2014) that has incorporated reaction time measures to examine the incidental learning of 
other areas of L2 grammar. As the design of previous research into the incidental learning 
of L2 case markers (Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005) did not include direct 
measures of learning, this result provides an additional insight into characteristics of the 
knowledge that can be acquired as a result of incidental exposure.  
8.2. Summary of the Individual Experiments 
The purpose of the two pilot studies was to establish an initial learning effect of 
the target case-marking system. The intention was that, once an initial learning effect was 
established, subsequent studies could manipulate variables within the experiment to 
examine the effect that these manipulations had on learning, and on the development of 
implicit and explicit knowledge.  
In Pilot Study 1, participants received training on the semi-artificial case-marking 
system under incidental learning conditions. The stimulus set for this experiment 
consisted of three different case markers (nominative -a, accusative -u, and instrumental -
ou), which were presented within English sentences that followed four different syntactic 
patterns. In the exposure phase of this experiment, participants listened to the sentence, 
and then decided which of two pictures presented on the monitor best matched the 
meaning of the foreign word. The entire exposure phase consisted of 144 sentences, 48 
for each of the three morphological categories. Following the exposure phase, 
participants completed a surprise grammaticality judgement test (GJT), together with 
subjective measures of awareness. The experiment concluded with retrospective verbal 
reports in the form of both written and oral interviews. Analyses of the GJT indicated a 
null result; in other words, participants had not developed knowledge of the target 
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morphological structures. Furthermore, the retrospective verbal reports revealed that 
participants had not become aware of the morphological rule system. As a result of this 
null finding, it was not possible to investigate the awareness issue further using subjective 
measures of awareness. 
Pilot Study 2 set out to determine whether decreasing the complexity of the 
stimulus set and manipulating the training conditions to promote additional noticing 
(Schmidt, 1990) of the target structures would spark learning of the L2 case-marking 
system. As in Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2 investigated the acquisition of three different 
morphological markers (nominative -a, accusative -u, and instrumental -ou), but the 
stimuli were simplified to include only two syntactic patterns (as opposed to four patterns 
in Pilot Study 1). The training procedure in Pilot Study 2 was also modified in that it 
included elicited imitations as part of the training task. In the exposure phase, participants 
first listened to the sentence, then repeated the sentence aloud before indicating which of 
the two pictures on the monitor best matched the meaning of the foreign word. Despite 
these modifications, Pilot Study 2 did not result in a significant learning effect. As was 
the case in Pilot Study 1, the null result for Pilot Study 2 precluded the possibility of 
examining the data from the subjective measures of awareness. However, data from the 
retrospective verbal reports indicated that participants had noticed the endings of the 
foreign words, suggesting that the addition of elicited imitations to the training procedure 
had resulted in more noticing. Furthermore, participants' comments indicated that they 
had become aware of the endings because the repetition of the foreign words across the 
three morphological categories. Thus, the direction forward appeared to be to simplify the 
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training set further, and to manipulate the stimulus set to increase repetition of the stimuli 
therein. 
Experiment 1 followed the same general design as Pilot Studies 1 and 2, but 
incorporated several changes with regard to both the stimulus set and the training 
procedure. Firstly, the stimulus set was further simplified to include only two case 
markers (nominative -a, and accusative -u). Furthermore, the number of exemplars was 
reduced from 48 foreign words to only 24. Each foreign word occurred in two unique 
sentences (one nominative, one accusative) that were each repeated three times across the 
training set, resulting in a total exposure of 144 sentences. These changes were made to 
increase the repetition of the exemplars within the training set, while keeping the total 
amount of exposure across the experiments constant.  
The training procedure in Experiment 1 was modified from Pilot Study 2. In this 
experiment, participants were asked to listen to the sentence, repeat the entire sentence 
aloud, and to then repeat the foreign word in isolation before judging which of the two 
pictures on the monitor best matched the meaning of the foreign word. As in the previous 
pilot studies, the exposure phase here was followed by a surprise GJT, together with 
subjective measures of awareness. The experiment concluded with retrospective verbal 
reports, both written and oral. The results of Experiment 1 indicated a significant learning 
effect for the experimental group when compared to the performance of the control 
group. Post-hoc tests indicated that performance for accusative items was the driving 
force behind the overall learning effect demonstrated by the experimental group. 
Although an analysis of the retrospective verbal reports revealed that this learning effect 
occurred in the absence of verbalisable rule knowledge, analyses of the subjective 
302 
 
measures of awareness provided a more nuanced picture; specifically, that the knowledge 
acquired was partly implicit in the sense that there was no relationship between 
confidence and accuracy in the GJT, but also partly explicit in that it was accompanied by 
low levels of awareness manifested in the form of intuition. 
Experiment 2 set out to replicate, validate, and extend the results of Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 followed the same basic design as Experiment 1, with the following 
modifications. The total number of morphological categories reverted to the original three 
(nominative -a, accusative -u, instrumental -ou). To counteract the potentially detrimental 
effects that increasing complexity might have on the overall learning effect, the total 
amount of exposure and the repetition of exemplars was increased in this experiment. 
Firstly, the total number of exemplars was reduced from 24 to 20. These exemplars were 
included in three sentences, one for each of the three case markers. Secondly, these 
sentences were repeated four times each for a total exposure of 240 sentences. All other 
aspects of the experimental procedure were identical to that of Experiment 1.  
The results of Experiment 2 supported the results of Experiment 1. Firstly, the 
overall learning effect appeared to be driven by performance on accusative markers. 
Secondly, with regard to awareness, the retrospective verbal reports indicated that this 
performance took place in the absence of verbalisable rule knowledge, yet was marked by 
low levels of awareness in the form of noticing the target morphological structures. As in 
Experiment 1, initial analyses of the subjective measures of awareness indicated that this 
knowledge was partly implicit and partly explicit in nature. However, further breakdowns 
of the subjective measures of awareness, specifically when analysing the confidence 
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ratings for accusative items only, found that the knowledge acquired in this experiment 
was explicit in nature. 
The final experiment in this thesis, Experiment 3, set out to investigate the same 
research questions as the previous experiments, but from a different methodological 
angle. Experiment 3 incorporated the use of an SPR task as the principle measure of 
learning, alongside an offline multiple-choice (M/C) sentence completion task as an 
additional measure. The training set of Experiment 3 followed the general outline of 
Experiment 1. The stimulus set included two morphological categories (nominative and 
accusative) and two syntactic patterns. There were 24 foreign words in total, which were 
included in two sentences (one nominative and one accusative). These sentences were 
repeated three times each for a total exposure of 144 sentences. The training procedure of 
the SPR task required participants to click through the sentence, to repeat the sentence 
silently, and to then answer a comprehension question based on the content of the 
sentence. In the testing block, participants encountered 48 novel grammatical and 
ungrammatical sentences. The ungrammatical sentences were generated by replacing the 
correct case marker with the incorrect case marker. Learning was operationalised as 
prolonged reaction times to instances of an incorrect case marker. Following the SPR 
task, participants completed an offline multiple-choice sentence completion task in which 
they had to indicate which of two options (one nominative and one accusative) best 
completed a sentence. This was accompanied by subjective measures of awareness. As 
with the previous experiments in this series, Experiment 3 concluded with both written 
verbal reports and an oral interview.  
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The results of Experiment 3 found evidence of learning in both the M/C task and 
the SPR task. With regard to the M/C task, learning was limited to participants who had 
developed verbalisable rule knowledge of the morphological rule system, providing 
strong evidence that their knowledge was explicit in nature. Analyses of the subjective 
measures of analysis also indicated that the participants had developed explicit 
knowledge. However, performance in the SPR task, in contrast to performance in the 
M/C task, was not linked with verbalisable rule knowledge. These results indicate that 
participants had developed explicit knowledge, as evidenced in the M/C task, as well as 
more automatic knowledge as measured via the SPR task. However, it should be pointed 
out that this result could be attributed solely to the fact that only two participants became 
aware of the case-marking system during the SPR task. As such, this finding should be 
viewed with some caution until it is supported by additional data. 
8.3. Theoretical Implications 
The results of the experiments in the present thesis are consistent with previous 
research investigating the learning of L2 case markers under incidental learning 
conditions (Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 2005); furthermore, they have several 
implications for our understanding of adult SLA. Firstly, this research has shown that it is 
possible to develop some knowledge of an L2 case-marking system as a result of 
incidental exposure, albeit in a semi-artificial language consisting of novel, foreign words 
nested within a highly established system (i.e., the L1 of the participants). However, as in 
previous research (Brooks et al., 2011; Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Grey et al., 2014; 
Robinson, 2002, 2005), this knowledge appeared partial, because performance on 
outcome measures remained low, particularly with regard to the GJT utilised in 
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Experiments 1 and 2 and the M/C task in Experiment 3. This suggests there is a limit 
concerning the aspects of grammar that might be acquired as a result of a limited amount 
of incidental exposure in the absence of explicit instruction and/or feedback (this point is 
addressed in more detail below). 
In addition, as mentioned above, these results suggest that awareness plays an 
important, if not vital, role in the process of acquiring L2 case markers. In particular, the 
data here suggest a link between awareness and the learning of accusative markers 
attached to novel foreign words. Contrary to previous research that has relied solely on 
retrospective verbal reports (Brooks & Kempe, 2013; Grey et al., 2014; Robinson, 2002, 
2005), the results here indicate that learning can be achieved in the absence of 
verbalisable rule knowledge; in other words, awareness at the level of understanding 
(Schmidt, 1990). Evidence for this interpretation can be seen in the results from the GJTs 
in Experiments 1 and 2, as well as from the data gathered from the SPR task in 
Experiment 3, in which participants were largely unable to develop metalinguistic 
understanding of the underlying case-marking system across these experiments. 
However, all learning in this thesis was accompanied by reports of attention to, and 
awareness of, the surface features of the morphological forms in the input, namely 
awareness at the level of noticing (Schmidt, 1990). This result points towards the 
facilitative role of awareness in the learning process, a result that is consistent with a 
wealth of empirical research in SLA (Alanen, 1995; Brooks & Kempe, 2013; DeKeyser, 
1995; Grey, Williams, & Rebuschat, 2014; Hama & Leow, 2010; Leow, 1997, 2000, 
2001; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012; Rosa & Leow, 2004; Rosa & O’Neill, 1999; 
Robinson, 1997, 2002, 2005; Williams, 2005). 
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The fact that the learning that took place in these experiments appeared linked to 
low levels of awareness also concords with theoretical models of attention and awareness 
in SLA (Robinson, 1995; Schmidt, 1995; Tomlin & Villa, 1994, see Section 2.2 for an 
overview of these models). In particular, the results here appear to support Schmidt's 
(1995, 2001) argument that noticing, or conscious registration of the surface features of 
the stimuli, is facilitative to adult SLA, and is perhaps even necessary under certain 
conditions, such as in the case of redundant grammatical features (Schmidt, 2001). When 
we consider the redundant nature of the case-marking system used here, and the fact that 
learning was only sparked when the training conditions incorporated elicited imitations 
that necessitated noticing of the target structures, it would appear that noticing might 
have played an important role in the learning demonstrated in this thesis. Further 
evidence of the facilitating effect of awareness comes from the M/C task in Experiment 
3, in which the performance of participants who developed metalinguistic awareness was 
significantly higher (~70% accuracy in the M/C task) than was the performance of 
participants who only demonstrated awareness at the level of noticing (~50% accuracy in 
the M/C task). This result indicates a relationship between higher levels of awareness and 
the amount of learning that took place during the experiment. This finding also fits well 
with Schmidt's (1990) noticing hypothesis, as well as with empirical research that has 
demonstrated a link between the level of awareness and the amount of learning that takes 
place (Leow, 1997, 2000; Mackey, 2006; for overviews, see Leow, 2013; Schmidt, 2001, 
2010). 
Also of interest was the fact that none of the participants who took part in the first 
four experiments in this series (Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2, Experiment 1 and 
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Experiment 2) managed to crack the code and become aware of the underlying case-
marking system. It was only when the modality was changed to a visual presentation in 
Experiment 3 that some of the participants managed to achieve a metalinguistic 
understanding of the morphological system. However, it should be pointed out that, 
although some participants in Experiment 3 came to a conscious understanding of the 
form-meaning mappings of the case-marking system, the majority of the participants 
(15/23) failed to do so. This finding echoes the results from previous, similar research. 
Specifically, this result suggests that the adult learners who took part in this series of 
experiments appeared largely unable to discover grammatical categories related to 
inflectional morphology, despite the simplicity and transparency of the case-marking 
system utilised here.  
The fact that learners failed to uncover the rules appears to be in line with the 
predictions of a number of theoretical positions within SLA. In particular, this finding 
could be interpreted in light of VanPatten's model of input processing (VanPatten, 
2002a), or the shallow structure hypothesis (Clahsen & Felser, 2006), as well as being 
linked to issues related to perceptual salience, learned attention and blocking (N. Ellis, 
2006a). As noted previously, one of the principles of VanPatten's (2004a) model of input 
processing is related to the primacy of meaning, specifically that learners tend to process 
input for meaning before they process grammatical forms. Furthermore, VanPatten 
argued that, when the input contains redundant grammatical forms, as was the case with 
some of the stimuli used throughout the present thesis, learners are more likely to rely on 
semantic clues to work out the meaning of a sentence than they are to process these forms 
(2004a). In a similar vein, these findings could also be seen to support the shallow 
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structure hypothesis (Clahsen & Felser, 2006). As noted in Section 4.3.2, this hypothesis 
holds that, while L1 speakers fully utilise both lexical-semantic and grammatical cues as 
they process input, L2 users tend to process input shallowly in that they rely exclusively 
on lexical-semantic cues to work out the meaning of an utterance. As noted previously, 
although this hypothesis was initially held to apply only to L2 syntax, more recent 
research has indicated that L2 learners also process morphology shallowly (Clahsen et al., 
2010) Again, given the redundant nature of the stimuli used in this thesis, it appears 
plausible that participants processed the utterances shallowly and relied on lexical clues, 
rather than on grammatical morphemes, to comprehend the utterances. 
Finally, N. Ellis (2006a, 2006b) has postulated that attention is learned and 
selective, and, furthermore, that the salience of input is shaped by both the learner's L1 
and the features of the input itself. In this sense, attention can be seen as an aspect of 
language that can potentially transfer between the learners’ L1 and their L2. N. Ellis 
argued that the salience of cues is influenced by the redundancy of cues. If, for example, 
we take the sentence "I walked to the store last week," the temporal meaning is marked 
both lexically (through the adverbial phrase last week) and grammatically, through the -
ed morphological marker. According to N. Ellis (2006a), in cases of redundant cues, 
learners might never notice the lower salience cues, particularly when the more obvious 
cues suffice for the communicative task at hand. In this sense, the cue with the higher 
degree of salience overshadows, and possibly blocks, the lower salience cue. This has 
several ramifications for the present thesis. Firstly, when we consider that the L1 of the 
participants in the present thesis (English) does not include a case-marking system, it 
seems possible that the participants were not naturally tuned to attend to the word endings 
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as a cue to the meaning of the utterance. Secondly, as the meaning carried by the case 
markers was redundant, this makes it less likely that the learners would necessarily attend 
to these forms, particularly as the case marker would represent the less salient cue in N. 
Ellis' (2006a, 2006b) model. 
In summary, VanPatten's model of input processing, the shallow structure 
hypothesis, as well as issues related to perceptual salience, can be seen to provide an 
explanation for the limited amount of learning displayed in the experiments in this thesis. 
In short, it would appear that the participants relied on the semantic information 
conveyed by the lexis of the sentence, as well as on the contextual information provided 
by the pictures (in Experiments 1 and 2), in order to comprehend the utterances. It was 
only when the training conditions necessitated that the participants attend to the surface 
features of the input, in the form of elicited imitations, that some learning of the 
morphological system took place. 
To shift the focus towards the development of implicit and explicit knowledge, 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that participants developed knowledge that 
was characterised by low levels of awareness. In other words, the participants were aware 
that they had learned something (Dienes, 2004), but this awareness remained below the 
threshold of verbalisation. The results of Experiment 3 were largely similar to those of 
the previous two experiments, with the exception that some of the participants in 
Experiment 3 developed verbalisable rule knowledge of the target case marking system. 
This result is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, it underscores the fact that 
incidental learning conditions are no guarantee that learning will take place incidentally, 
nor that the knowledge acquired as a result of incidental exposure will necessarily be 
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implicit in nature. In fact, analyses of the retrospective verbal reports in Experiment 3 
indicated that a number of the participants admitted to engaging in rule-search behaviour 
during the experiment, with the majority (6/8) doing so during the M/C task. Such a 
result mirrors findings from previous research that reported similar behaviour among 
participants under incidental conditions (DeKeyser, 1995, 1997; Robinson, 1997, 2002, 
2005). However, this finding might have been influenced by the nature of the M/C task, 
which required participants to choose between two forms of a foreign word, one with the 
accusative marker and one with the nominative marker. This dichotomous choice is likely 
to have encouraged rule-search behaviour in that it is clear that the case marking is linked 
to the correct answer.To address this issue, future research might examine the 
performance of participants across the testing phase of the experiment to determine if 
there is a difference in performance between, for example, the first quarter versus the last 
quarter of the M/C task. An increase in performance would provide evidence that 
participants had become aware during the testing phase and not at a previous point in the 
experiment. 
It is also interesting to consider how the above results might be interpreted with 
regard to the interface between implicit and explicit knowledge (see Section 2.4 for a 
discussion). For instance, the fact that participants appeared to engage in rule-search 
behaviour in Experiment 3 could be offered as a simple explanation for the reason that 
participants developed explicit knowledge. In other words, the use of explicit learning 
strategies resulted in explicit knowledge. Such a result might be seen to support non-
interface positions (Krashen, 1982) in which explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge 
arise separately out of isolated processes. However, this might not necessarily be the 
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case. For instance, recent studies have demonstrated that learners develop explicit 
knowledge rapidly as a result of incidental learning conditions, even in the absence of 
reported rule-search behaviour (Hamrick, 2013).  
Thus, this result, as well as the overall results from the present thesis, could 
support N. Ellis' (2005) weak interface position. As part of N. Ellis' model, mental 
representations are first seeded within explicit memory before developing into abstract 
"trees," or implicit knowledge (see Section 2.4.3 for a discussion). This process occurs 
over a long period as a result of repeated exposure to patterns within the input. Following 
this model, the fact that the learning demonstrated in the experiments within this thesis 
was marked by conscious awareness could be explained by the theoretical account above; 
specifically, that more explicit knowledge is quick to develop, whereas implicit 
knowledge develops slowly over a longer period as implicit mechanisms work to abstract 
grammatical regularities contained in the input (N. Ellis, 2005; Robinson, 1996, 1997).40  
However, it is important to note that such an account is speculative, as this thesis 
provides no direct evidence of the interface between implicit and explicit knowledge, nor 
of how these types of knowledge develop over time. Although some research has 
investigated the time course of implicit and explicit knowledge with regard to the 
learning of artificial grammars (Ziori & Dienes, 2012), to my knowledge, no SLA studies 
have yet done so. By tracing how implicit and explicit knowledge develop over time, 
future research might better inform the debate surrounding the interface between implicit 
and explicit knowledge in SLA. 
                                                     
40 However, such data could be interpreted to support the declarative / procedural model of learning (see 
DeKeyser, 2009; Ullman, 2004 for discussions). 
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8.4. Methodological Implications 
The results of this thesis have a number of methodological implications. Firstly, 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2 underscore the fact that relying on retrospective verbal 
reports as the sole measure of awareness is an inadequate means of measuring the nature 
of knowledge acquired within a study (Rebuschat, 2013; Shanks & St. John, 1996). 
Furthermore, it provides additional evidence of the usefulness of subjective measures of 
awareness in identifying low levels of awareness, which might otherwise be missed by 
retrospective verbal reports.  
However, it should be pointed out that Experiment 2 also suggested a limitation of 
the zero-correlation criterion as a measure of implicit knowledge (Dienes & Scott, 2005). 
As noted, learning in Experiment 2 was limited to accusative items. When the entire 
dataset was analysed (both nominative and accusative items), analyses revealed no 
significant relationship between confidence and accuracy in the GJT. Following the zero-
correlation criterion, this would provide evidence that the knowledge acquired was 
implicit in nature. However, when the accusative items in the GJT were examined in 
isolation, the results indicated a statistically significant relationship between confidence 
and accuracy, indicating that the knowledge acquired was, in fact, explicit in nature. In 
summary, it would appear that confidence ratings can be influenced by performance on a 
sub-component of a test, just as the overall learning effect might be driven or masked by 
performance on a particular type of test item. In this sense, future research might benefit 
from analysing confidence rating data across all sub-components of a test. Such an 
undertaking could lead to a more refined and valid understanding of the conscious status 
of knowledge being utilised in a particular assessment. 
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In addition, with regard to incorporating multiple measures of learning, the results 
of Experiment 3 underscore the benefits of including both direct and indirect measures of 
learning within a single experiment. For instance, if Experiment 3 had relied solely on the 
M/C task, the results would have only provided evidence that the knowledge acquired 
was strongly linked with verbalisable rule knowledge. This result would have been 
interpreted as providing evidence that the incidental exposure conditions led to purely 
explicit knowledge. Conversely, if this experiment had utilised only the SPR task, the 
results would have indicated no link between verbalisable rule knowledge and learning. 
This result would have been interpreted to indicate that the incidental learning conditions 
resulted in implicit knowledge. Instead, the use of both of these measures allowed for a 
more nuanced view of the learning that had taken place in this study: specifically, that the 
incidental exposure conditions appeared to result in two types of knowledge, or in a 
single type of knowledge that was utilised in different ways. Such a finding highlights the 
benefits of triangulating data from multiple measures of awareness and multiple measures 
of learning (Purpura et al., 2015). Furthermore, this result provides additional support for 
the use of both direct and indirect tests when investigating implicit and explicit 
phenomena in SLA (R. Ellis et al., 2009; Leung & Williams, 2011; Norris & Ortega, 
2000; Reingold & Merikle, 1988).  
Finally, when reflecting critically on the measures of awareness included in the 
present study, a limitation of Pilot Study 1, Pilot Study 2, Experiment 1, and Experiment 
2 lies in the lack of information about the strategies adopted by participants when dealing 
with the stimuli in the exposure phase. Incidental learning conditions as operationalised 
here provide no guarantee that learners actually learn incidentally; that is, without 
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intention. This issue was addressed in Experiment 3 by modifying the retrospective 
verbal reports to include a question that asked whether participants were actively 
searching for rules during the experiment. As in previous research (Robinson, 2002, 
2005), responses to this question indicated that some participants in Experiment 3 
engaged in rule-search behaviour during the experiment, despite the fact that the 
experimental condition was designed to create opportunities for incidental learning. 
Future studies, similarly to earlier research in this area (DeKeyser, 1995; Robinson 1997, 
2002, 2005), should continue to include retrospective questions asking participants if they 
were actively involved in searching for rules. This information could increase the 
construct validity of incidental learning studies. In particular, it could reveal whether the 
intended incidental learning conditions succeeded in orienting learners’ attention towards 
the meaning of the stimuli and in preventing them from utilising explicit learning 
strategies. 
8.5. Limitations and Future Directions  
Despite the positive results listed above, this thesis leaves a number of questions 
connected with the development of implicit and explicit knowledge unanswered. Firstly, 
Experiments 1 and 2 witnessed the development of knowledge that was made manifest in 
the form of intuition judgements in a GJT.Although some have argued that such intuition 
judgements are reflective of implicit knowledge (Dienes, 2008), others have argued 
against the possibility of participants gaining native-speaker-like intuition after a short 
exposure period (Hama & Leow, 2010; Serafini, 2013). Implicit in the latter argument is 
that the construct of intuition, as indicated via source attribution data, is not equivalent to 
the intuition that native speakers have of their L1. In other words, there is an assumption 
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that similar intuition judgements by L1 users would not be accompanied by low levels of 
awareness. To my knowledge, however, no research to date has set out to examine if this 
is necessarily the case. A further limitation of the subjective measures of awareness was 
highlighted in Experiment 2, in which the data cast some doubt on the reliability of the 
zero-correlation criterion as criterion for implicit knowledge. To my knowledge, no 
research to date has thoroughly validated subjective measures of awareness as reliable 
and valid tools towards the measurement of implicit and explicit knowledge. If one goal 
of SLA is to foster the development of implicit knowledge, then validation studies of 
these instruments is clearly warranted.  
Also, as has been noted by many others (Hulstijn, 1997), caution must be 
exercised when attempting to extrapolate laboratory studies to naturalistic language 
acquisition, particularly when these experiments utilise artificial grammars, the 
generalisability of which to natural languages has long been challenged (Schmidt, 
1994b). As noted previously (please refer to Section 3.4.2), the use of artificial languages 
stems from the quantitative tradition that stresses "reliability over validity and control 
over context" (Hulstijn et al., 2014, p. 365). In this sense, the advantages of artificial 
languages are clear–they allow the experimenter complete control over the input present 
in the experiment, and allow the experiment to control effectively for other confounding 
variables, such as prior knowledge on the part of the participants.  
However, the limitations of artificial languages, such as the system employed in 
the present study, are also apparent. For example, as noted in Section 5.1, some authors 
(e.g., Rogers, Revesz, & Rebuschat, 2015) have argued for the need to demonstrate that a 
semi-artificial system is learnable within a particular context as part of the experimental 
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piloting process. This argument is predicated on the many unknowns when working with 
a novel semi-artificial system, such as whether the system might be too simple or too 
complex  for a particular learning context. To illustrate, Pilot Studies 1 and 2 found no 
learning effect of the target morphological structures. In isolation, the results from these 
two experiments might be interpreted to indicate that that no implicit learning, or no 
development of implicit knowledge, is possible within that particular context. However, it 
is important to note that these pilot studies indicated no learning had taken place, neither 
implicit nor explicit. To be able to say with any certainly that implicit learning is not 
possible within a particular context, one must demonstrate that explicit learning is 
possible. Otherwise, one must simply conclude that no learning is possible. Thus, 
validation of the learnability of semi-artificial languages appears warranted, in particular 
when used to investigate issues related to attention and awareness in SLA. 
Further limitations of semi-artificial languages include the fact that these 
languages represent highly simplified versions of natural language systems, and often 
completely ignore important aspects of language, such as pragmatics. In addition, it is 
important to stress that there is no direct evidence that the cognitive processes involved in 
processing and learning the semi-artificial system employed in this thesis necessarily 
reflect that of processing and learning a natural language. For example, in the present 
thesis, the presence of a single foreign word embedded within familiar lexis might have 
resulted in the participants allocating an unnatural amount of attention to the foreign 
word. Such behavior would call into question whether the findings reported here, in 
particular findings related to the role of awareness in SLA, necessarily generalise to the 
learning of natural languages. Future research would undoubtedly be strengthened by 
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developing a process to validate the semi-artificial system in question, or by using stimuli 
that reflect the complexities inherent within natural languages more closely (for example, 
a miniature language system such as that which was used in Brooks & Kempe, 2013). 
In addition to the more general limitations related to the use of semi-artificial 
languages in SLA research, there are also a number of limitations specific to the semi-
artificial system utilised within this thesis. In particular, although care was taken in the 
creation of the semi-artificial system, there are a number of variables that were not 
controlled for and, as such, might have impacted on the results of the study. For instance, 
the stimuli included sentences that contained both redundant and essential case markers. 
In addition, the animacy of the foreign noun as well as the use of pronouns (e.g., “he”) 
and names (e.g., “Patrick”) were not effectively balanced across the training and testing 
sets. The internal validity of future research would undoubtedly be strengthened by 
modifying the stimuli to better control for these potentially confounding variables. 
Despite these reservations, it should be noted that recent research has pointed 
towards similarities between the cognitive processes that underpin the processing of 
natural languages and the processing of artificial grammars (Folia, Uddén, De Vries, 
Forkstam, & Petersson, 2010; Petersson, Folia, & Hagoort, 2012), as well as a 
relationship between the learning of artificial grammars and the learning of an L2 
(Ettlinger, Morgan-Short, Faretta-Stutenberg, & Wong, in press; cf. Robinson, 2005). 
Finally, when we consider the amount of research that has utilised artificial or semi-
artificial languages that has undoubtedly contributed to our understanding of SLA (de 
Graaf, 1997; DeKeyser, 1995, 1997; Grey et al., 2014; Hama & Leow, 2010; Leung & 
Williams, 2011, 2012, 2014; Rebuschat & Williams, 2012; Robinson, 1997, 2010; 
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Williams, 200541), it is hoped that the semi-artificial language used here can also be a 
valid instrument in contributing to our knowledge of language learning processes. 
To shift the focus towards possible future directions for this line of research, there 
are a number of issues related to implicit processes within SLA that have yet to be 
determined. For instance, there is ongoing debate regarding the degree to which 
individual difference variables affect implicit and explicit processes in SLA (Paradis, 
2004, 2009). A number of cognitive individual difference variables have been implicated 
within this debate. These include both phonological short-term memory and/or working 
memory (N. Ellis, 2005; Paradis, 2009; Roehr, 2008; Williams, 2012), personality and 
learning styles (Grey, Williams, & Rebuschat, 2015; Kaufman et al., 2011), information 
processing cognitive style (Granena, in press), and sequence learning ability (Granena, 
2013; Kaufman et al., 2010). Although some research has attempted to address the role 
that some of these different variables might play within implicit and explicit learning 
processes, the research to date has been limited, and has produced conflicting results (see, 
for example, the relationship between working memory and incidental learning in 
Tagarelli et al., 2015, versus Robinson, 2002). It is clear that further research in this area 
is necessary in order to develop a fuller and more valid understanding of the cognitive 
variables that underpin the development of implicit and/or explicit knowledge.  
Finally, the development of automatic knowledge appears to be an area  that most 
strongly warrants further research and is the avenue that my future research will follow. 
The development of automatic knowledge is interesting for a number of reasons. On a 
theoretical level, such research might help inform the debate surrounding the 
                                                     
41 See also Gómez (2007) for a review of the use of artificial grammars in L1 research. 
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development of implicit and explicit knowledge in that it might lead to a better 
understanding of the defining characteristics of these types of knowledge within the field 
of SLA. On a practical level, the develop of automatic knowledge has immediate 
implications for the L2 classroom. To elaborate, it can be assumed that the goal of the 
average language learner is to be able to use his or her L2 fluently, intuitively, naturally, 
and efficiently in a variety of situations. In this sense, whether the knowledge used is 
accompanied by awareness might not be important to the average language learner. 
Instead, he or she is concerned with whether this knowledge can be deployed 
automatically and accurately. Thus, one direction forward might be to examine the 
development of knowledge that can be used spontaneously in both comprehension and 
production (Keenan & MacWhinney, 1987). Researchers could examine the degree to 
which various learning conditions, such as incidental versus intentional exposure, lead to 
automatic knowledge and, furthermore, could investigate the role of awareness within 
this process. Such an understanding would not only benefit the field on a theoretical 
level, but could also provide results with more immediate implications for the L2 
classroom.  
As can be seen, the results of this thesis have raised more questions than they 
have answered. It is hoped that future research will continue to improve upon the 
methodology employed here. Such an undertaking might allow for a more complete 
understanding of how implicit and explicit knowledge develop, and how these two types 
of knowledge might best be measured. Despite the limitations of the experiments in this 
thesis, and the remaining unanswered questions, it is important to highlight that this 
thesis can be seen as part of an ongoing narrative. In other words, the completion of this 
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thesis does not represent a conclusion of this line of investigation but, instead, a second 
starting point. The goal of my future research is to attempt to answer some of the 
questions outlined in the paragraphs above. It is hoped that such an undertaking will 
contribute to the debate regarding the development of implicit and explicit knowledge, 
and will allow for a fuller understanding of the cognitive processes that underlie adult 
SLA. 
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Appendix C: Training Sets for Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and Experiments 1 and 2 
Training Set 
 Nominative -a 
 PS1 
1 
PS2 
2 
E1 E2  
   X X Today the way showed the smerovka on the street. 
   X X Last week the brasna broke its handle at the shop. 
   X X All night the boy frightened the zruda in his dreams. 
     In summer the pilka cut the wood with its teeth. 
   X X Last weekend holes made the vrtacka with the bit.  
     Last year the bedna stored pictures in the garage.  
     Today David's face cut the britva at the sink. 
     Last weekend the kladka raised the box to the roof. 
   X X Last night his mouth burned the bylina in the food. 
     All day the mycka did the washing with water. 
     Last week the door opened the klicka to the room.  
   X X All night the lednicka cooled the food at the store. 
     Last month him entertained the loutka with a show.  
   X X All year the prehrada supplied power to the town.  
   X X In the morning bread made the pekarna at home.  
   X X All year the zahrada grew veggies in the ground.  
     This morning the eggs moved the sterka to the plate.  
     Last year the kasa held Sarah's money at home. 
     Some time ago dirt cleaned the stetka in the sink. 
     Last weekend the kocka killed the bird with its teeth. 
   X X Last night the clothes pressed the zehlicka at his home. 
     This morning malta connected the stones in the wall.  
     Last winter them attacked the flota with its guns.  
   X X This evening the pracka pumped water to the clothes. 
     Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. 
   X X All day the zkouska challenged them with hard questions. 
     Weeks ago the cheese took the myska to its hole.  
   X X All day the susicka dried clothes at the cleaners. 
     This morning them killed the flinta with a live round. 
   X X This morning the salina carried us to work. 
     At night a fire started a sirka at the camp. 
   X X This evening the guma made marks on the paper. 
   X X All summer phones built the tovarna with machines. 
   X X Last month the opona hid the stage at the show. 
   X X Last month a hole dug the lopata in the ground. 
     Last week the rtenka added colour to her face. 
   X X All evening the bath filled the sprchka in the home. 
     All week the lecba helped her in the hospital. 
   X X At night light made the svitilna in the garden. 
     Last winter the studna supplied water to town. 
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    X In the morning the ship kept the kotva in place.  
    X This evening the krava fed its young with its milk. 
   X X All week lunch supplied the katedra to the kids. 
   X X Some time ago the salupa raised sails at sea. 
    X Last weekend the meat cut the dyka with its edge. 
    X Last year the delba carried water to his home. 
   X X All night wine opened the vyvrtka at the bar. 
   X X Last year the ohrada kept the cows in the field. 
 
 Category 2: Accusative -u 
 PS1 
1 
PS2 
2 
E1 E2  
   X X In summer they placed the smerovku at the road. 
   X X Last weekend the brasnu put David in the boot. 
   X X Last week he drew a scary zrudu with the paint.  
     Last month the pilku pressed the builder to the board. 
   X X All week the builder took his vrtacku to work.  
     Some time ago the bednu closed Brian with tape.  
     Today Peter used a britvu in the bathroom. 
     All day a kladku used he at the building site.  
   X X At night Lucy cooked the bylinu with some oil.  
     Today the mycku connected James to the pipe. 
     In the morning she turned the klicku at the gate. 
   X X Last week the lednicku closed Jill in the kitchen.  
     Last night Katie carried the loutku to the stage. 
   X X Today the prehradu closed they at the river.  
   X X All year the baker used a pekarnu at work.  
   X X Weeks ago the zahradu planted Beth with fruits.  
     All week the cook used a sterku at the cooker.  
     Last month the kasu opened David with the key.  
     This morning the cleaner took the steku to work. 
     All morning the kocku rubbed she in the garden. 
   X X Today she pressed the zehlicku against her shirts.  
     Last weekend the maltu mixed Brian with a stick. 
     At night they positioned the flotu at the front. 
   X X Last week the pracku carried we to the kitchen. 
     Some time ago John kept the kozu at the farm.  
   X X Last week a zkousku gave the teacher to the class. 
     In summer the cat chased the mysku in the house. 
   X X Last year the susicku repaired Mark with his tools.  
     In the morning James fired the flintu in the air.  
   X X Last month the salinu stopped Peter with the bell. 
     Last winter Sarah moved the sirku to the coal. 
   X X Some time ago the gumu left Jill on her desk. 
   X X Last year the owners closed the tovarnu in town.  
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   X X Last night the oponu closed Anne in the bedroom. 
   X X This morning Beth used a lopatu in the dirt.  
     Today her rtenku applied she with a brush. 
   X X Weeks ago he fixed the sprchku in the bathroom.  
     All evening the lecbu gave the nurse with a shot.  
   X X Last night she held the svitilku to the darkness. 
     Some time ago a studnu dug she at their home.  
    X Last night the sailor raised the kotvu with a chain. 
    X In winter the kravu carried he to the farm. 
   X X All day she attended the katedru in her town. 
   X X Today a salupu rowed Jill in the river.  
    X This morning John sharpened the dyku with a stone. 
    X Some time ago the delbu fixed he with his tools. 
   X X Last week Anne handled a vyvrtku in the pub. 
   X X Last weekend an ohradu built they at the farm. 
 
 
 Category 3: Instrumental -ou 
 PS1 
1 
PS2 
2 
E1 E2  
   X X Last week the drivers warned they with a smerovkou. 
   X X Today David carried the food with a brasnou.  
   X X Some time ago the child scared John with a zrudou. 
   X  Today he cut the wooden board with a pilkou.  
   X X This morning some holes made James with a vrtacku. 
   X  In the morning Jill packed her things with a bednou. 
   X  In the morning her leg cut Anne with a britvou. 
   X  Last month Brian lifted the rocks with a kladkou.  
   X X Last year the food salted Beth with the bylinou.  
   X  All night Peter washed the dishes with a myckou.  
   X  This morning the door opened she with a klickou. 
   X X Last week Sarah froze the food with a lednickou.  
   X  All night the child entertained he with a loutkou. 
   X X Last month they blocked the river with a prehradou. 
   X X This morning some bread made we with our pekarnou.  
   X X Last year she grew enough food with her zahradou. 
   X  This evening the meat turned David with a sterkou. 
   X  Last weekend John hid his money with a kasou.  
   X  All evening the toilet cleaned Mark with a stetkou.  
   X  Some time ago he scared the birds with his kockou.  
   X X All evening her clothes pressed Jill with a zehlickou. 
   X  Some time ago Brian built the wall with maltou. 
   X  Last night the river guarded they with a flotou. 
   X X In the evening Anne washed her dress with a prackou. 
   X  In winter the grass maintained Beth with a kozou. 
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   X X Weeks ago he failed the students with a zkouskou.  
   X  This evening the woman scared we with a myskou. 
   X X All night Lucy dried her clothes with a susickou.  
   X  Some time ago a bird shot Sarah with a flintou.  
   X X All day Katie crossed the city with a salinou.  
   X  Last night a fire started David with a sirkou. 
   X X Last weekend John fixed the mistake with a gumou. 
   X X Last year cars produced the town with a tovarnou.  
   X X Today he darkened the room with the oponou. 
   X X All evening a hole dug James with the lopatou. 
   X  Last weekend she darkened her eyes with rtenkou. 
   X X All evening himself cleaned he with a sprchou. 
   X  Weeks ago he improved his health with the lecbou. 
   X X At night the bedroom lit Jill with a svitikou. 
   X  All day she supplied fresh water with a studnou.  
   X X This morning the ship secured Anne with a kotvou.  
   X X In summer Beth produced some milk with a kravou.  
   X X Last month the trip arranged students with the katedrou. 
   X X All week we sailed the river with a salupou.  
   X X Last winter the man murdered she with a dykou.  
   X X In summer they supplied water with a delbou.  
   X X All year the wine opened he with a vyvrtkou.  
   X X All year they guarded their land with an ohradou.  
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Appendix D: Testing Set Used in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and Experiment 2 
 
Grammatical Items 
Last week the fruit washed the prodejna with water. 
Some time ago the brana blocked the road to town.  
Last weekend food burned the trouba in the kitchen.  
All evening the hracka entertained them at home. 
This evening the room cleaned the sluzka with water.  
Today the dilna delivered food to their home.  
All year wood chopped the sekera in the forest.  
In the morning the bunda warmed him at the park. 
All year a paku built Peter with a board. 
This morning the man changed the plenu in the bathroom. 
Weeks ago the stuhu tied the man to the gift. 
All evening Mark bought an andulku at the shop. 
In the morning the kasnu built Katie with stone. 
This evening he wore a plastenku in the rain.  
Last night the propisku pressed she on the paper. 
This morning she changed the ropu at the garage. 
All night pages printed they with a tiskarnou. 
Today papers joined he with a sesivackou. 
Last weekend the food mixed James with a vareckou. 
This morning Anne wrote a letter with the kridou. 
All evening the present tied he with a strunou. 
All week we cleaned the tables with a prachovkou. 
Today him examined the doctor with a lupou. 
This morning they turned the ship with the kosatkou. 
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Ungrammatical Items 
At night her bag took the cizinku to the train.  
In summer the lisku ate the eggs at the farm.  
At night him welcomed the letusku with a drink. 
Last winter the chuvu cleaned the mess in the room. 
All week the car lent the pujchovnou to the man. 
In summer the zenou bought the dress at the shop. 
Last night the feed ate the veverkou in the tree. 
In the morning the babickou surprised them with cake. 
Last winter the lichotka gave he to his wife. 
This evening she reduced the cena at the shop. 
All evening the smetana mixed they in the bowl.  
In summer David cooked the kachna with the fire. 
This morning a babovkou gave we to our friend. 
Last year Beth grew a paprikou in the garden. 
Last month a chalupou built she at the river. 
This morning he heated the chatou with a fire. 
Last weekend the box closed Lucy with the paska. 
Some time ago they cleared the ice with the skrabka. 
Last week his wife surprised he with a kvetina. 
Last week we sharpened the knife with the ocilka. 
This evening a shirt made David with bavlnu. 
This morning we fixed the sound with a ladickou. 
Weeks ago a path cut they with a macetu. 
Last year the town produced milk with a mlekarnu. 
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Appendix E: Testing Set Used in Experiment 1 
 
Grammatical Items 
Last weekend the fruit washed the prodna with water. 
Some time ago the brana blocked the road to town.  
Last weekend food burned the trouba in the kitchen.  
All evening the hracka entertained them at home. 
This evening the room cleaned the sluzka with water.  
Today the dilna delivered food to their home.  
All weekend wood chopped the sekra in the forest.  
In the morning the bunda warmed him at the park. 
All year a paku built Peter with a board. 
This morning the man changed the plenu in the bathroom. 
Weeks ago the stuhu tied the man to the gift. 
Some time ago Mark bought an andku at the shop. 
In the morning the kasnu built Katie with stone. 
This evening Patrick wore a plastku in the rain.  
Last evening the propku pressed she on the paper. 
This morning she changed the ropu at the garage. 
All night the pages printed the tiskna at work. 
Today papers joined the seska in the office. 
All day vegetables mixed the varka in the bowl. 
Today the krida drew a picture on the page. 
All evening a strunu tied he to the present. 
This evening the pracka pumped water to the clothes. 
Today the lupu used a nurse at the clinic. 
Today the captain turned the kostku on the ship. 
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Ungrammatical Items 
At night her bag took the cizinku to the train.  
In summer the lisku ate the eggs at the farm.  
At night him welcomed the letusku with a drink. 
Last winter the chuvu cleaned the mess in the room. 
All week the car lent the punchnu to the man. 
In summer the zenu bought the dress at the shop. 
Last night the feed ate the veverku in the tree. 
In the morning the babku surprised them with cake. 
Last winter the lichtka gave he to his wife. 
This evening she reduced the cena at the shop. 
All evening the smetana mixed they in the bowl.  
In summer David cooked the kachna with the fire. 
This morning a babka gave we to our friend. 
Last year Beth grew a papka in the garden. 
Last month a chalpa built she at the river. 
This morning he heated the chata with a fire. 
Last month the box sealed the pasku in the bedroom. 
Last night the skabku cleared the ice on the window. 
Some time ago a kvetna gave he to his wife. 
Last year the cilku sharpened the knife on the stone. 
This evening she cleaned the bavna with some water. 
Last weekend a ladka carried they to the room. 
Last night a path cut the macku in the forest. 
Some time ago they closed the mlecna in the town. 
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Appendix F: Stimuli for M/C Task in Experiment 3 
 
Nominative 
Today the way showed the smerka to the drivers. 
Last week the brasna broke its handle at the shop. 
All night the boy frightened the zruda in his dreams. 
Some time ago holes made the vrtka in the wall. 
Last evening his mouth burned the bakna in the food. 
All evening the ledka cooled the food at the store. 
All year the predka supplied power to the town. 
In the morning bread made the pekna in the town. 
All summer the hradka grew veggies in the ground. 
Last night the clothes pressed the licka at the cleaners. 
This evening the pracka pumped water to the clothes. 
All day the kouska tested them with hard questions. 
All weekend the suska dried their clothes in the sun. 
This morning the lina carried us to the town. 
Last night the guma erased marks on the pages. 
This evening the pona hid the stage at the show. 
Accusative 
This morning Patrick used a lopku in the dirt.  
Weeks ago he fixed the sprchku in the bathroom. 
Last evening she held the svitku to the darkness. 
All morning she attended the katdru in her town. 
All evening a salpu rowed they in the river. 
Last week Anne used a vrtku in the restaurant. 
Some time ago a hradu built they at the farm. 
In the morning he drove the holku to her school. 
In the evening she took the vacku to the show. 
Last week the police took the bandu to prison. 
In the morning he hired a ridku in the street. 
This morning he ordered the pajku to the front. 
Some time ago James left the gumu on his desk. 
In summer Anne put the tonku into the lock. 
Last weekend Mark used the bartku in the garden. 
Last weekend the child called her mamku on the 
phone. 
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Appendix G: Stimuli for Experiment 3 
SPR Task 
Training Sentences and Comprehension Questions 
Sentence In summer the pilka cut the wood with its teeth. 
CQ1 Was the wood cut in winter? 
CQ2 Was the plastic cut? 
CQ3 Did it cut the wood with its teeth? 
Sentence Last year the bedna stored pictures in the garage.  
CQ1 Were the pictures stored in the closet? 
CQ2 Did this happen last year? 
CQ3 Were the pictures kept on the wall? 
Sentence Today David's face cut the britva at the sink. 
CQ1 Was David’s face injured? 
CQ2 Did this happen last month? 
CQ3 Was David's face cut in the bedroom? 
Sentence Last weekend the kladka raised the box to the roof. 
CQ1 Was the box moved to the ground? 
CQ2 Was the box lifted? 
CQ3 Did this happen yesterday? 
Sentence Today the mycku connected James to the pipe. 
CQ1 Did this happen today? 
CQ2 Did John connect something to the pipes? 
CQ3 Was something connected to the wall? 
Sentence In the morning she turned the klicku at the gate. 
CQ1 Did she turn something at the door? 
CQ2 Did she turn something? 
CQ3 Did this happen in the evening? 
Sentence Last night Katie carried the loutku to the stage. 
CQ1 Did she do this last night? 
CQ2 Did something carry Katie? 
CQ3 Was something carried to the stage? 
Sentence All week the cook used a sterku at the cooker.  
CQ1 Did an actor use something? 
CQ2 Was something used in the kitchen? 
CQ3 Was something used at the cooker this morning? 
Sentence Last year the kasa held Sarah's money at home. 
CQ1 Did this happen last year? 
CQ2 Did something hold Sarah's car? 
CQ3 Was Sarah's money held in a bank? 
Sentence Some time ago dirt cleaned the stetka in the sink. 
CQ1 Was the bath cleaned by something? 
CQ2 Was the dirt cleaned in the sink? 
CQ3 Did this happen recently? 
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Sentence Last weekend the kocka killed the bird with its teeth. 
CQ1 Was a mouse killed? 
CQ2 Did something kill a bird with its claws? 
CQ3 Did this happen last weekend? 
Sentence This morning malta connected the stones in the wall.  
CQ1 Were the stones connected by something? 
CQ2 Did this happen a long time ago? 
CQ3 Were the stones connected in the wall? 
Sentence At night they positioned the flotu at the front. 
CQ1 Did this happen in the morning? 
CQ2 Did something move them? 
CQ3 Was something moved to the front? 
Sentence Some time ago John kept the kozu at the farm.  
CQ1 Was something kept in the house? 
CQ2 Did John keep something at the farm? 
CQ3 Did this happen recently? 
Sentence In summer the cat chased the mysku in the house. 
CQ1 Was something chased by the cat? 
CQ2 Did this happen in winter? 
CQ3 Did the cat chase something in the garden? 
Sentence In the morning James fired the flintu in the air.  
CQ1 Did James fire something? 
CQ2 Was something fired at a target? 
CQ3 Did this happen in the afternoon? 
Sentence At night a fire started a sirka at the camp. 
CQ1 Did a fire start something? 
CQ2 Did this happen during the day? 
CQ3 Was there a fire at the camp? 
Sentence Last week the rtenka added colour to her face. 
CQ1 Was colour added to her clothes? 
CQ2 Did something add colour to her face? 
CQ3 Did this happen today? 
Sentence All week the lecba helped her in the hospital. 
CQ1 Was she helped by something? 
CQ2 Did something help her at home? 
CQ3 Did something help her only on Monday? 
Sentence Last winter the studna supplied water to town. 
CQ1 Did this happen in summer? 
CQ2 Was water supplied to town? 
CQ3 Did something supply electricity to town? 
Sentence Last night the sailor raised the kotvu with a chain. 
CQ1 Did this happen last week? 
CQ2 Did the soldier raise something? 
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CQ3 Was something raised by a chain? 
Sentence In winter the kravu carried he to the farm. 
CQ1 Was he carried to the farm? 
CQ2 Was something carried to the farm in winter? 
CQ3 Did he carry something in summer? 
Sentence This morning John sharpened the dyku with a stone. 
CQ1 Did John throw something? 
CQ2 Was something sharpened? 
CQ3 Did he sharpen something this evening? 
Sentence Some time ago the delbu fixed he with his tools. 
CQ1 Did a woman fix something? 
CQ2 Was something fixed with his tools? 
CQ3 Was something fixed recently? 
Sentence All day the mycka did the washing with water. 
CQ1 Did something do the washing? 
CQ2 Was the washing done only in the morning? 
CQ3 Was the washing done with water? 
Sentence Last week the door opened the klicka to the room.  
CQ1 Was the door to the basement opened? 
CQ2 Did something open the door? 
CQ3 Did something open the door last month? 
Sentence Last month him entertained the loutka with a show.  
CQ1 Was he entertained by something? 
CQ2 Was he entertained with a book? 
CQ3 Did this happen this morning? 
Sentence This morning the eggs moved the sterka to the plate.  
CQ1 Were the eggs moved this afternoon? 
CQ2 Did something move the eggs to the plate? 
CQ3 Was something moved to the pan? 
Sentence Last month the pilku pressed the builder to the board. 
CQ1 Did he press something against the board? 
CQ2 Was something pressed against the board this morning? 
CQ3 Was something pressed against the board? 
Sentence Some time ago the bednu closed Brian with tape.  
CQ1 Did Brian do something? 
CQ2 Did he use tape for something? 
CQ3 Did this happen recently? 
Sentence Today Peter used a britvu in the bathroom. 
CQ1 Did Peter use something in the bathroom? 
CQ2 Was something used in the kitchen? 
CQ3 Was something used in the bathroom by Peter today? 
Sentence All day a kladku used he at the building site.  
CQ1 Was something used in the office all day? 
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CQ2 Did he use something at the building site? 
CQ3 Did he use something all day? 
Sentence Last winter them attacked the flota with its guns.  
CQ1 Were they attacked by something? 
CQ2 Did something attack them with arrows? 
CQ3 Did something attack them in winter? 
Sentence Last summer the grass ate the koza in the field. 
CQ1 Did something eat the grass in winter? 
CQ2 Was the grass eaten? 
CQ3 Did something eat the grass in the field? 
Sentence Weeks ago the cheese took the myska to its hole.  
CQ1 Was the cheese taken by something? 
CQ2 Did something take the cheese to the sofa? 
CQ3 Did something take the cheese weeks ago? 
Sentence This morning them killed the flinta with a live round. 
CQ1 Were they killed by a knife this morning? 
CQ2 Did something kill them with a bullet this morning? 
CQ3 Were they killed? 
Sentence Last month the kasu opened David with the key.  
CQ1 Did David open something with a key? 
CQ2 Was something opened with a crowbar? 
CQ3 Was something opened last month? 
Sentence This morning the cleaner took the steku to work. 
CQ1 Did she take something to her home? 
CQ2 Did this happen this morning? 
CQ3 Did she take something to her office? 
Sentence All morning the kocku rubbed she in the garden. 
CQ1 Did she rub something in the garden? 
CQ2 Did this happen in the living room? 
CQ3 Did this happen at night? 
Sentence Last weekend the maltu mixed Brian with a stick. 
CQ1 Was something mixed this morning? 
CQ2 Did Brian mix something with a stick? 
CQ3 Was something mixed by Brian? 
Sentence In the morning the ship kept the kotva in place.  
CQ1 Did something hold the ship in place? 
CQ2 Did this happen in the morning? 
CQ3 Did the ship moved? 
Sentence This evening the krava fed its young with its milk. 
CQ1 Did something feed its young with solid food? 
CQ2 Did this happen in the evening? 
CQ3 Did something feed its young? 
Sentence Last weekend the meat cut the dyka with its edge. 
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CQ1 Did something cut the meat? 
CQ2 Was the meat cut yesterday? 
CQ3 Did something cut the meat with its edge? 
Sentence Last year the delba carried water to his home. 
CQ1 Was the water carried last year? 
CQ2 Did something carry water to his home? 
CQ3 Did the water move something? 
Sentence Last winter Sarah moved the sirku to the coal. 
CQ1 Did she move something towards the coal? 
CQ2 Was something carried away from the coal? 
CQ3 Did this happen in winter? 
Sentence Today her rtenku applied she with a brush. 
CQ1 Did she put something on with a pen? 
CQ2 Was something applied with a brush today? 
CQ3 Did she apply something? 
Sentence All evening the lecbu gave the nurse with a shot.  
CQ1 Did the nurse give something? 
CQ2 Was something given with a pill? 
CQ3 Was something given by the nurse in the evening? 
Sentence Some time ago a studnu dug she at their home.  
CQ1 Did she dig something? 
CQ2 Did this happen at home? 
CQ3 Did David dig something recently? 
 
SPR Task: Testing Set 
Sentences and Comprehension Question 
Sentence All night the pages printed the tiskna at work. 
CQ Did this happen at work? 
Sentence Today papers joined the seska in the office. 
CQ Were papers connected by something at home? 
Sentence All evening a strunu tied he to the present. 
CQ Was something tied to a tree? 
Sentence This morning the krida marked the pages with ink. 
CQ Did something mark the pages with paint? 
Sentence All day vegetables mixed the varka in the bowl. 
CQ Did James use something in the kitchen all day? 
Sentence All morning the maid used the prachu in the home. 
CQ Did this happen all evening? 
Sentence Today the lupu used a nurse at the clinic. 
CQ Did a nurse use something? 
Sentence Today the captain turned the kostku on the ship. 
CQ Did something sink the ship? 
Sentence Last weekend the fruit washed the prodna with water. 
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CQ Did something weigh the fruit? 
Sentence Some time ago the brana blocked the road to town.  
CQ Did the brana open the road to town? 
Sentence Last weekend food burned the trouba in the kitchen.  
CQ Was the food burned today? 
Sentence All evening the hracka entertained them at home. 
CQ Were they entertained this morning? 
Sentence All year a paku built Peter with a board. 
CQ Did Peter build something? 
Sentence This morning the man changed the plenu in the 
bathroom. 
CQ Did she change something? 
Sentence Weeks ago the stuhu tied the man to the gift. 
CQ Did they tie something to the gift? 
Sentence Some time ago Mark bought an andku at the shop. 
CQ Did Mark sell something at the shop? 
Sentence In summer the liska ate the eggs at the farm.  
CQ Did this happen in winter? 
Sentence At night him welcomed the lestku with a cold drink. 
CQ Did this happen in the morning? 
Sentence Last winter the chuva cleaned the mess in the room. 
CQ Did this happen last winter? 
Sentence All week the car lent the punchna to the man. 
CQ Was the car lent to the man? 
Sentence Some time ago the lichtku gave he to his wife. 
CQ Did he give something to his wife? 
Sentence This evening she reduced the cenu at the shop. 
CQ Was something raised at the shop? 
Sentence All evening the smetnu mixed they in the bowl.  
CQ Did this happen at noon? 
Sentence In summer David cooked the kachnu with the fire. 
CQ Did he cook something in summer? 
Sentence This evening the room cleaned the sluzka with water.  
CQ Was the room cleaned by someone? 
Sentence Today the dilna delivered food to their home.  
CQ Was the food delivered? 
Sentence All weekend wood chopped the sekra in the forest.  
CQ Did something chop the wood in the forest? 
Sentence In the morning the bunda warmed him at the park. 
CQ Was he warmed by something in the morning? 
Sentence In the morning the kasnu built Katie with stone. 
CQ Did she build something? 
Sentence This evening Patrick wore a plastku in the rain.  
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CQ Did he take off something in the rain? 
Sentence Last evening the propku pressed she on the paper. 
CQ Was something pressed against the wall? 
Sentence This morning she changed the ropu at the garage. 
CQ Was something changed by a man at the garage? 
Sentence In summer the zena bought the dress at the shop. 
CQ Did someone buy a dress? 
Sentence Last weekend the nuts ate the vevku in the tree. 
CQ Were the nuts eaten in the tree? 
Sentence In the morning the babka surprised them with cake. 
CQ Were they surprised with something in the morning? 
Sentence Last month the box sealed the paska in the bedroom. 
CQ Was something broken in the bedroom? 
Sentence In the evening a larku gave we to our friend. 
CQ Were we given something? 
Sentence Last summer Beth grew a papku in the garden. 
CQ Did Beth grow something on the windowsill? 
Sentence Last weekend a chalpu built she at the river. 
CQ Was something built by her at the river? 
Sentence This morning he heated the chatu with a fire. 
CQ Did he build a fire? 
Sentence Last night the skabka cleared the ice on the window. 
CQ Did this happen last night? 
Sentence Some time ago a kvetnu gave he to his wife. 
CQ Did this happen today? 
Sentence Some time ago they closed the mlecnu in the town. 
CQ Did they open something in the town? 
Sentence This evening she cleaned the bavnu with some water. 
CQ Did she burn something? 
Sentence At night her bag took the cizinka to the train.  
CQ Did she take her bag to the bus? 
Sentence Last year the cilka sharpened the knife on the stone. 
CQ Was a knife sharpened? 
Sentence Last weekend a ladku carried they to the room. 
CQ Did they bring something into the room? 
Sentence Last night a path cut the macka in the forest. 
CQ Did something happen in the forest? 
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Appendix H: Debriefing Questionnaire used in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and 
Experiments 1 and 2 
Candidate number________ 
 
Debriefing questionnaire 
 
In the course of this experiment, you have indicated for every sentence whether you 
thought it belonged or did not belong to an artificial grammar system. 
 
Reflecting on your performance, please estimate (in %) your overall level of accuracy in 
these judgements.  
 
I estimate my overall level of accuracy to be …….. %.  
 
 
While performing the tasks of the experiment, did you notice any particular rule or 
regularity? If yes, please indicate what you believe you have noticed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned in the experiment, the sentences were not arbitrary. Reflecting now 
specifically on the form of the foreign word within the sentences, can you recall any 
specific rule or regularity?  
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Page 2: Personal information  
 
 
1. What is your name?  
 
2. Please indicate your age ……….., sex [m / f], and nationality ………..  
 
3. What is your occupation?  
 
If you are a student,  
 
a) type of course (e.g., BA, PhD)  
 
b) subject(s)  
 
c) year  
 
4. What is your language background? Please complete the following:  
 
 
 
Native language(s): 
 
 
 
 
Foreign language(s): 
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Appendix H: Debriefing Questionnaire Used in Experiment 3 
 
Candidate number________ 
 
Debriefing questionnaire 
 
 
While performing the tasks of the experiment, were you actively looking for any rules or 
regularities in the sentences?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What, if anything, did you notice about the sentences? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflecting now specifically on the form of the foreign word within the sentences, can 
you recall any specific rule or regularity?  
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Page 2: Personal information  
 
  
 
1. Please indicate your age ……….., sex [m / f], and nationality ………..  
 
2. Course: 
 
3. Year (e.g., 1st, 2nd, 3rd): 
 
4. What is/are your native language (s)? 
 
 
 
 
5. What foreign languages have you studied (please include level, e.g., Fluent, Beginner, 
GSCE, A-levels, etc.).  
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Appendix J: Pictures used in Pilot Studies 1 and 2, and Experiments 1 and 2 
 
 
Baterka Bedna Brana 
   
Brasna Bylina Britva 
   
Dyka Flinta Flota 
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Guma Hracka Kasa 
   
Kasna Kotva Kocka 
 
 
 
Koza Krava Lecba 
   
Lednicka Lopata Loutka 
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Malta Mycka Myska 
   
Opona Paka Pekarna 
 
 
 
Pilka Pracka Prodejna 
 
 
 
Kladka Reka Salina 
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Salupa Sirka Skola 
   
Sterka Stetka Studna 
   
Susicka Tovarna Trouba 
   
Vrtacka Vyvrtka Zahrada 
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Zehlicka Zkouska Zruda 
   
 
 
Distractor Images 
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Appendix K: Supplementary Tables and Data from Experiment 3 
 
Contents of Appendix K 
K1. Supplementary Data from the Critical Region of the SPR task in Experiment 3 
K2. Supplementary Data from the Pre-critical region of the SPR task in Experiment 3 
K3. Supplementary Data from the Post-critical region of the SPR task in Experiment 3 
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K1: Supplementary Data from the Critical Region of the SPR task 
Untransformed Reaction Times 
 
Inverse-transformed Reaction Times 
 
Log-transformed Reaction Times 
 
Figure A1. Density Plots of Raw, Inverse-transformed and Log-transformed Reaction 
Times of Critical Region Data from Experiment 3 
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Figure A2. QQ plots of Log-transformed RTs of Critical Region Data by Participant 
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Figure A3. QQ plot of Residuals of the Best-fit Model for the Critical Region Data 
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K2: Supplementary Data from the Pre-critical Region 
 
Table A1. 
Average Response Time (ms) for Aware and Unaware Participants across Training and 
Testing Blocks for Segment 3 
  Training Phase  Testing Phase 
Group  Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Transition  Control  Violation 
Aware m 1178.66  1109.45  1128.92  1010.98  967.66  999.88 
 sd 577.37  521.41  504.73  380.71  389.09  414.93 
 
Unaware 
 
m 
 
820.75 
  
772.46 
  
734.25 
  
687.37 
  
712.15 
  
685.12 
 sd 528.34  406.19  397.78  394.25  507.84  386.92 
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Table A2. 
Total Reaction Time (in ms) for All Aware and Unaware Participants for Control and 
Violation Items in Segment 3 
All 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Near Far 
Control  M  831.01 824.88 837.13 818.39 843.62 807.65 854.36 
 SE  23.92 33.30 34.43 34.14 33.58 31.11 36.34 
 SD  458.92 451.65 467.02 463.05 455.46 421.95 492.98 
 
Violation 
 
M 
 
806.61 808.74 804.50 814.78 798.49 764.26 849.20 
 SE  23.79 28.49 38.13 28.77 37.92 28.28 38.05 
 SD  455.68 385.43 517.24 389.17 514.33 384.38 514.71 
Aware 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Near Far 
Control M  1002.75 981.25 1019.73 1005.09 1000.41 987.78 1031.07 
 SE  37.69 83.59 56.65 58.98 47.39 67.40 61.20 
 SD  426.38 442.33 453.16 471.85 379.11 494.43 403.72 
          
Violation M  976.42 988.46 975.45 967.60 985.25 967.31 999.59 
 SE  49.55 70.87 86.43 51.58 64.65 50.57 60.59 
 SD  558.39 375.00 691.43 409.42 677.18 455.76 590.52 
Unaware 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Near Far 
Control M  728.74 723.08 734.41 713.48 744.00 705.89 751.59 
 SE  28.61 40.66 40.42 38.72 42.24 35.24 45.14 
 SD  443.23 445.42 442.83 424.20 462.76 386.02 494.46 
          
Violation M  727.34 736.03 718.66 739.80 714.88 688.08 766.61 
 SE  23.75 33.52 33.78 32.64 34.61 30.78 393.83 
 SD  367.94 367.14 370.08 357.54 379.15 337.18 35.95 
 
  
425 
 
 
Table A3.  
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests in the Pre-critical Region 
Fixed Effect χ2 df p r2 
Test version 4.01 5 .58 .51 
Awareness 6.75 3 .08 .44 
Case 0.58 4 .97 .44 
Syntax 1.09 4 .89 .44 
Locality 9.50 4 .05 .46 
Grammaticality 5.17 4 .27 .46 
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Table A4. 
Results from a Linear Mixed-effects Model Comparing Reaction Time (RT) across 
Control and Violation Items for Segment 3 
      Random Effects 
  Fixed Effects  By 
subject 
 By item 
Parameters  Estimate SE t  SD  SD 
Intercept  2.91 0.05 58.47*  .11  .03 
Aware  -0.02 0.06 -2.05*  –  .04 
Locality  0.03    0.03 1.30  –  – 
Aware: locality  -0.01    0.03 -0.15     
Note. All factors were coded using contrast coding, as follows: Syntax (−.5 = S-V-O, .5 
= O-V-S), Locality (−.5 = near, .5 = far), Case (−.5 = Nominative, .5 = Accusative), 
Gram Model (−.5 = control item, .5 = violation item) formula: RT~aware*locality+ 
(locality|subject) + (aware|item).∗|t| > 2.0, indicating a significant effect (Gelman & 
Hill, 2007). 
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K3. Supplementary Data for Post-Critical Region 
 
Table A5  
Average Response Time (ms) for Aware and Unaware Participants across Training and 
Testing Blocks for Segment 5 
  Training Phase  Testing Phase 
Group  Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Transition  Control  Violation 
Aware m 1748.59  1701.65  1681.36  1488.55  1520.65  1499.42 
 sd 1153.64  1145.54  1210.82  639.24  817.49  689.54 
 
Unaware 
 
m 
 
1598.78 
  
1634.17 
  
1590.24 
  
1509.30 
  
1446.05 
  
1452.59 
 sd 1188.44  1118.57  1121.72  1094.55  1288.91  1126.31 
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Table A6. 
Total Reaction Time (in ms) for All (Aware and Unaware) Participants for Control and 
Violation Items in Segment 5 
All 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Near Far 
Control M  1489.69 1478.36 1501.02 1483.64 1495.74 1497.13 1482.25 
 SE  60.00 75.65 74.19 62.23 102.19 70.28 71.00 
 SD  1150.96 1026.11 1006.39 844.08 1386.20 953.35 963.14 
          
Violation M  1445.63 1422.99 1470.27 1451.59 1441.67 1436.15 1467.11 
 SE  52.01 60.40 84.84 78.75 68.17 78.45 68.52 
 SD  997.79 819.31 1150.78 1068.22 924.66 1064.18 929.46 
Aware 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Near Far 
Control M  1520.65 1498.94 1542.36 1437.28 1604.02 1519.82 1521.48 
 SE  72.54 109.26 96.31 82.49 118.63 112.87 91.64 
 SD  691.44 874.05 770.51 659.88 949.02 902.99 733.13 
          
Violation M  1475.53 1415.14 1535.92 1427.72 1523.34 1400.64 1550.42 
 SE  691.44 86.70 86.84 75.30 96.87 80.61 730.22 
 SD  61.12 693.61 694.75 602.41 774.96 644.91 691.28 
Unaware 
Participants 
 Total Nom Acc SVO OVS Near Far 
Control M  1473.34 1469.21 1477.47 1533.69 1412.99 1476.36 1470.33 
 SE  63.13 100.19 77.28 84.55 93.76 89.05 89.82 
 SD  978.02 1097.55 846.58 926.23 1027.04 975.44 983.91 
          
Violation M  1431.02 1416.51 1445.53 1468.98 1393.06 1452.43 1409.61 
 SE  72.88 80.49 121.80 114.11 898.73 112.26 93.10 
 SD  1129.00 881.74 1334.21 1250.00 82.04 1229.70 1019.91 
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Table A7. 
Summary of Likelihood Ratio Tests in the Post-critical Region 
Fixed Effect χ2 df p r2 
Test version 1.18 3 .76 .50 
Awareness 0.60 1 .44 .51 
Case 0.12 3 .99 .50 
Syntax 5.57 3 .13 .51 
Locality 2.13 3 .55 .51 
Grammaticality 1.63 3 .65 .51 
Spillover 0.21 1 .64 ˂.001 
 
 
 
